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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I propose a rule of pred1cate-11nk~ns, which
accounts for the distribution of non-argument maximal projections.
These XPs are considered predicates, and are treated 8S one-place
syntactic functions, requiring completion, or saturation. This
saturatiun is achieved by linking each predicative XP to an argument
XP, its syntactic subject. "Subject" is always defined relative to
a particular XP, and not 8S "subject of an SIt. The predicate-linking
rule, which is a condition on well-formedness at S-structure, defines
the syntactic conditions under which such linking takes place. There
are two major advantages of representing S-structure in terms of
syntactically defined subjects and predicates. In the first place,
it allows us to account for constraints on phrase-structure not
subsumed under X-bar theory. In particular, the phrase-structure
rule 5 -~ NP INFL VP becomes redundant, and the occurrence of both
small clause and main clause predicates is accounted for by the
same principle. The predicate-linking rule should be seen as
complementary to the theta-criterion; the latter is a constraint on
the distribution of argument XPs, whilst the former is a constraint
on the distribution of non-argument, or predicative XPs. In the
second place, this representation makes available a simple algorithm
which maps from S-structure, via LF, to the semantic component,
using syntactic information to build a semantic representation in
which semantic 81Jbj ect-predicate relations are encoded. Chapters
III and IV of this dissertation discuss how it is ensured that a
semantically appropriate argument is the subject of a particular
XP. We see that there are general lexical principles which dictate
that certain thematic arguments will always be interpreted as the
subject of the maximal projections of the lexical heads which select
them. We also see how the interaction between the lexicon and the
syntactic and semantic components accounts for the assymetries between
subjects and objacts. Chapter IV argues that the mQvement of arguments
(1. e. cases where the trace left by Move- oC is A-bound) and the
insertion of pleonastic9 are syntactic mechanisms which have the
effect of providing subjects for predicates which are not assigned
one by lexical principles. Chapter V distinguishes between two forms
of syntactic predicates: primary, or clausal predicates, and
secondary predicates, or small clauses. Chapter VI analyzes the
structural properties of NPs and S's, and suggests why, unlike the
other maximal projections, these XPs which may be predicative, may
also be, and in most cases are, theta-marked arguments.
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CHAPTER I
1.1 A fundamental qtlesti,:>n which has exercised linguists e~pecially
over the last 25 or so years is hew we know when a string of words
constitutes a syntactically well-formed sentence of a particular
language. An attempt at developing a grammar of a language, L,
is an attempt to describe rules which will separate the syntactically
well-formed sequences from the ill-formed ones. Chomsky (1957)
develops a model for a transformational grammar. This proposes
that the syntactic rules of a grammar are basically of two types,
the phrase structure rules and the transformational rules. Phrase
structure rules are rewrite rules which can be understood as
recursive definitions defining a set of syntactically well-formed
strings for a language. The basic symbol to be defined 1s S, (or
sentence) which is reWTitten
9
(1) 5 ---) NP !NFL VP
and then NP and VP are themselves defined, for example
(2) VP --~ v (NP) (NP) '*(PP)
where VP 1s reWTitten as a verb followed optionally by no more than
two NPs and an indefinite number of PPs. V is a terminal symbol,
,
and thus cannot be reWTitten, except as a lexical item of the cate-
gory V, e.g., hit, ~, etc. Non-terminal categories are rewritten
until there are no non-terminal constituents remaining. The trans-
formational rules allow specific permutations of the output of
the phrase structure component, relating by transformations pairs
of sentences like
10
(3) a. John fed the baby.
b. The baby was fed by John.
The principle of transformations was the f1rslt major simplification
of the phrase structure component. Because some structures can be
formed by permuting t!,le base structures, thE~ work of the
phrase structure grammar was simplified; d ~lhole set of structures
need not be generated by the rules. The advuntage of this is twofold.
In the first place there are many different !iyntactically well-formed
sequences of English and it is a major empir:lcal task to develop
a rewrite system which generates all of them. The effect of trans-
formations is to allow the system to generatte only a basic set and
to allow rules of permutation to generate th,e other structures. In
the second place, the phrase structure grammar is basically descrip-
tive. It describes by recursive definition which structures are
well-formed but it gives no explanations of why this is so. Trans-
formational rules are an attempt to make certain generalizations as
to the types of syntactic permutations which are available, and as
such make a step towards explanation.
,
The movement towards the simplification of the phrase structure
component is one which has continued. 'However, transformational rules
did 30t have che desired results. Ie ~;as seen that the generalizacic~s
~de ~y cransfo~a~ional rules ~ere a~so ~asically descripcive, and
did not have explanatory torce. Fur:he~ore, i~ order :or the rul=s
to work, they had to be so complex, and co have such power chat ic
was not possible even to make insightful generalizations as to what
rules were possible rules of a language. The next step was a change
of focus, in an attempt to deal with this problem. Transformational
rules were simplified eventually to a single rule, move-category, or
move-«. The phrase structure component (much simplified also) and
the transformational component were no longer required to generate
all and only ~ell-formed strings of a language. Instead they may
over-generate, and a modular system of constraints rules out the
unacceptable sequences. These constraints include principles of
case-assignment, localitity conditions on movement, conditions on
distribution of argument NPs,etc.
The goals of generative grammarians thlJS include the following:
(1) to develop a grammar which will describe (i.e., generate) the
~ell-formed sentences of a language and (2) in the process to simplify
and develop the existing model of the grammar so that it does ~ot
merely describe, but also explains why all and only the well-formed
syntactic strings are ~ell-formed. It is hoped that the general
explanations developed under (2) will not be language specific, bue
that we can idencify various universal properties of natural languages
which will also constitute part of an explanation pf the cross-
linguistic processes of child language-acquisition. These general
principles will form pare of a Universal Grammar (UG). I: is hypothe-
sized that as ~vell as identifying gen~ral ?ri~ci?les,~e ~1l1 also
Ii
be able to identify various parameters at which languages must make
a choice between two options, for example, Rule R applies/does not
apply in this language. Thus by isolating a limited number of
parameters at each of which an independent choice must be made, we
will be able to account for the differences between languages and
explain how a few general principles such as the generalized trans-
formation move-~ can apply in a wide variety of languages, but with
such different effects. The general principle which we will be
discussing in this dissertation is that predicates must have subjects,
and we will discuss various parameters at which languages make
different choices, resulting in different rules for the realiza-
tion of subjects in each language.
Work on the simplification of the phrase structure component
took a great leap forward in 1977 with the publication of "A Theory
of X-bar Syntax~' by Ray Jackendoff If The basic principle of X-bar
syntax is that rewrite rules np~d not be category-specific (for
example (2) refers only to VPs) but can be stated in category-
neutral terms. Rewrite rules are to be stated in terms of XPs,
e. g.,
12
( 4) a.
b.
XP ---)
X' --~
x' .....
x .....
VP, NP', AP and PP, all have basically the structure defined in (48).
They are each projections of a constituent of the same category.
The lower-level constituent itself is always a projection of a
lexical head of the same category. VP (or V") is thus a projection
of V' and V· a projection of V. A maximal projection is defined in
the theory as the constituent which appears only on the left, and
never on the right of the arrow in the set of rewrite rules in ~).
Stowell (1981) attempts to refine Jackendoff's system even further,
by suggesting that properties of phrase-structure rules can be
p~ed1cted from other principles of the grammar, notably rules
governing case-assignment.
X-bar theory is concerned with the internal structure of
maximal projections. The problem which I discuss in this disser-
tation concerns not the internal structure of these constituents,
but how they may be concatenated in a sequence of a language. This
involves a discussion of the one remaining phrase structure rule
which is not immediately brought under X-bar theory; and that is
rule (1) which states that clauses must consist of a subject and
verbal predicate.
Maximal projections can be divided into two types, argu~ent XPs
and non-argument XPs. The distribution of argument XPs is governed
by a rule proposed in Chomsky (1981). This states that all argument
XPs must be arguments of (=assigned a theta-role by) some lexical
item and it is set out in the theta-criterion, clause (2). The
claim of this dissertation is that there is a complementary rule
which governs the distribution of non-argument XPs. These XPs ~re
to be understood as syntactic predicates, i.e., open functions,
and thei.r distribution is governed by a rule stating that every
syntactic predicate must be closed by being linked to an appropriate
13
••
•
•
syntactic argument, to be called its formal subject. This rule is
called the predicate-linking rule and it is a condition of well-
formedness on syntactic strings.
The advantages of this rule are several. In the first place,
it accounts for the distribution of predicat1ve XPs, which 1s its
prtmary purpose. In this analysis both clausal and secondary
predicates are accounted for by tile same rule. In (5)
14
b. Mary ate carrots raw.•
(5) a. Mary saw John
•
•
•
•
•
both the clausal predicate !8W John and the non-clausal raw are
linked to subjects. "Subject" is defined as subject of a predicate,
and the effects of the phrase structure rule (1) are subsumed as
a special case of predicate-linking_ (1) states that clauses have
subjects; the predicate-linking rule states that inflected (or main
clause) predicates have subjects, along with all other predicates.
An S is redefined as a particular type of (clausal) predication
1
relation. A second advantage of representing the syntactic string
in terms of syntactic predicates and subjects is that it makes a
mapping from the syntactic to the semautic representation very
straightforward. Subj'ect-pred1cate telat10ns are among the relations
to be represented in the semantic interpretation of a syntactic
string. While a representation of syntactic (or formal)
,
subjects and predicates 1s not isomorphic to the semantic represen-
tation, the algorithm mapping between them is simple.
1.2 The model of the grammar in which I am working is basically
that of Chomsky (1981, 1982). It 1s set out diagrammatically in
15
(6~ (Lexicon)
D-structure
(move.. rA )
S-structure
Phonological
Representation
(QR etc.)
LFCLogical Form)
-----.- Semantic
Representation
(SR)
D-structure is the level at which underlying grammatical relations
are represented. S-structure is the level at which surface grammatical
relations are represented, but with D-structure relations encoded
by means of traces. Move-o\ ,the single transformational rule,maps
between the two levels. S-structure is the input to the Phonological
Representation and to LF, a syntactic representation at which
quantifiers are assigned scope, and certain syntactic ambiguities
are disambiguated. It is also the level at which thematic relations
are checked. LF is the input to the semantic representation (SR).
1.3 The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter II
I shall define the syntactic relation of pre~ication, and the terms
predicate and subject, and I will formulate the rule of pred1cate-
linking, a condition on well-formedness at S-structure, and show
how this accounts for the core of well-formed syntactic configurations.
In Chapter III, I discuss the relation between the syntactic and seman-
tic notions of predication and propose an algorithm for a partial
mapping between LF and SR. I then discuss the simple&t method of
satisfying the predicate-linking rule. When the head selects a
thematic argument which, because of its semantic nature, is auto-
matically "external." i.e. syntactically realized outside the maximal
projection of the head, this argument will be the syntactic subject
of that maximal projection. The predicate will then have its subject
available at D-structure. Certain properties of such D-structure
external arguments are discussed including the fact that there are
semantic and syntactic assymetr1es between external and internal
arguments (subject and object). It is argued that all arguments are
selected by a lexical head, and these 8ssymetries are due to
S-structure and semantic rules of interpretation and not to assyme-
tries between the arguments within lexical representations. Chapter
IV discusses what happens when a head does not have a lex:f.cally
determined external argument, but has no arguments or only internal
arguments. At D-structure the maximal projection of the head has
no external argument to be linked to. In order that the S-structure
be well-formed an external syntactic argument must be provided, and
this occurs in one of two ways. In the first place, an argument of
the head is moved by move-a( to the external position. It
1s suggested that all cases of arguments being promoted to subject
position are instances of 'move-~ applying to ensure that an empty
16
subject position be filled, so that the predicate-linking rule may
be satisfied. If this transformation does not take place, a pleo~
nastic may be inserted at S-strl1cture to satisfy the requirement
that there be a formal subject. The conditions under which this
may occur vary from language to language. Chapter V discusses the
differences between clausal (or primary) predication and secondary
predication and S is defined as an instance of primary predication.
Chapter VI suggests an analysis of those constituents which may be
arguments -- i.e., NP, S' and S, explaining why they do not require
linking to a formal subject.
17
FOOTNOTES
(1) Note that this is a different view from that developed by
Stowell (1981, to appear) who argues that there are "subj ects
across categories". NP, AP, VP and PP as well as S tmmed1ately
dominate subject positions. "Subject" is thus understood
as the specifier of XIV. It 1s defined by the rule
18
(i) X" --~ SUBJ Xl Modifier
which is itself an instantiation of the generalized phrase
structure rule
(i1) x·' --~ SPECIFIER X' Modifier
Th~s differs crucially from OU% analys1s in that for Stowell,
the subject of a category 1s within the maximal projection
of that category, whereas for us, the subject of an XP must
be external to the XP. It also follows from our definition
of the subject-predicate relation, and from the definition
of S as an instance of clausal predication (the precise
definition will be given in Chapter V) that S is not a pro-
jection of any category. This contrasts with e.g., Jackendoff
(1979), Marantz (1980), who propose that S is the maximal
projection of V.
ICHAPTER II
In this chapter we will argue that a correct analysis of phrase
structure configurations at S-structure is in terms of syntactically
defined subjects and predicates. A predicate is an open one-place
syntactic function requiring saturation, or closure by an argument.
The syntactic unit which may be a predicate 1s a maximal projection
(XP). All maxtmal projections are one-place functions which'require
closure, but an XP 1s a ~redicate only when it is closed by a syntac-
tical1y external argument, i.e., an argument which is not c-commanded
by the head of the XP. When an XP is closed by an external argument
it is a predicate of or predicated of that argument. The argument
is subject of the XP. APs, VPs and PPs must always be predicated
of an argument. NP and S' may be predicated of an argument, but
they may be closed internally without involving any mechanism
external to the XP. The paradigm case of predication is the simple
declarative sentence, where the VP is predicated of an NP, (called
[NP, 5], the first NP of the sentence) for example [[John]NP
[saw Mary]vp] where the VP is predicated of the [NP, S] John.
NP and 5', when they are internally closed have the status
of arguments, and as such their dis~ribut1on 1s restricted by the
theta-criterion, which applies to all, and only to, arguments.
A subject of a predicate must be an argument, but not all arguments
19
are subjects for example Mary in the sentence just given. We
,
will discuss in Chapter VI what it 1s about the structure of s'
and NP which allows them to be internally closed, and thus to be
arguments as well as predicates.
The internal structure of each type of maximal projection is
restricted by the principles of X-bar theory interacting with the
lexical properties of the individual lexical heads. The problem
which we will consider here 1s that of defining where predicative
XPs can occur. The distribution of XPs which are not predicative
is governed by the principles of theta-theory (clause 2 of the theta-
criterion), which state that arguments can appear only in theta-
marked po~itions, and that only one argument can occur in each
theta-marked position. Other principles indicate for configurational
languages what structural positions these arguments can have. For
example, it has been suggested (Stowell 1981) that 1n English
case-assignmentlsonly to adjacent NPs. The distribution of predi-
cat1ve NPs has to be accounted for separately. An XP which is
a predicate of something by definition has to have an external
argument to be a predicate of. A given configuration will be an
acceptable S-structure for a sentence of a language L only if all
the non-argument XPs have been properly saturated by external
arguments. The question which must be answered is under what
conditions can an XP whi~h is allowed, or required to be predicated
of something, be predicated of a given argument, and thus be inter-
preted as a saturated, closed, function. The conditions which are
syntactically defined, will be set out in section 2.2. when we describe the
rule of predicate-linking which acts as a syntactic condition on
acceptability for S-structure -- analogous to the way in which the
theta-criterion is a condition on acceptability at LF. This rule
will account for not only the distribution of "main clause"
20
predicative XPs which combine with NPs to form 59 (instances of
what we will call pr~ary predication) but also for the distri-
but10n of the "small clause" XPs, or secondary predicates. It
is an argument in favor of the predicate-linking rule, that it
can account for the structural properties of both types of clauses
in a single rule. Before we go on to discuss this, we will examine
more closely the definition of predicate.
2.1 The relations "subject-of X" and "predicate of y" are 8yntactic
relations defined at S-structure. An XP which 1s predicated of an
argument is termed a predicate, and an XP which has something predi-
cated of it is the subject of that predicate and is termed a subject.
Predicate and subject, too, then are syntactic terms, dencting syntac-
tic constituents a If X is a predicate of Y then Y ie the subject
of X, and Y saturates the function denoted by the XP.
The term predicate is used from the semantic point of view as
1in Frege. According to Frege, a grammatical predicate is a particu-
lar type of function expression denoting a function and it has
certain properties common to all such expres~ions. A function,
in the Fregean sense, is open, incomplete,or unsaturated; in order
that it be closed, completed, or saturated the empty place must
be filled by an argument. In a simple arithmetic function-expression,
the empty place 1s marked by a variable and the argument which will
complete the function 1s denoted by the name of a number. Thus in
I
(1) 3x. 2
21
the variable!: marks the place where the name of a number will be
inserted to complete the expression. Frege points out that the
expression has two parts: the "sign of the argument"t and the lIexpres-
sion of the function". The distinction is tmportant because the
two parts are disstm11ar; the argument is "complete in itself"
whereas the function is not, and r~quires saturation by an argument.
In
(2) Berlin is a capital city.
the predicate is a capital city takes a name, in this case Berlin,
to saturate it and make it a complete expression.
The syntactic predicate which we are concerned with 1s similar,
but not ident1ca~ to Frege's grammatical predicate. Syntactic
predicates too are incomplete expressions requiring the name of an
argument to complete them. In a simple sentence
(3) John saw Mary.
the VP pr~d1cate saw Mary is an incomplete expression which requires
an argument John to complete it. However, a syntactic predicate
differs from "grammatical predicate" in that syntactic predicates
are always monadic (i.e. one-place) functions, whereas for Frege,
grammatical predicates may be polyadic. In
(4) Berlin is the capital of Germany.
22
the predicate is the capital of Germany is a one-place predicate
while is the capital of is a two-place predicate requiring the
name of a city and the name of a country for saturation. The
counterpart of this type of predicate in the government-binding
framework is the lexical head, which take arguments; the number and
nature of which are specified by theta-roles, or thematic roles
assigned by the head. For example, the verbal head ~ assigns an
agent and a patient theta-role, and can be considered as a two-
place function requiring saturativn by two arguments of the appro-
priate thematic type. Thu3 whenever!!! is used, as in (3) above,
it is a necessary condition for its acceptability that see is
saturated by an agent and patient argument. Within the government-
binding theory, the representation of a sentence in terms of heads
.",
and arguments 1s part of its LF representation, and the condition
that all lexical heads must be saturated by the appropriate thematic
arguments is part of the theta-criterion, a condition on LF. Knowing
the number and type of theta-roles that a head assigns is a matter
of lexical knowledge. The thematic properties of lexical heads are
idiosyncratic, and have to be learned as part of the process of
learning "how to use the word". Lexical heads are thougllt of as
entered in a mental lexicon, and with each entry is the particular
information one needs in order to use the word. Thus a (partial)
lexical entry for give might look like this:
23
(5) give.. ·
, v (dative)· agent patient goal
••
I
indicating that the verbal head give assigns three theta-roles and
thus requires three argument~ that of agent, patient and goal. The
information that it is a dativ,e verb tells us that these arguments
may be represented in one of two ways: either with a direct object
and a prepositional object as in John gave the book to Mary, or with
two NPs marked with objective case, as in John gave Mary the book.
In contrast to this, the structure of the syntactic predicate
is determined only by the rules of syntax and has no connection with
any semantic or idiosyncratic properties of the head. A maximal
projection 1s a one-place function whose structural properties are
determined by purely formal rules of syntax. However, it requires
saturation by an argument in exactly the same way as grammatical
24
predicates or lexical heads -- do. We have said that the theta-
criterion is a condition on LF which says, in part, that all
lexical functions must be saturated. The constraint on predicate-
linking is an analogous condition on S-structure saying that all
syntactic functions must be saturated. VP, AP, and PP require
saturation by an external syntactic argument, which they are predi-
2
cated of, and NP and S' , while they are allowed in some circum-
stances to be predicated of subjects, need not be sclturated 1n this
way. They can be closed internally, without involving anything
external to the maximal projection itself, in which case, as we
said above, they are arguments.
Examples of each of the four lexical categories (NP, AP, pp
I
and VP) acting as predicates are given in (6).
•• (6) a. John [gave Mary the book]vp
b. Bill [eats carrots [raw]AP]vp
•
c. He [drinks tea [with sugar]pp]vp
d. She [thinks him [a fool]NP]vp
25
•
•
•
•
•
•
In each of these examples in (6) the maximal VP 1s a ·syntactic
predicate of the [NP, S]. In addition, in (b)-(d) the VP contains
maximal projections of each of the other lexical categories, the
AP raw, the pp with sugar, and the NP a fool, each of which are
themselves predicated of an NP also within the VP. It is important
to notice that the XP and its subject may, but do not always, form
a constituent. The VP and its NP subject always form a constituent,
.. and we will argue below that the NP predicate and its subject in
(6d) also form a constituent. 1~ese are the instances of what we
called primary predication. The AP and PP predicates in (6b) and
(6c), though they must have structural subjects, do not form consti-
tuents with" these subjects. These predicates are termed secondary
predicates or "small clauses", and the relation between them and
their subjects we will call secondary predication. The subjects of
the secondary predicates in these examples are arguments of the
verbs which govern them. This will turn out to be a defining
characteristic of secondary predication the subject of a secondary
I
predicate must be assigned a theta-role by another lexical head.
Thus carrots is the patient argument of eats and teh the patient
argument of drinks. By contras~ him 1s not an argument of thinks,
rather the whole constituent him a fool is the argument of the
••
•
verb in (6d). This sketch of an analysis of secondary predication
will be developed in Chapter V.
We can represent, formally, the predicate structure of XPs
using Quine's notation (introduced in Elementary Logic and Methods
26
of Logic, eds. 1-3). He uses a circled numeral or l.Y to indicate
•
•
the places in a predicate expression where a free variable, or name,
must be inserted to form a sentence from the predicate expression.
Bearing in mind that -- as the examples of secondary predication
show -- not all completed predicate expressions are sentential, we
can nonetheless represent maximal projections as predicate-schemata
with circled numerals indicating the argument position. Thus the
examples of predicate XPs in (6) will be represented as
(7) a. (i) give Mary the book
b. cD raw
•
c. (!) with sugar
d. (f) a fool.
• Because the structure of all syntactic predicates
•
is determined by the same formal rules, no syntactic predicate will
have more than one empty argument position to be filled.
I
2.2 The rule of predicate-linking
3The syntactic rule of predication, or predicate-linking defines
,
I
the conditions under which an XP may be predicated of a given
argument. It is stated in (8):
••
(8) Rule of Predicate-linking (for English)
a. Every non-theta-marked XP must be linked at
S-structure to an argument which it immediately 4
c-commands and which immediately c-commands it .
b. Linking is from right to left (i.e., a subject
precedes its predicate).
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We can therefore define the relationship X is a predicate of Y,
or X is predicated of Y, in the following way:
• (9) X is predicated of Y (is a predicate of Y) if andonly if X is linked to Y under (8).
•
•
•
•
•
and conversely:
(10) X is the subject of Y if and only if Y is linked
to X under (8).
(8) is divided into two clauses because each clause is of a different
status in U.G. It is hypothesized that clause (a) may be universal,
whereas (b) is language specific and may have no status in U.G.,
but instead it may follow independently from the language-specific
properties. It is clear that there 1s a directionality constraint
in English, but this may follow from other facts, such as its being
a head-final language at the level of X" expansion. At the other
extreme, in Walpiri there is evidence that (8a) holds, which we
would expect if it is a principle of UG, but there .'is no directioll-
ality contraint. This 1s to be expected in a non-configurational
••
•
language, and will follow from whatever factors allow Walpiri its
(virtually) free word-order.
The predication relationship is an 8ssymetric one. Configura-
tiona like (11), where two XPs are each linked to the other, are
impossible.
2£
• (11) •XP
I
i
Xl'
"
•
"Regressive" linking 88 in (12) is a180 impo8sible:
(12) IXP
•
I
(11) is of course ruled out in English by the directionality
clause (b), but a deeper claim is at stake; (11) and (12) are both
ruled out by the properties of the predication relation. (8a) states
that an XP must be linked to an argument, which 18 defined in the
theory as a closed, i.e., non-pred1cat1ve, XP. We can state the
following principle, derived from (8a) and the definition of
argument:
(13) If X 1s predicated of Y, then Y is not predicated of
anything.
(11) and (12) both follow from this.
A further assymetry between subject and object follows from
the structural properties of XPs. As we showed above, an XP must
take only one argument, which 1s to say it can be predicated of
only one subject. A subject has no such structural restrictioD8,
and may be the subject of more than one predicate, for example:
(14) John WTecked the car drunk
where John is the subject of wrecked the car and drunk. We shall
see in Chapter V that there ~y be semantic restrictions on subjects
taking multiple predicates. but if the structural constraint of
mutual c-~ommand 18 met then a subject may be subject of more than
one predicate.
The status of the relation of predication in a theory of language
acquisition 1s ~portant. I shall argue in the next chapter that
it 1s possible to interpret a subset of syntactically defined
predicates of subjects as denoting expressions which are semantic
predicates of those subjects. However, the syntactic relation is
not defined 1n terms of semantic notions, nor is it taken to be a
syntactic primitive. Rather, the relation pred1cate-of is definable
syntactically, making crucial use of the concept of c-command. This
is a concept which 1s central to various syntactic relations,
including anaphoric relations and instances of coreference.
Government, too, is a particular restricted form of the c-command
relation c-command by a lexical head. Thus a child can grasp the
relation of predication by applying the previously given configurational
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concept of c-command to structures which are preeented to hfm
for interpretation.
2.3 The remainder of this chapter shows that (8) accounts for the
basic predication relations in EDglish. Before going on to this,
we will mention briefly where the l~1t8 of (8) 11e. As we have
already remarked. NP and S't when they are in theta-marked positions,
are not predicated of anything. As (8)-(12) indicate, it is
necessary that some XPs are capable of being internally closed,
and do Dot therefore require linking. If this were not the case, it
would be impossible to avoid 80me fo~ of the c{rcu1arity of (11),
where a predicate XP was itself linked to a predicate XP, violating
(13). it 1s logically possible for a language to avoid this
circularity by linking all IPs to pleonastic8, but I know of no
instances of this. The distribution of pleonastics 1s highly
restricted, as we see in Chapter IV.
The condition that theta-marked XPs do not have to be linked
has several interesting extensions. We have instances of a restricted
class of PPs -- locative PPs -- appearing in what seems to be
subject position, e.g. (16).
(15) In the armchair j.s a comfortable place to sit.
In English this construction is marginal, but Torrego (to appear)
argues that the use of locative PP "subj ects" in Spanish and Catalall,
though restricted, is much more widespread than 1n English. In
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&~g11sh these PPs appear only with copulas and with raising verbs
{which we shall argue later to be a special type of copula. Where
a non-copula verb 1s u8e~ the PP 1s understood as topica11zed,
e.8. (16):
(16) In the armchair sits my grandmother.
It 1s possible to analyze (15) 8S an instance of topicalization
analagaue to (16) or 8S Hillinbotham (personal communication)
suggests. (15) may be a reduced form of (17):
(17) [the place which is] in the armchair 1s a comfortable
place to sit.
so that the constituent in [NP , S] position is in fact underlyingly
a nominal. It remains to be seen whether the Spanish and Catalan
cases can also be analyzed as analagous to (17).
Another extension of the condition that theta-marked XPs are
not linked involves some APs. Prenominal APa such as blue, tall,
old,as in the blue balloon, the tall man, the old house, are not
linked to XPs at all. We shall argue in Chapter VI that this 18
because they are semantically and structurally part of the NP which
immediately dominates them and so "share" in its theta-role.
They therefore appear at S-~tructure as theta-marked and therefore
are not subject to (8).
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We shall also discusl in Chapter VI the structure of PPs which
appear not to be linked to anything, for example:
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(18) a.
b.
c.
It rained for three hours
Be buttered the bread with a carv10a knife
She flew the spaceship to the Evenina Star
An extension of (8) allows linking in certain c1rcumetancee to
INPL. and in the examplee in (18) the PPe are linked in this way.
2.4 The paradigm cases of linking are 35 follows:
(19) a. NP"'" VP
saw Mary
b. NP6WNP
s
~~
John /vp~
V ~S
I /"".considers NP NP
Ma~Y a JeniUS
c. NPfll'WAP
SNP~~VP
T/~s/""-considers NP AI
I IMary fooliah
d. HI' ~ pp
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I
the aarb-Ie out of the house
In each of these sentences, to begin with, the VP 1. linked to
[NP, S] -- a structural te~ denoting the first NP in the sentence.
(Note that in all these cases the NP which the predicate is linked
to is interpreted as its "semllnt1c" subject. How and why this is
'Mill be discussed in Chapter III.) NP and VP c-command each other;
they are syntactic sisters. In examples (b-d) there are instances
of the other categories linked by (8) to NP subjects and in each
case NP and XP c-command each other. Early attempts (e.g., Rein-
hardt 1976) to formulate the relation of c-command made reference
to branching nodes and ~ was said to dominate ~ if and only if
the first branching node dominating 0( al~o dominatedtr. Here we
,
follow Aoun and Sportiche (1982) in assuming that the proper ex-
pression of the relation of c-command refers not to branching nodes
Ibut to maximal projections; ~ c-commands ~ in the following
circumstances:
(20) Definition of the c-command relation
0( c-cOII88Dds 1/ if and only 1f every maximal
projection dominating 0( also d01Dlnatell,8.
Mutual c:-c:oaaand, 1.e. 0<.. c-eoaaandl fJ and ~ c-co1llll8nde 0( lIleane
that ~ and ~ .hare all maximal projectioDs. 1.e. there 111 no
maximal projection dominating C'(. which doe. not a180 dOlDiDate ~
and there 1. no maximal projection dominatingf' which does not also
dominate 0( • It 1. clear that the relation of mutual c-co1lllWlDd
holds between subjects and predicates 1n examples (19a-d). In fact t
these subjects and predicates would c-command each other whether
"c-co1llll8nd" was defined in terms of branching nodes or IIUlximal
proejct1ons. In each of the above examples the first branching
node dominating ~ach subject and predicate i8 a maximal projection.
However. there are examples of predicate-linking where, according
to the Aoun-Sportiche definition, subject and predicate c-command
each other but where according to earlier definitions they w011Id not
do so. These examples show that the ·relevant configurational relation
between subjects and predicates is that of being dominated by all
the same maximal projections. Aoun and Sportiche have independent
justification for arguing that the relation of c-command 1s to be
defined as they suggest -- the theoretical reason is that maximal
,
projection is already defined within the theory whereas branching-
node as a theoretical term is needed nowhere in the syntax other
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than in the definition of c-eommand. The examples cited here (21-22)
are further support for the clatm that the relation defined by
Aoun and Sport1che 18 the relevant one.
The cases we are concerned with involve predicate. which form
a subset of the "811811 claulee." Here I am goinl to give certain
arguments for a particular structural representation; a full discussion
of this analysis of small clauses including its repercussions for the
theta-criterion follows in Chapter V.
We have sentences 11ke
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(21) a. John painted the car red
b. Bl11 ate carrots raw
c. Tom met Mary drunk
The suggested representations for (2la-b) are given in (22):
(22) a.
b.
s
VP
~"=;
r I
painted the car
s
~
NP
I
B1ll
~
. I
ale carrots raw
------..
AP
I
red
The two sentences are both examples of an AP predicated of an NP
within the VP (i.e. what we have called secondary predicates) but
they have different structural representations because they are of
different semantic types. With each type 1s correlated certain proper-
ties and restrictions. I shall argue in Chapter V that restrictions
on chese predicates hold at all three levels of the grammar ,._-
S-structure, LF and the semantic representation, with the res:trict1on
at S-structure being the rule of predicate-linking. -- but here it
will suffice to state the reasons for representing the structures
as in (22).
MUch work has been done in distinguishing the various types
of predicates (e.g. Halliday (1967), Levin and Simpson (1981),
Simpson (1982». The (a) example has been termed an instance of a
resultative predicate; the predicate red is predicated of the direct
object of the verb, here the house, and describes the result of the
action described by the verb, the effect that this action has on what
is denoted by the direct-object. In (21a) the action denoted by the
verb 1s that of painting, and it has an effect on the thing denoted
by the object NP; it turns it red. There 1s clearly a close connec-
tion between the verb and the predicate because of the meaning of the
predicate; only when the verbal head of a VP denotes a change of
state can a resultative predicate be predicated of the verb's direct
object. It 1s the verb which dictates whether or not a resultative
predicate is possible; we can see it as one of the verb's lexical
properties that it allows for an optional resultative predicate.
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This close relation between verb and predicate is expressed by
representing (21a) as in (22a), with the resultative predicate hung
from the VP as an immediate sister of V, and governed by it. Resul-
tative predicates, like thematic arguments of a verb, are selected
by the semantic nature of the verb and are represented at S-structure
ae ~ed1ate sisters of the verb. (Note, by the way, that it 1s not
only the verbal heads which take predicates -- 85 we will discuss in
Chapter V -- other lexical heads such as nominals have these proper-
ties. For example:
(23) The painting of the house red surprised us.
A further indication of the close relation between verb and resulta-
tive predicate comes from Icelandic, where resultat1ve predicates
occur with the same semantic restrictions as in English. In Icelandic
a predicate of this type may be compounded with the verb.
(24) Eg hV1t-;rofi1 fot1n
I white washed the clothes
"I washed the clothes till they were white."
Only resultat1ve predicates can be compounded in this way. Non-
resultatives e.g. the Icelandic equivalents to (21b-c) -- can
never appear in this fo\~. The adjectival predicate appearing 1n
the VP of (21b) has been termed a depietive predicate, and it describes
the state of the thing denoted by the direct object of the verb
(the [NF, VP]) at the time when the action denoted by the verb is
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occurring. ThuS!!! in (21b) denotes a state which is predicated of
the object denoted by the [NP, VP] -- 1.e., the carrots, at the time
when they are being eaten. A paraphrase of (2 b) might be
(25) B1ll ate the carrot~ when they were raw.
This paraphrase 1s tmportant because when the verb denotes not a
single action but a habitual one, the depietive predicate can be
interpreted as a conditional.
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(26) 8. Bill eats carrots raw.
b. Bill eats carrots when they are raw.
The ambiguity of the paraphrase between "Bill eats carrots which
are raw", and "Bill eats carrots only when they are raw" highlights
this. The semantic properties of depict1ve predicates are complex
-- they will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V. What it is
important to note here is that there is no close connection between
the verb and the depictive predicates which we saw to exist between
verb and resultative predicate. In the case of depictives the semantic
role of the predicate differs depending on the aspect of the verb
-- as contrasts between (218) and (26a) show. Contrasts like
(27) a.
b.
John ate the meat raw/*tasty
John ate the meat salted/*salty
••
•
indicate that only certain types of states can be predicated of the
object denoted by the [NP. VP] and that the restrictions do not
seem to result f ..~m the semantic properties of the verb. This
contrasts with the data on resultatives where a certain type of
verb allows the possibility of a predicate interpreted as a resul-
tative and the constraints on what the predicate can be are the
constraints of the real world. The anomaly of
(28) John painted the house scorched (where scorched 1s a
resultat1ve predicated of
the house)
1s due to the real-world fact that scorched 1s not a result of
painting. Real-world facts donft account for t&e ungrammatical
examples in (21) -- there 18 nothing in the world which makes it
possible to eat meat when it 1s raw or aalted but impossible when
it is tasty or salty. The structural representation in (27a) i.a
supposed to encode the close connection between verb and resultative
predicates and the similarity between predicate and nominal arguments
of the head, both of which are selected, obligatorily or optionally,
by the verb. Conversely, the structural representation of (21b)
given in (22b) encodes the fact that depictive predicates are not
closely related to the head of the VP. That depictives are attached
to the VP node in this way makes certain predictions about occurrences
and co-occurrences of predicates. To start with, only one resultative
can appear in a sentence
(29) *John washed the clothes clean white
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•• whereas more than one depict1ve can appear in a sentence:
40
•
(30) They eat meat raw, tender. (from Simpson 1982)
•
This we will assign a structure as in (31):
(31)
s
•
•
ITiley
v~
I
eat meat
~
, XP
tender
raw
•
•
•
I
The 'double-stacking' captures the fact that each XP is a condition
on the whole of the VP preceding it. An XP hung from VP is a
n-l
condition on VP so that the paraphrase of (30) should be
(32) They eat meat when the meat is raw when the raw meat is
tender.
Our analysis also predicts that when resultatives and depictives
co-occur in a sentence the resultat1ve must precede the depictive.
This is borne out:
(33) a. We hammered the metal flat hot
I
b. *We hammered the metal hot flat.
••
•
•
•
•
In presenting this analysis of predicates and in arguing that a
predicate has to be linked to an NP which it c-commands and which
c-commands itt we are making a particular claim about the nature of
maximal projections -- namely that in (22b) and (31) it is not the
VP but the vp' and the VP" ~espect1vely which are the maximal projec-
tions of the V. This ~p11es that a maximal projection of a category
is defined relative to a particular treei it is not possible to
state out of context that V" is a maximal projection of v. vp lt is
the maximal project1o~ of V in (31); vp' is the maximal projection
of V in (22a), and VP is the maximal projection of V in (19).
(2Ie), reWT1tten here as (34) is ambiguous:
(34) John met Mary d~k.
drunk can be linked to, and predicated of, either ~ohn or Mary.
Depending on which interpretation is chosen a particular structure
will be assigned:
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•
•
•
(35) a. s
AdrU'~k
V NP
J I
met Mary
b.
•
In (35a) drunk must be linked to John because that is the only
NP available for linking to under the predicate-linking rule;
••
•
similarly in (35b) there is no subject for drunk other than Mary,
so this is the linking which must take plAce. This makes predictions
about the order in which multiple predicates may occur: the XP
predicated of [NP, S] will always be the rightmost: in (36)
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•
(36) a.
b.
.John eats meat raw drur"
[John [eats meat raw]vp'
•
•
•
•
I
I
the structure must be as in (36b) where!!.!. 1.8 witllin the VP and
drunk is a syntactic sister of the [NP, S] and the VP'. Note that
the semantics, also, predict that drunk 1s not part of the VP.
Whilst dep1ctives which are part of the VP state 'ccnditions' on
the rest of the VP, as argued in (26b), drunk does not function in
this way. The paraphrase of (36&) should read
(37) John eats meat when the meat 1s raw, when John ia drunk.
Ii predicates predicated of [NP, 51 are hung directly from the VP,
this ~plies that predicates selected for by the verb cannot be
predicated of the [HP, 51. Thus we predict that r~sultat1ve8 can
never be predicated of [NP, 51 and this 1s borne out
(38) *John painted the carts tired. (i.e., until he was tired).
A possible problem for this analysis was suggested to me by Ken
Safir. In
(39) Drunk, it's hard PRO to drive
the AP, drunk, has as its semantic subject the NP, PRO: this must
be its structural subject too, and there is no other NP it can be
linked to, though PRO does not c-command drunk. One SU8sestion is
that drunk has its own PRO subject.
(40) PRO drunk, it's hard to drive.
There are several theoretical reaSODS for not allowing predicates to
have their own PRO subjects which we will discuss in section 5.5.
But here, it seems that there is an analysis of (40) which avoids
these problems, which is that drunk 1s a toplcalized AP moved from
its underlying position to the right of the VP; thus the S-structure
of (40) is actually
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(41) [Drunkl AP1
[it's hard [PRO [to dr1ve]vp[t]AP ] •
1
Here the PRO and the trace of drunk c-command each other, and drunk
and its trace are, of course, co-indexed by move-~. This implies
that a straightforward emmendation of rule (8a) is required.
(42) An X not in a (potential) theta-position, or a trace
it 1s co-indexed with must be linked at S-structure
to an argument which it c-commands and which c-commands
it.
FOOTNOTES
(l) Function and Concept: 1891.
(2) S' is considered to be a projection of COMP. The relation
between COHP and INFL 1s discussed in Chapter VI.
(3) The rule is termed predicate-linking rather than simply
predication. in order to distinguish terminologically
between predication at the semantic level and at the
syntactic level. An XP which Is a predicate of a given
argument is linked to that argument at S-structure. Some,
but not all, eyntact1c predicates are predicated/at the
semantic level, of the items they are linked to at S-structure.
(4) In the general case (8) has to account for the fact that
every non-theta-marked Xl has to be linked to a syntactic
argument. The only exception, of course, is that pleonastic8,
which are by definition non-theta~rked. are still not
linked. However, in the strictest sense, an XP is a projec~
tiOD of some X, and therefore, a pleonastic, not being 8
projection of anything, but rather a formal "place-holder'~
is Dot subject to (8).
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CHAPTER III
3.0 The predicate-linking rule introduced in the previous chapter
expresses the fact that every predicate must have an external
syntactic argument. The structural restrictions on syntactic
arguments follow, as we have seen, from certain general conditions:
a predicate can be linked only to something which does not itself
require linking, i.e. to something which is internally clo8ed~ This
means that linking 1s to NPs and SiS and in some cases maybe to
1locative PPs also. We now have to ask what other restrictions
there may be. The answer lies in the interaction of syntactic rules
with theta-theory, and it is to this topic that Chapters III and
IV are devoted.
3.1 The tJp1c involves a larger issue: that of the interaction of
the syntactic and semantic components. The subject-predicate
relatioDs defined by the predicate-linking rule are strictly
syntactic in nature, but there are also semantic notions of predi-
cation and of subjecthood. We presume that these semantic subject-
predicate relations are represented in a level of semantic represen-
tat10D (SR), and that in the mapping from S-structure to SR the
semantic component must use syntactic information to determine which
are the subject and predicate in the semantic sense. (In order to
distinguish between the different uses of the terms we will refer
to the subject and predicate, defined at S-structure as the formal
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subject and predicate, i.e. the words used in the syntax~ Subject and
predicate in the semantic sense, i.e., the denotations of the words,
we will call the notional subject and predicate.) As we indicated
in Chapter I, an advantage of representing S-structure in terms of
formal predicates and subjects is precisely this: that it makes
available a s~ple mapping fram the syntax to a semantic representation
in which subject-predicate relations are made explicit. Before
discussing what form this mapping is likely to have, we should look
more closely at the semantic notion of predication.
We will consider subject and predicate, 8S represented 1n the
semantic component, in the Aristotelian sense. Aristotle presents
2the terms subject and predicate in De Interpretatione , paragraphs
4 and 5 and goes on to make explicit U8e of these concepts in the
Prior Analyties. He defines a predicate 8a an expression which is
a sign of something said of something else, 1.e.,"something predicable
of or present in some other thing" (paragraph 4) and goes on to use
the three definitions as co-extensive. Something 18 predicable of
something else if and only 1f it cad be said of that thing and if
and only if it 1s present in that thing. The "thing" which it is
said of or predicated of i~ the subject. The only refinement required
is that of allowing negative predicates such 8S "1s not healthy" and
"is not ill", which are the signs of "the absence of something in
the subject." A subject and its predicate together form a EEoposition.
A proposition is a type of sentence -- i.e., a "significant portion
of speech, some parts of which have independent meaning," and which
differs from other sentences because it has a truth-value; it must
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be either true or false. A simple proposition is either a simple
affirmation or a simple denial: it either asserts or denies that
what is expressed by the predicate Y is present in the denotation of
the subject-expression X. However. it 1s important to note that
in Aristotelian terms, the concatenation of subject and predicate
is not sufficient to const:f.tute a proposition P. P must always
contain a tense-marker, or 8S Aristotle puts it, itA verb or the
tense of a verb." A proposition is "a statement, with meaning, 8S
to the presence of something in a subject t or its absence. in the
present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time."
What comes out of this is that basic semantic notions are
that of proposition, predicate and subject. Sentences to which
truth or falsity can be ascribed have a basic structure in which
something is said about something else. Predicate describes the
expression used to signify the "something said about" and subject
describes the expression denoting the "something else." There is
only one subject in a proposition, though of course it can be a complex
subject, e.g., Socrates and Call1as as in "Socrates and Call1as are
healthy." This definition of predicate is thus, essentially,
semantic and contrasts with the Fregean grammatical predicate
which denotes a polyadic function which takes n arguments Co form a
sentential expression.
Given this account of semantic primitives, subject and predicate
relations 11IUSt be fundamental in a semantic representation. In
the model of grammar with which we are working. the syntax, and
more precisely, the LF representation, provide the information out
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of which the semantic component builds a semantic representation.
Semantic subject-predicate relations must thus be encoded in the
syntax. The S-structure representation given by the predicate-linking
rule encodes such semantic information. and the mapping between
S-structure and the sa via LF 1s straightforward. Semantic predicates
are encoded in maximal projections which must be linked to 9yntact1c
arguments. Notional subjects are encoded in formal subjects, the
syntactic arguments which the XPs are linked to and which saturate
or complete them. Thus the simple sentence Birds fly will have an
S-structure representation as in (1):
(1) [[Birds]NP [f1y]vp]S
The VP denotes the semantic predicate "fly" and the NP to which the
VP is syntactically linked denotes the notional subject of this
predicate, the species bird.
The simplest possible algorithm for mapping between synta~ and
semantics would be "An 11' linked by the predicate-linkil\g rule to
an argument A, is interpreted by the semantic component as predicated
of the denotation of A." However, this will give the right results
only if the S-structure, in terms of syntactic subjects and predicates,
is isomorphic to the semantic representation of notional subjects
and predicates, and this is not the case. Although all notional
predicates can be correlated with XPs and their respective notional
subjects correlated 'with the arguments that the appropriate XP is
linked to, the converse does not hold. Not all XPs linked to
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syntactic arguments to satisfy the predicate-linking rule correlate
with predicates and subjects in SR. To give a s~ple example, in
(2) It snows.
the VP snows 1s linked to a pleonastic at S-structure to satisfy
the predicate-linking rule and 1s thus the formal subject of th~ VP.
However it bears no semantic relation to snows and there is no
subject-predicate etructure in the sa of (2).
However, as we have already mentioned in the model of grammar
we are working with, mapping from syntax to semantics is mediated
by LF. If we want to use an algorithm like the one stated immediately
above, it is LF and the SR which must be isomorphic in the relevant
respects. It is the case, as I shall argue throughout this disser-
tation, that the s~plest possible algorithm does give the right
results and that LF and SR are indeed isomorphic in the relevant
respects. Predicate-linkiog takes place at S-structure, and the
proper linking of all XPs is a condition on well-formednes8 at
S-structure. The mapping between S-structure anJ LF 1s also as
simple as possible (i.e., the rules alter the structure as little
as possible). ThuB all syntactic subjects and predicates linked
at S-structure will be so linked at LF unless the rules mapping
onto LF from S-structure have "broken" the linkings. If LF and sa
are to be isomorphic with respect to subject-predicate relations
then the following must hold:
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(3) All pred1cate-linkings at S-structure which are not
to be interpreted as semantic predications at SR
must be "broken" by the mapping from S··structure to LF.
The algorithm which maps from LF to the semantic representation may
now be stated very simply:
(4) If X is the formal subject of Y at LF, then X is
interpreted as the notional subject of Y at SR.
Given that it is analytic within the theory that 1f X 1s the subject
of Y then Y 1s predicated of X it follows from (4) that if Y is
predicated of X at LF then Y is interpreted as predicated (semant1-
cally) of X at SR.
A point to be clarified about the relation of predication at
SR involves PPs such as to Mary 1n
(5) John gave the book to Mary.
Here, according to the predicate-linking rule, the PP must be linked,
and the NP it must be linked to 1s the book. (In Chapter VI we
will discuss another option for the linking of PPs, that they can
be linked to INFL.) If to Mary is linked to the book then according
to (4) the PP is interpreted semantically as a predicate of the NP.
It might be suggested that this semantic predication relation
differs from the predication in, e.g., John eats carrots raw, where
carrots is both the formal and notional subject of ~, and !~
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is understood as a property in some sense ascribed to carrots. It
is difficult to understand to Mary as a simple property ascribed
to the book. Rather the locative preposition ~ names a two-place
semantic relation indicating location, in (5) the second place in
the relation is filled by ~, while the first place is filled by
the formal subject of the PP. Semantically, what is being predicated
of the NP subject is the change of location, being "to Mary."
We can distinguish between the two "varieties" of predicates
straightforwardly. The AP !!! assigns a theta-role to its formal
subject while the PP does not do so. We can describe the relation
between the PP predicate and NP subject in (5) in the following rule
of interpretation:
(6) If X is the formal subject of Y at LF, and the head
of Y denotes an n-place relation, then at SR~ X is
interpreted as being the first argument in the relation
denoted by the head of Y.
In the case of (2) above, it snows cannot have a subject-predicate
structure in SR because pleonast1cs are non-theta-marked syntactic
"dummies" which are ignored at LF. (2) has a semantically operative
representation (7):
(7) [[snows]vp]S
and as the VP is not syntactically linked at LF, it'cannot, according
to (4) be interpreted as a semantic predicate. We will discuss the
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question of pleonast1cs, as well as more complex instances of "link-
breaking ll in Chapter IV.
The predicate-linking rule, then, has as its output a syntactic
representation which directly encodes the semantic primitives of
subject and predicate. The other basic semantic notion which is
introduced in the Aristotelian framework 1s that of proposition,
which intuitively we can correlate with the syntactic "n". The
syntactic definition expressed by the phrase structure rule (8)
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(8) s --~ NP INFL VP
reflects directly Aristotle's claim that a proposition consists of
a subject, predicate and tense. (8) states that an S consists of
a syntactic, verbal predicate, linked to a subject, with a syntactic
tense marker. Later we will argue that (8) is not the best way to
state the definition of S; for the moment it suffices to point out
the following. A proposition can be defined in terms of a semantic
(i.e., notional) subject and predicate and the syntactic correlate
of a proposition, the S, can be defined in terms of the syntactic
correlates, a formal subject and predicate. Although (8) 1s not the
best way to define the S, it does capture the intuition -- which
Aristotle also makes explicit that an S is more than just a
subject and predicate; something else -- hypothesized to be tense
must be present as well. The ccnverse of this 1s also true. There
are instances of syntactic predication where the XP and its NP
subject do not form an S; and where the notional subject and predicate
denoted by the syntactic correlates do I not form a sj~ple proposition.
These, of course, are the secondary predicates mentioned in 2.2,
such as
(9) John ate the meat raw.
The distinction between primary and secondary predication and the
relation between instances of predication and propositions will be
discussed at greater length in Chapter V.
One further point must be made before we go on to discuss the
interaction of the predicate-linking rule with theta-theory. We
have argued in this section that there is a set of basic semantic
nations which includes subject, predicate and proposition, and a
set of formal syntactic concepts which correlate with them. The
structure of an S reflects the structure of the proposition. However,
this is not to make a claim that either syntactic or semantic notions
are conceptually prior.· There is no "directionality" implied in
the model, and no presumption as to which level of representation
is more fundamental 1n language acquisition. It 1s possible that
the semantic concepts of subject and predicate -- "picking something
out and saying something about it," -- may be conceptually prior
and that the syntactic constraints reflect the semantic structure.
However, it is equally plausible that the structural relation of
predication is conceptually prior, and the semantic structure is
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a reflection of this. As we have seen, it is clear that each can
be defined independently of the other.
3.2 Given this account of the interaction of the syntax and
semantics, the following questions arise. With respect to the syntax
we must ask what, in each instance, is an appropriate argument for
the XP to link itself to? We have seen that the argument must be
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closed i.e., either an 5' or an NP -- and it is clear from
empirical observation that in the overwhelming majority of cases the
subject argument is an NP. In fact, if we follow Koster's 1979
account of S' subject sentences, then we can say 9imply that all
subjects are NP. We will discuss the question of S' subjects later,
and concentrate for the moment on NP subjects. The predicate-linking
rule gives a structural criterion for an NP being an appropriate
subject the relation of mutual c-command must hold between it
and its predicate, but this is not all that must be said. To begin
with, we noted that in some circumstances pleonastics may operate
as subjects, but not in all cases. (Compare the acceptable (2)
to the unacceptable "it drives the car" (where it is not the neuter
correlate of he and she.» An account must explain where pleonastics
can occur and why. Secondly, and this involves the semantic repre-
sentat10n too, the subject NP has to be thematically appropriate
for the XP, whether to avoid simple cases of semantic anomaly like
"John injured the rock" where injure takes an animate object, or
,
cases like lithe rock hit John" or "Sincerity admires John" where
in each case the thematic roles have been permuted so that the NP
we would expect to find in subject position has changed places with
the NP we expect to find in object position. The answ~rs to questions
of this type lie in theta-theory, and this is what we will examine
in the rest of this chapter.
3.2.1 The principles of theta-theory can be stated'very simply.
The chief principle 1s that a lexical h~~, 1 1' a function which may
require certain arguments of particular semantic types in order to
be completed. The lexical head is considered as assigning theta-roles
or thematic roles, and the information as to the number and type
of theta-roles that a given lexical head assigns is part of the
information associated with it in the lexicon. For example, the
information associated with the head give is that it assigns agent,
patient and goal theta-roles, i.e., that the lexical head takes
three NPs which will be interpreted as having agent, patient or
goal relations to the action described by the verb. Theta-theory
is thus responsible for conveying two types of information about
a lexical head; firstly how many thematic arguments are required
for the head to be completed and secondly what type of argument is
required in each case for semantic compatabil1ty. If the wrong
number of thematic ,arguments are supplied the sentence is either
elliptical as in (10), where there are argument positions which are
(10) John gave.
not filled, or plainly ungrammatical as in (11)
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•• (11) *John gave Mary Bill the book.
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•
•
where there 1s one argument which 18 uninterpretable because it
has no theta-role and 18 thus not related thematically to any
lexical head. When the lexical meaning of an argument is not
compatible with the thematic role it receives, then the sentence
is semantically anomalous, 8S for example in (12):
•
(12) 'Sincerity admires John. (where' indicates semantic anomaly).
•
•
•
Here admires may be considered 8S 8ssigning a theta-role "experiencet ll
or "+animate" to its first argument and sincerity ~_8 not au NP which
1s compatible with this role. Presumably semantic/thematic compata-
b111ty is checked by the semantic component, where information about
lexical meaning is available. This explains why sentences like (12),
or the famous "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" are syntactically
well-formed but semantically anomalous -- the sentences satisfy
syntactic conditions on acceptability, but not conditionu which
operate at the level of semantic interpretation. Whether or not
the correct number of arguments are present for the lexical function
to be satisfied is a syntactic matter, as shown by the fact that
(11) and (12) are at worst, uninterpretable and at best, in the case
of (11) elliptical. The axiom of theta-theory which guarantees
that sentences with these problems are marked as unacceptable by
,
the grammar is the theta-criterion:
(13) Theta-criterion (Chomsky 19ijl)
(1) Every obligatory theta-role must be assigned
to one and only one argument,
(11) Every argument muat be assigned one and only
one theta-role.
We will have reason to modify (13) in Chapter V, following Schein
(1982), as it appears that the second clause is too strong and should
not contain a biconditional, but (13) is the axiom argued for in
Chomsky (1981) and (1982). (13) holds at LP, where theta-role
assignment 1s represented. If we look at the relation between a
lexical head and its theta~rked arguments 8S the relation between
a functiou and its arguments then (13) can be understood intuitively
as the condition that every function must be completed and every
argument must be an argument of some function. We will return to
this at the end of Chapter IV.
In English the preferred method of satisfying the predicate-
linking rule is by linking to a lexical NF, assigned a theta-role
by the head of the XP. ~ is used only when the lexical head does not assign
any theta-roles; as is the case with snow and rain. 3 When the NP-
subject is a lexical argument of the head, then there are two ways
1n which it can be "assigned" to that position. In the first case,
it can be assigned to that position 1n D-structure, its D-structure
position being decided by general principles governing how thematic
relations are syntactically realized. It is a mat~er of lexical
knowledge that a lexical head has certain theta-roles to assign
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but in addition to this knowledge there must be some syntactic
relation between the head and the NP encoding syntactically that
one is an argument of the other. The three methods available for
encoding this information are direct-case marking by the head,
case-marking via a preposition and predicate-linking. In
(14) John gave the book to Mary,
the thematic relation between the book and the verbal head is
encoded by direct case assignment. the relation between Mary and
the head is through case-assignment via a preposition, and the rela-·
tion between John and gave is indicated by the fact that John is
the syntactic subject of the VP. There seem to be general princi-
ples governing how particular types of theta-roles are realized. In
English, the NP bearing the agent role will always, in an active verb,
be assigned to the syntactic external argument position, and be
related to the head via predication. The NP bearing patient role
will be realized in a position where it can be assigned objective
case i.e., internal to the VP, and adjacent to the V. The syn-
tactic relations dictated by the general principles of syntactically
encoding theta-marking are represented at D-structure. When these
general p~1nc1ples ensure that a lexical head has an argument in the
NP-subject position so that the maximal projection of the head can
be linked into it, then the predicate-linking rule is satisfied in
,
the simplest possible way. The D-structure representation will
then be identical (in the relevant respects) to the S-structure
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representation, as is the case with (14). This is the first
method of deciding which argument a lexical head is predicated of.
However, it may turn out that the general principles assign
no thematic argument to the external syntactic argument position.
This may be for one of two reasons. Firstly, the lexical head may
just not have any thematic arguments of the appropriate type. For
example, the so-called "unaccusative" verbs or "ergative" verbs
(Burzio 1981, L. Levin 1983) are generally analyzed as caking.only
one argument, a "theme", which should be assigned to the [NP VP]
position. These verbs include arrive and ~, for example, and the
D-structure of a sentence like John arrived is hypothesized to be
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(15) [ [arrived John]vp] S
with an un11nkab1e VP.
The second instance of a D-structure where there are unlinkable
XPs occurs where the thematic argument assigned by general principles
to the external syntactic argument position has been detached by
a lexical rule. This happens in psss1ve constructions where a
lexical rule "delinks" the agent, giving a paradigm D-structure
representation as in (16).
(16) [[was given the book to HarY]vp1S
Here again the Vp cannot be linked because nothing is available
for it to be linked to.
In these instances the grammar has methods of ensuring that
there is a thematic NP available at S-structure for linking. In
English, the mechanism 1s M~ve-NP. In both (15) and (16 ) the
[NP VP] is moved outside the VP, so that the VP can be linked to
it at S-gtructure -- and so that tIle theme can be interpreted in
the SR as the notional subject. Another device which some languages
use instead of the Move~~ mechanism is that of inserting a pleo-
nastic element in the [NP, 5] position, which operates as the formal
subject and which is co-indexed (cosuperscripted) in Chomsky (1981» with
an internal argument. The formal linking at S-structure is thus
to a pleonastic, but because the pleonastic is cosuperscripted with
the internal argument, and represented as such at LF, the structurally
internal argument can be interpreted as the notional subject.
English permits this in a very restricted number of cases where
there is inserted in the [NP, 51 position. These can be cosuperscripted
only with an indefinite NP, and then only with verbs of a particular
semantic type:
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(17) [
was
there stood
appeared
a man 1n the garden
In French, there are similar restrictions on the type of NP that
can be used in this construction, but the mechanism can be used
in a wider variety of circumstances, e.g., with a passive verb.
(18) , , ,11 a ete mange trois giteaux.
In Italian and Spanish the vocabulary of pleonastics includes the
empty pronominal pro which appears in [NP, S1 position and which 1s
cosuperscripted with a postverbal NP, either one which is underlyingly
[NP, VP] or one which has been adjoined to the VP through rightward
4
move-.l •
Pleonastics which are not cosuperscripted with post verbal
NPs occur only when the lexical head has no thematic arguments at
· all, so that there 1s nothing to c08uperscript with. The pleonastic
must be inserted so that "degenerate" monadic VPs like snow can be
linked to satisfy the predicate-linking rule, but these "free"
pleonast1cs, unlike the cosuperscripted ones w are not represented
at LF; the degenerate VPs are not interpretable as predicates of a
subject in the semantic component, and presumably a sentence like
(2) forms some sort of "degenerate proposition" in the semantic
5
sense.
In summary, general lexical principles will, in the simple
case, indicate which NP 1s to be syntactically external to t,he
maximal projection of the lexical head. When this external argument
position is not filled this way, ~echanism8 such as move-a( or
cOAuperscr1pting are employed to ensure that the predicate-linking
rule can be satisfied. In the degenerate case where neither of
these mechanisms will work, a pleonastic is inserted simply to
satisfy the S-structure requirement, because no thematic NP is
available to fill this position. In the remainder of this chapter
we will take a closer look at the way theta-marking properties are
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represented in the lexicon, and at how the syntactic encoding of
theta-relations takes place. In Chapter IV we will examine the
mapping from D-structure to S-structure -- that is, how move-
and the c05uperscripting mechanisms work.
3.3 In this section we will look more closely at how theta-roles
are assigned and at how the relations between a head and its thematic
arguments are represented at S-structure. Lexical heads are presumed
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to be listed in a lexicon, together with pertinent grammatical
information. Part of this information is how many thematic arguments
a head takes -- i.e., how many theta-roles it assigns -- and what
type of theta-roles these are; agent, patient, goal, etc. These
thematic arguments are realized 8S syntactic arguments of XO at
S-structure. As far as the syntactic realizations are concerned,
an argument of a head 1s either external or internal. An external
argument is outside the maximal projection of the head o and thus
is not c-commanded by it. An internal argument is within the maximal
projection of the head and is c-commanded by it.
There are various ways in which an NP argument can be syntac-
,
tically encoded in English. An internal argument can be in the
[NP, VP] position -- i.e., the NP right-adjacent to the Va. Here
~
the NP will be case-marked by the verb. Internal arguments can be
objects of prepositions, in which case they are case-marked by
the preposition, and it is the PP which is a sister to and is governed
by the Xo. There are also ditrans1t1ve verbs, where two NP arguments
are both governed by the Vo , and both receive case directly from
6the verb. External arguments are always related to the XP via
predication, which is to say the external argument of a head 1s
the NP to which the maximal projection of the head is linked. This must be
the case because XPs are always monadic functions, and thus can have
only one external argument. They must all be linked to satisfy
the predicate-linking rule. Therefore in order that this rule be
satisfied the external argument must be in the position where it
can serve as subject of the XP.
These three syntactic characteristics, i.e. receiving
objective case from a verb, being the object of a preposition
selected by a lexical head, and being the NP that an XP is predicated
of,are the three syntactic indications of the fact that a thematic
relation exists between the NP and the lexical head. The question
which is of interest here is which type of thematic argument 1s
realized by which method. If we assume the sfmplest possible
theory, then a lexical head should be entered in the lexicon with
an unordered list of arguments, and then general principles will
determine how each type of argument is to be realized syntactically.
Studies, such as those of Gruber (1965), Jackendoff (1972, 1975, 1976),
Perlmutter (1978) and Marantz (1981) indicate that this is what seems
to occur. Gruber and Jackendoff point out that an agent argument
is always assigned to the external argument position, while the
theme is always the [NP, VP]. Perlmutter claims that when a verb
only has one thematic argument it is possible to use general semantic
principles to predict whether that argument will be underlyingly
external or internal. Verbs which have only an external argument
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-- ergatives or "intransitive" in Burzio's (1981) terminology --
have a D-structure representation (19):
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(19)
Unaccusative verbs, which Burzio calls "unergative", have a single argument
which by general principles is assigned to [NP. VP] position, with
a D-structure representation as in (20):
(20)
Perlmutter does not in his 1978 article state the semantic principle
involved, but he does suggest certain general deciding factors. For
example, unergatives describe""willed or voluntary acts" and there-
fore assign agent theta-roles to their single arguments. These
verbs include "work", "play", "speak", "talk", "grin", "frown",
"enjoy", "swim", "run", "whisper", etc. They also describe certain
involuntary bodily processes such as "cough", "sneeze", "hiccough".
"belch", "burp", "vomit", where the theta-role assigned is not agent
but what he terms "inalienable possessor." Unaccusatives include
those verbs assigning the sole theta-role of patient, such 8S
"burn", "fil1", "drop", "sink"; verbs of existence and happening
and aspectuals like "begin", "stop", "start", "cease". This class
includes those verbs generallYtermed "lnchoatlv~', single argument
I
verbs with transitive counterparts, where the surface-subject of
the inchoative is the surface-object of the transitive verb, for
example those shown in (21):
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(21) John closed the door / The door closed
Mary broke the vase / The vase broke.
Marantz (1981) makes the more gen~ral argument that the claims
made by Jackendoff and by Perlmutter all follow from the same facts
about the interaction of syntax and the lexicon. He argues that
there is a parameter in universal grammar at which languages differ.
Either they follow the pattern in English, where the agent or
agent-like argument is external to the XP, and the patient or theme
is internal, or the converse 1s true. The first type of language
is the familiar nominative-accusative type, and the second is what
Marantz calls "true ergative" languages. The languages of the world
are overwhelmingly nominat1ve~accusative ; so far there is clear
evidence of only two true ergative languages, Dyirbal and Greenland
Eskimo, analyses of which are presented in Marantz (1981, to appear).
The particular details of these various claims are not important
what is essential here is not how the generalizations are charac-
terized, but that there is evidence that such generalizations can
be made. Such generalizations are part of what we learn when we
learn a language. This means that given a sentence in which a
particular lexical item is used, and given that knowing a lexical
item is knowing what arguments it can take, there are sufficient
general principles to determine what theta-role each syntactic
argument must be assigned.
It is necessary to know exactly what arguments a lexical head
requires because the syntactic configuration in which an argument
appears at S-structure is not sufficient information to tell what
its thematic role is. It is not possible to know what thematic
role an [NP VP] with objective case has, without information about
the lexical properties of the head. In the first place tllere is
no one-to-one correspondence between position and theta-role.
Some NPs with objective case are patients, such as the object of the
verb hit, others are not, for example the [NP, VP]s in John weighs
10 lbs. The book cost $5, The twins resemble each other. Thus it
is necessary to know what are the theta-roles that a head may assign,
before deciding on a particular mapping between lexicon and syntax.
In some cases other information is required, such as the configurational
properties of the S. For example to interpret (22)
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(22) a. John gave the book to Mary
b. John gave Mary the book.
it 1s necessary to know that give may assign objective case twice,
in which case [NP VP] is assigned the patient role and [NP,VP] the goal
2
or "dative" argument. Because of the alternation between the
(a) and (b) forms, there 1s no general principle that th,e [NP VP]
of a1ve is interpreted as patient. (There is, however, a general
principle of dativization which describes the relation between
(22a) and (22b) as a particular instance of a more general rule
which states that verbs with thematic structure like that of give
have these alternate forms available.
Another instance of objective case marking failing to indicate
underlying grammatical relations is the objective case assigned by
Exceptional Case Marking CECH) verbs like believe. These verbs take
an s' as argument, but exceptionally they assign objective case to
the [NP 5] of the S', just in case the lower clause is infinitival,
as in (23):
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(23) John believed J
thought
considered
her to be a genius
This 1s a syntactic indication of the peculiar fact that though
her in (23) 1s thematically an argument of the VP to be a genius,
and is the NP to which this VP is linked, it behaves syntactically
as an argument of the matrix verb with respect to configurationally
defined syntactic relations.
Yet another instance of the non-dependancy of case-marking
and theta-role assignment 1s the assignment of case in idioms.
The Case Filter as it stands states that all lexical NPs must have
case; presumably NPs like the bucket in kick the bucket are no
exception. However, it is a defining characteristic of idioms
that the verbal heads do not specify thematic arguments, to fill
the apparent syntactic argument positions, but that they demand
specific lexical items, listed in the lexicon as cooccuring with
the particular head, and as having f1xe~non-compositionalmeanings.
In kick the bucket the NP has no literal meaning but together with
the verb forms a single composite semantic unit meaning "to die."
The whole unit -- verb plus specified lexical item -- forms a single
lexical entry.
The respective thematic roles of NPs governed by prepositions
aremoretransparent in the syntax. Prepositions are relational
te~s indicating relations of location ~, ~, ~, ~, etc.;
relations of tfme -- before, after, durinJl; relations of instrumen-
tality -- with and through, and many others. The type of preposition
thus indicates the type of thematic relation that its object will
have to the verb. (There are, however, some "degenerate" PPs
where the preposition doesn't indicate a relation of this type, but
where the whole PP has an adjectival force. These PPs seem to assign
theta-roles to the NPs they are linked to, and are interpreted
semantically as predicates. Examples of such PPs are (24)
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(24) a. We though t him out of the country.
b. They believed the cat in the garden.
These PPs must assign theta-roles to him and the cat, respectively,
otherwise the NPs would be without theta-roles and the theta-
criterion would be violated. Believe and think take clausal
arguments, as we stated above. and theta-mark the whole clause,
7
not the NPs that they case-mark. Thus there is no way for the NPs
to be theta-marked other than by the PP.)
The syntactic realization of the thematic relation between
a lexical head and its external argument is-that the maximal projec-
tion of the head is predicated of the argument, i.e., that the former
is linked to the latter by the predicate-linking rule. It 1s clear
that case does not dete~1ne what the external argument of a head
is. When an external argument is [NP, 51 then it usually receives
nominative case, but there are exceptions, e.g., the ECM exa~ples, where the
[NF, S] of the lower clause receives objective case from the matrix
clause. But leaving these exceptional instances aside, there is
also the fact that external arguments of secondary predicates are
frequently not assigned nominative case. The subject of a secondary
predicate 1s a thematic argument of another lexical head, and if it
is an internal argument of this head, will receive case according
to its position in the VP. Th~s 1n (25)
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(25) John eats thea raw.
them, which is an external argument of ~, is also an internal
argument of eats, and receives case from the verb, indicating this
fact. That it is an external argument of ~ is shown by the relation
of predication holding between themand~. Note that because the
grammar allows the NP them to be an internal argument of one head
and the external argument of another, it is necessary for theoretical
reasons that some device other than case indicates at least one of
these argument relations. If them is already case-marked by ~,
it is not possible for the subject-predicate relation to be marked
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• by nominative case assignment. If this happens there would ~e a
case-confl1c~ for the NP would be assigned two different cases by
•
two different lexical items.
How can we test this claim that the syntactic encoding of a
theta-role assignment is via predication? It is nece6sary to see
•
what happens when a lexical head haa a theta-role to assign, but
where the only NP that the theta-role can be assigned to is not an
NP it 1s predicated of. Such an instance occurs with NPs. The
•
structure of an NP 1s (26)
(26) NP
NP
IMary
A
p NP
I I
of the book
N
'
~
N
I
gift
net{NP
The)John'S
•
•
• Herethehead of the NP is gift which, like the verbal head give in
(22), takes three thematic arguments; agent, patient and goal.
•
Theta-role assignment must be syntactically encoded, and as nominals
do not assign objective case all the arguments with the N' must be
governed by a preposition. As in the VP in (22a) the goal argument
I
is indicated by the preposition~. The patient is marked by of,
a dummy preposition inserted at S-structure to a~9j.gn case ~here
,
the lexical head is [-V]. The agent argument has still to be
asslgne~ but the general rules of theta-role assignment designate
agent as an external argument assigned through predication.
John, the [NP, NP] is the only NP available -- but the agent argument
has to be assigned through predication. The expression "gift of
the book to John" cannot assign the theta-role to anything via
predication because it is not a maximal projection but an N', and
thus cannot be predicated of an argument at all. As there is no
predicate within the NP , there can be no subject either, for
"subject" is defined as "subject of an XP". We can test the claim
that John is not properly assigned a theta-role in an interesting
way. We discussed earlier the fact that secondary predicates are
predicates of NPs which are already arguments of another lexical
head. In
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(27) 8.
b.
John performed drunk.
John gave the book to Mary drunk.
drunk 1s in each case the secondary predicate of the [NP, 5] which
1s assigned a theta-role by performed and gave respectively. If
the [NP , NPl 1s assigned a theta-role by the head of the NP then
it too should be a possible subject for secondary predicates, If,
as we have argued, the prenom1nal NP is not assigned a theta-role
then it should not be possible for it to be the subject of a secon-
dary predicate. This is in fact the case. Thus the following
are unacceptable
(28) a. *John's gift of the book late.
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b. *John's arrival in a hurry.
c. ~John's performance drunk.
Compare the perfectly acceptable predications within a gerundive
nominal
(29) a. John's giving the book to Mary late.
b. John's arriving late.
c. John's perfo~1ng late.
Here the nominal has the structure [NP VP]NP- i.e.,
(30) [[John I s] [performing drunklvplNP"
The [NF, NPl here is the subject of the maxtoal projection, and
via predication, is assigned a theta-role by the head of the VP
performi~. It can therefore also be the subject of the secondary
predicate drunk. In each of the examples in (28) the underlined
XP is also supposed to be a secondary predicate of the [NP, NPl,
but because this NP does not receive a theta-role from another
lexical head the secondary predication is impossible. The reason
that the examples in (28) are interpretable, and by some people
are considered marginally acceptable is that gift, arrival, and
I
performance all have a theta-role to assign; it is just that there.
is no way of syntactically encoding this thematic relat:i.lJnsh1p and
thus "properly" assigning the theta-role. However, it iA possible
t ssi it "improperly" 1 e "match up" the (NP, NFl with theo a gn -- .. ,
"floating" theta-role, even though there 1s no syntactic mechanism
to encode this. Thus the John of (28c) can be understood as the
agent of performance,and drunk is marginally interpretable as a
secondary predicate of John because John is "improperly" assigned
a theta-role in this way. Note that when the nominal head is
non-derived and has no thematic arguments and thus no theta-roles
to assign, there is no chance of even tmproper assignment of a
theta-role to the prenominal NP and that NP is totally unacceptable
as the subject of a secondary predicate, e.g.,
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(31) *John's letter drunke
To return to the central point ~ the main issue d;fscussed here
is that there are different ways of encoding syntactically the thematic
relations between a head and its arguments and that there are general
principles which map an argument of a specific thematic type onto
a particular structural representation. The relevance of this to
the general discussion of predicate-linking 1s that, depending on
the thematic arguments which a head takes, it is possible for there
to be no external argument, and therefore no NP for the predicate
to be linked to. If a lexical head takes only a theme argument,
and if, as in English, the theme ia assigned to [NF, VP] position,
,
then the D-structure representation will be of a predicate with no
subject as in (32b):
(32) a. John arrived
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b. [[arrived John]vp]S
If the lexical head originally assigned an external theta-role but
underwent a lexical-morphological rule in the lexicon which deleted
its external argument, then the D-structure representation will
be analagous to (32b). For example, the relation between the
active and passive forms such as John ate the cake vs. the cake
was eaten, can, at least in part, be characterized by the fact that
the passive construction does not have the external agent argument,
which is obligatory in the active form. If general principles of
theta-role aosignment always have the theme realized as [NP. VP]
then the D-structure of the passive sentence will be
(33) [[was eaten the cake]
Here again the predicate is un11nkable, and if (33) is not modified
in its mapping to S-structure, then the rule of predicate 11nki~g
will mark the sentence as unacceptable.
In the next chapter we will discuss the rule of move-NP t and
the process of pleonastic-insertion and c08uperscripting precisely
as mechanisms to render structures like (32b) and (33) acceptable
at S-atructure.
3.4 In the previous section it was assumed that theta-roles ~l:Q
assigned to the D-structure external arguments by the head of the
XP predicated of it. An external argument linked to a VP Is an
argument of the V, the external argument of an AP is the argument
of the A. This, however, is not an uncontroversial claim. Chomsky
(1981) and Marantz (1981) both argue that the subject receives a
theta-role fram a maximal projection and not a lexical head. Thus
in (34a)
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(34) a.
b.
John broke his arm.
We found Bill proud of his new horse.
his arm is considered an argument of break whereas the [NP, S]
must be an argument of broke his arm. Similarly in (34b) his new
horse is an argument of proud, but Bill is an argument of fraud
of his new horse. This controversy is what I will examine in the
final section of this chapter.
The claim that the external argument is not an argument of
the head, but of the maxtmal projection of the head is an attempt
to explain the assymetry which there is between subject and object
position. In the first place, the external argument, when it is
an [NP, S] is not an obligatory theta-position. When, for example,
the verb has passive morphology the external theta-role is not
assigned. Further evidence for the assymetry between external and
internal argument positions is two-fold. First, it is claimed that
the semantic nature of the XP determines the thematic role of the
external argument whereas the external argument and the head can
never together determine the thematic role of internal arguments.
Thus Marantz (1981) gives the following examples to indicate that
object selection determines theta-role assignment to subject:
(35) (Marantz 2(35»
a. throw a baseball
b. throw support behind a candidate
c. throw a boxing match (i.e. take a dive)
d. throw a party
e. throw a fit
f. kill a cockroach
g. kill a conversation
h. kill an evening watching TV
1. ki'11 a bottle (i.e. empty it)
j . kill an audience (i.e., win them)
Here the [NP, VP] does force a particular type of NP as external
argument. On the other hand, 1n (36) the lexical subjects don't
force a particular choice of semantic object:
(36) (Marantz 2(36»
a. The policeman threw NP
b. The boxer threw NP
c. The social director threw NP
d. Aardvarks throw NP
e. Throw NP
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f. Harry killed NP
g. Everyone is always killing NP
h. The drunk refused to kill NP
i. Silence can certainly kill NP
j. Cars kill NP
This assymetry, that choice of object affects choice of subject,
whereas choice of subject doesn't affect choice of objects, leads,
it is argued, to the conclusion that the head alone determines the
semantic nature of the object, whereas the head and internal argu-
ments determine the semantic nature of the subject.
The second piece of evidence brought to support this assymetry
comes from idioms. Marantz makes the observation that in English
there are countless idioms such 8S kick the bucket involving V
and internal argument but with a free subject. However, there are
no idioms involving subject and verb with free internal arguments.
If the verb selects for internal but not external arguments then
this idiomatic combination of verb and object but not verb and
subject is exactly what we would predict. On the other hand, if
it is the VP which selects the subject, then we might expect to
find VPs idiomatically combining with a fixed subject in phrasal
idioms, only when the internal structure of the VP is also fixed
idiomatically:
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(37) a.
b.
the shit hit the fan
*The shit hit the airconditioner
Marantz suggest that there is a possible counter-example -- an
idiom with fixed subject and free internal argument in the cat has
aat XiS tongue. However, this is not a problem because the variable
is not an argument of the verbal head S!!, but a determiner of
tongue, and the fixed NP XiS tongue 1s the fixed argument of V.
It does not seem, however, that this evidence is sufficient to
substantiate the cla~ that the choice of external argument is not
projected from the lexical head, but is assigned by the head and
its internal arguments together. This is not to dispute the impor-
tance or relevance of the assymetr1es which Chomsky and Marantz
describe, but rather to say that these facts are compatible with
the theory of lexical entries presented here. MOre than that, the
rules of syntactic analysis and semantic interpretation which were
proposed earlier 1n this chapter and in Chapter II, explain and
even predict the existence of exactly these types of assymetries.
The analysis presented here is essentially simpler and more
restrictive than the Chomsky-Marantz proposals. If it can account
for all the same data, while maintaining that all lexical arguments
are equally arguments of the head and without introducing new
mechanisms for the assignment of external arguments, it is ipso
facto to be preferred.
The fact is that the subject is a distinguished argument, and
that aspects of its relationship to the head depend on the semantic
properties of the maximal projection of the head. However, it is
as much determined by the lexical head as the internal arguments are.
In the case of throw (35a-e) the V assigns an agent role to its
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external argument position and the "semantics" of throw indicate
the relation which exists between agent and action. It is clear,
however, that while the object is interpreted as "object of V,"
the subject is interpreted, both syntactically and semantically,
as "subject of VP," and that in the examples in (35) the semantic
content of the VP does force a specific interpretation of the
agent-role. This results from the syntactic configurations in which
the head and this particular argument occur, and from the semantic
interpretation at SR. The syntactic encoding of the object relation
is that it is assigned case by the verb so that syntactically,
as~well as thematically, it is an argument of the head. The [NP, 5],
however, 1s marked syntactically as being the external argument of
V by the fact that the whole VP is predicated of it. Thematically
it is the argument of the head, but syntactically it Is the argument
of the XP and semantically it is the notional subject of the predi-
cate. The semantic assymetr1es between subject and object are thus
explained by the assymetries in syntactic representation, and not
by assymetries in the lexical representation. The head determines
the general nature of the external argument for example that
throw requires an agent1ve subject--and the semantic component
will determine what "sort" of agent this must be, depending on what
property is p~edicated of it. The range of examples in (36) show
only a few of the possibilities. Where a completely different
thematic role is assigned for some sense of the verb then it seems
we have a different homophonous lexical item, for example break,
in John broke his arm vs. John broke the window. 8 Not only
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is this account of the assignment of arguments more restrictive,
but it also allows a simpler account of the workings of the lexicon.
The lexicon, as we said above, consists (in part) of a list
of lexical items. With each item comes certain information,
including the number and type of thematic arguments it takes. Thus
give and die, for example, will be listed as in (38)
80
a.(38) ~: agent patient goal
b. ~: experiencer
If the external argument is not assigned by the head, then this
argument will not be listed along with the internal arguments as
in (38), and the lexical entreis will be as in (39):
(39) a. givev: patient goal
b. di~:
Within the lexicon it will not be possible to distinguish between
die or run an.d other intransitives, and ~, which takes no
arguments at all. The major problem with this theory of lexical
entries is that lexical rules which operate in the lexicon can
make no reference to the external argument because it isn't
listed there. However, there are a great many lexical rules which
make reference to external arguments, in fact Williams (1981)
I
claims that lexical rules which affect argument structure always
involve the subject (though some, e.g. Poser (1983) have pointed
out that rules like dative movement, do refer only to internal
arguments). Passive and inchoativization, for example, both involve
the deletion of the external argument. The rules will be discussed
more fully in the next chapter, but as we have already mentioned,
the rule relating (40a) and (40b) can be described as the addition
of passive morphology and the deletion of the agent role from the
9list of the verb arguments.
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(40) a. John ate the cake.
b . The cake was ea ten.
The lexical entries for eat respectively are
(41) a.
b.
eatv : agent patient
eaten
V
: agent patient
The passive rule formalizes the relation between (40a) and (40b)
as a lexical redundancy rule. The rule of inchoativization works
similarly. The relation between
(42) a. John broke the window.
b. The window broke.
also involves the deletion of the agent argument, although unlike
the passive rule, there is no morphological change to the verb~
The lexical entries (4la) and (41b) are
(43) a. break,l: agent patient
•
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b. brea~: patient.
Whereas the D-structure of (42a) will be virtually the same as
its S-structure, the D-structure of (42b) will reflect the underlying
thematic relations:
(44) [[broke the window]vp]S
and the move-NP rule will map (44) onto (45) in order to satisfy
the predicate-linking rule, the trace indicating the
(45) [[the window]NP [broke t]vp]S
original theta-role assignment at D-structure.
If external arguments are not represented as arguments of the
head in the lexicon, then it is difficult to maintain a statement
of relations like these as lexical rules. Marantz does describe
these processes as lexical rules, but he does so by making the
structure of lexical entries more complex, and by introducing a level
of grammatical relations into the lexicon. In his framework the
lexical entry for the verb give is as in (46):
(46) give: (patient goal): logical subject = agent
and the lexical rule of passive, is stated as a rule mapping between
thematic and grammatical relations in the lexicon. (46) is clearly
more complex than (38): it requires a distinction to be made
between predicate argument structure (the arguments in parentheses)
and the external argument, and it also introduces a two-tiered
system of grammatical as well as thematic structure. The simplest
theory of argument assignment which we are proposing, which is that
the external argument is assigned directly by the head, also allows
the simpler theory of lexical representation.
Another argument in support of the cla~ that the extenlal
thematic argument is determined by the head, not by the maximal
projection of the head, involves the discussion of (28) and (29)
above. The explanation of the marginal status of (28):
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(28) a. John's gift of the book late
b. John's arrival in a hurry
c. John's performance drunk
i.5 that the nominal head has an external theta-role to assign but
that it cannot be properly assigned to the [NP NPl because assignment
of this theta-role is via predication and there is no maximal
projection of the head to predicate of the [NP, NP1. This implies
that the external theta-role, which is improperly assigned to the
prenominal NP in (28) and properly assigned to the [NF, NPl by the
I
VP head in (29), is determined by the lexical head, and not by the
XP. If it were only determined by the XP then there would be no
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
I
I
theta-role to assign even "improperly" in (29) and the examples
10
would be as uninterpretable as (31).
The second piece of evidence supporting the assymetry between
subject and object involved the non-existence of "object" idioms.
The account of lexical representations and predicate-linking which
we are developing predicts precisely these facts. The claim we
have been making is that a maximal projection must be linked to an
NP subject and that the preference of the grammar is that this NP
19 a thematic argument of the head. Pleonast1cs which are not
cosuperscripted with a thematic argument are inserted 8S subjects
only in the default case where there are no thematic arguments for
the XP to be linked to. It 1s this fact which also explains the
absence of object idioms. Idiom heads, like kick in ~ick the bucket
do not assign theta-roles to their objects, but rRther the V + NP
form a single lexical item with a non-compositional meaning. In
this instance the [NP. VP] doesn't even act as an independent
syntactic argument -- hence the unacceptab111ty of "the bucket was
kicked by John." (There are idioms which do allow the [NP, VP] to
act as independent syntactic, but not thematic, arguments, e.g.
"advantage was taken of John".) Thus a sentence like John kicked the
bucket has a simple thematic structure: the idiom VP with no internal
arguments takes a single extel~al argument. This conforms to a
general pr1ncipl~ that a VP is linked to a thematic argument when
possible. If we take the putative idiomatic s9ntence (46)
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(47) The bucket hit John.
where the bucket hit X means that "x was murdered," we have a
sentence where the internal arg~ent John is assigned a theta-role,
but where the external NP is not theta-marked. This would conflict
with the principle that the projection of a head which assigns
theta-roles is linked to a thematic argument and not to a non-theta-
marked NP. Phrasal idioms like "the shit hit the fan" will be
permitted, because here the head has no theta-role to 8ss1gn at
all. These idioms are analogous to lexical heads like ~, which
can be linked to pleonastic NPs because they have no thematic argu-
menta to externalize at all.
We might ask why in languages which allow widely the cos\~per-
scripting of a pleonastic 8ubj ect with a thematic internal ar~lument.
it is not possible to have object idioms, where a thematic internal
argument 1s cosuperscripted with idiomatic subject. If a languages
allows
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(48) 1[[pleonastic]
NP
where pleonastic and NP are coindexed and the [Nf, VP] is interpreted
semantically as the subject, why is it not possible to have
(49) 1 1[[the bucket ]NP [hit John ]vp]
where John and the bucket are coindexed, and John can be interpreted
semantically as the subject. The answer is provided by the theory
of case-marking: in (48) the c09uperscripting is po~sible because
the pleonastic and the [NF, VP] do not conflict in any features.
In (49) however. the [NF, 5], unlike the pleonastic, must be assigned
case. According to Burzio, one of the reasons why cosuperscripting
is required 1s that the pleonastic is assigned case, and by cosuper-
scripting can tr~nsfer it to the internal argument which, without
this transference, would be caselesis. However 1n (49) the [NP, VP]
as well as the [NP. S] 1s assigned case, and c08uperscr1pting of
these tNO NPs w'ould result 1n an insoluble clash of case features •.
86
FOOTNOTES
(1) See Torrego (to appear) for evidence of this in Spanish and
Catalan.
(2) The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. McKeon (Random House 1961).
(3) We will discuss the role of there-insertion in Chapter IV.
(4) Zagona (1982) suggests in her thesis that these constructions
e.g. Selva una letters Giovanni are not instances of right-
ward move-q. but that the NP is at D-structure, post-verbal.
Under th1~ analysis, 1f no pleonastic pro 1s inserted, then
leftward move-~ would be necessary to satisfy the predicate-
linking rule.
(5) This means, of course, that the Aristotelian definition of
a proposition as necessarily consisting of predicate, subject,
and tense, has to be modified to account for these degenerate
cases. The circumstances in which subjectless propositions
are possible at the semantic level are extremely restricted.
They occur only when the head of the predicate takes no
thematic arguments at all. In English (as in many other lang-
uages) this occurs only with weather verbs.
(6) Stowell (1981), who argues that case-assigner and NP must be
adjacent, suggests that in ditransitive constructions a
complex "word" is formed from the V + NP which assigns case
to the [NP 2 VP].
(7) It is interesting to note that the PPs which appear in this
position tend to be those which can appear in [NP. S]
positions as we discussed in 2.3, e.g.
(i) We thought him in the garden.
(11) In the garden is a pleasant place to sit.
(8) There are also instances of metaphorical usage:
(1) John threw the news at us
(11) Silence killed tr~ convers 1 tion
Here it appears that the thematic restrictions on what can
be an argument have been relaxed. This is the opposite
extreme from idiomatic usage. In an idiom tpe restrictions
on what can fill the art;ument position are narrowed to a
single lexical item. In metaphorical usage, the restrictions
are weakened 90 that anything with the syntactic structure of
an argument can fill the ~o8ition. It 1s an interesting
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line of research to investigate whether the same assymetry
exists for metaphors as for idioms, i.e. that a metaphorical
external argument is possible only when all the internal
arguments are also metaphorical.
(9) The external argument can be reintroduced as an internal
argument, governed by the preposition ~.
(10) It has been suggested that the reason why
(1) John's arrival dead
is interpretable 1s not because of this theory of theta-role
assignment, but merely by analogy with
(ii) John's arriving dead.
If this 1s the case, however, we would predict that
(iii) *Arrival dead
should be equally interpretable, by analogy with
(iv) Arriving deau.
However, (i11) 1s impossible. This is because there is
neither a lexical NP nor a PRO in the (governed) [NP, NPl
position to match up with the "floating" theta-role.
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CHAPTER IV
4.0 We argued in Chapter III that it is a condition on well-formedness
at S-structure that predicat1ve XPs be linked to arguments, the
subjects which they are predicated of. The preferred type of
subject for an XP is an argument which 1s assigned a theta-role by
the head of the XP. In some circumstances, the subject can be a
pleonastic. In section 3.3 we showed that there are general principles
governing the realization of theta-role assignments in the syntax.
These ensure, among other things, that arguments of certain thematic
types are assigned to "external" argument positions, where they auto-
matically become the subjects of the XPs whose heads they are argu.ments
of. The effects of these general principles are encoded in the D-structure
representation.
It may happen that at D-structure, there is no argument for an
NP to be linked to. This occurs when the arguments of a lexical
head do not include one which, according to the general lexical
principles, is assigned to the external argument position, either
because, inherently, the head does not assign such a theta-role, or
because that theta-role was deleted by a lexical rule. The pred1cate-
linking rule is a condition on well-formedness at S-structure, so
although there 1s no problem with an XP having no external argument at
D-structure, this condition must be remedied in the mapping to S-structure
if this latter representation is to be well-formed. In this chapter we
will examine linguistic devices that ensure that p~ed1cative XPs do
have subjects which they can be linked to at S-structure. The two
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basic methods which we will examine are the move-a( rule, and the
use of pleonastics.
4.1.1 Move-~1s a generalized movement rule, permitting the movement
of constituents of various kinds, and constrained by general conditions
on movement. These constraints are of several types; they include
for example, the subjacency condition and other locality conditions
indicating "how far" a constituent may be moved. and also bind1n.(
conditions which detail from a different point of view, the possible
relations betlteen a moved element and the "trace" it leaves behind.
Different types of constituents may be moved by the rule. In
wh-movement a question-word which 1s understood thematically as an
argument of a head. 1s realized in S-atructure at the beginning of
1the sentence, generated under the COMP node,
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(1) a.
b.
[He saw woolS
[[who]COHP [did he see t]S]g
while a trace indicates the "original" location of the wh-word,
that is, it indicates configurationally the relation between the
wh-word and its head. Another movement rule is QR, the rule which
assigns scope to quantifiers and which is part of the algorithm
mapping from S-structure to LF. It 1s suggested (May 1977,1982,
Higginbotham, 1983b) that this rule of QR 1s another instantiation
of the move-~ rule, and that the algorithm mapping between S-structure
and LF is (in this respect) a variation of the rule mapping from
D-structure to S-structure.
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The form of move-o( which we are interested j,n is the move-NP
rule though as we shall see, (4.4.2) move-argument is a more correct
term to use since S' arguments as well as NPs are subject to it.
Various aspects of this rule have been discussed in the literature
(esp. Chomsky 19&1, 1982) and principles governing the possibilities
of instantiating the rule have been set out. For example, the rule
move-NP is subject to the Empty Category Principle (ECP) which says
that the trace left by an instance of mov~P must be properly
governed. The trace of move-NP 1s considered an anaphor, so the
rule is subject to opacity conditions which set out the possible con-
figurational relations between an anaphor and its antecedent.
The aspect ofmove-NP which we. will be concerned with here, is not the
cond1t1~ns on output, but the domain of application of the rule. We
shall see that applications of move-NP are closely related to the
necessity for satisfying the predicate-linking rule at S-structure; it is used
just in case a D-structure representation has XPs which are neither
arguments, nor predicates of anything.
4.1.2 There are two basic reasons why a non-argument-XP may lack an
external argument at D-structure. In the first place, the head may
simply not take a thematic argument which general lexical principles
assign to the external position. A clear instance of this, as we
mentioned in Chapter III,is the class of unaccusative verbs which
have been analyzed as taking only one thematic argument, reelized in
[NF, VP] position at D-structure. (The most extreme case of heads
with no external arguments is the set of heads which take no arguments
at all, for example weather verbs: rain and snow.) The second reason
for a head having no external argument at D-structure is that a lexical
rule deleted the external argument from the set assigned by the head.
This is exemplified by cases of passive, where a lexical rule adds
passive morphology and removes the external argument from the inventory
of arguments. In Chapter III (41) we gave an example of the effects
of Passivization on the lexical entry for eat.
What unaccusatives and passives have in common is that at
D-structure the maximal projection of the lexical head has no subject.
Examples of such representations are given in (2):
(2) a. John arrived.
b. [arrived John]vp
c. The cake was eaten.
d. [was eaten the cake]vp
Because both arrive and was eaten take only D-structure objects so there
is no external argument, and (2b) anri (2d) contrast sharply with the
unergat1ve and active cases in (3):
(3) a. John ran.
b. [ [Johnl NP [ran lvp] s •
c. John ate the cake.
d. [[John] [ate the cake]vp1S •
'I
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Here there is no difference between the D- and S-structure representations
in the relevant respects.
It is in these instances that the rule of move-NP applies,
moving the [NF, VP] to [NP, 5] position so that the head will have
an external argument at S-structure to be predicated of. As the (a)
and (e) examples of (2) show, after movement the predicate-
linking rule can be satisfied and the S-structures are perfectly
well-formed. We have evidence that movement must take place between
D-structure and S-structure in these cases. This evidence comes from
the possibility of using resultative predicates with both unaccusatives
and passives. As we showed in 2.4, resultative predicates may be
predicated only of patient arguments of verbs of a specific semantic
group (those describing a change of state of the object). Resultative
predicates are selected by these verbs and are syntactic sisters of
the head of the XP. They appear in configurations like (4):
(4) S
~NP VP
IJohn V NP AP
I I Ipainted the house red
Because they are part of the VP, and because the relation between a
predicate and its subject is one of mutual c-comman4, these resultatives
can be predicated only of NPs which are also syntactic sisters of the
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VO. Yet we find resultative predicates with both unaccusative and
passive verbs:
(5) a. The river froze solid.
b. The house was painted red.
At S-structure, where the predicate-linking rule must be satisfied,
the predicates solid and red do not c-command the river and the house
respectively. However, the [NP, 5] in both these examples have been
moved from the [NP, VP] position leaving behind a trace:
(6) a. The river1 [froze c;solidlvp
b. The house1 [was painted t;red]vp
In each case the predicate and the trace of the subject do c-command
each other, and the predications are acceptable (cf. 2.4). ~en
the resultative predicate is predicated of an [NP, 51 subject which is
not coindexed with an [NP, VP] trace, the sentence is not well-formed:
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(7) 2*John ran exhausted (i.e. till he was exhausted)
MDve-NP then operates as a mechanism for ensuring that the predicate-
linking rule be satisfied at S-structure when general lexical principles
do not ensure a theta-marked argument in the [NP, 5] positj.on.
It is important to note that under this analysis the process
passivizat10n is split into two parts, a lexical rule, and an instance
of move-~, wh.ile no lexical rule governs the behavior of unaccu-
sative verbs at all. The lexical rule of passive deletes an argument
and adds morphology. The movement follows automatically from the need
to fulfill the condition on predicate-linking. With unaccusative
verbs no lexical rule is involved. These verbs inherently lack a
thematic external ar~~nt. The movement rule again allows them to
satisfy the requirement that all predicative XPs have a formal subject
at S-structure.
4.2.1 T'here are cases where an application of move- "" will not provide
an extf!rnal argument for a maximal projection and the XP will remain
unlink,ad at S-structure. This is the case with heads which assign
no the'ta-roles at all. Move-NP cannot move an argument of the head
to the external position because the head has no arguments, external
or internal. In English this occurs in the case of the weather verbs,
for eJtample~ and rain. It is clear that no lexical NP can be the
subjeet of these predicates because any lexical NP would have to be
assigned a theta-role, and these heads have no theta-roles co assign.
Sentences like (8) are thus impossible:
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(8) a. *Snow snows.
b. *The clouds rained.
In these instances, where a predicate has to have a subject, but a
non-lexical subject, English allows the insertion of the pleonastic ~'
which has no thematic content, and thus requires no theta-role. The
predicate-linking rule can now be satisfied at S-structure, without
the theta-criterion being violated.
The well-formed S-structure of sentences like (8) is of course
(9):
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(9) It rains.
Sentences like (9) occur in English only when a lexical head takes
no arguments. The problem of what to do with snow can be seen as an
extreme case of unaccusat1v1ty. Unaccusat1ves have no underlying
external argument and so the internal argument is externalized by
move-~. Weather verbs have no underlying external argument either
but neither do they have any internal arguments, so the move-d\ solution
is no help with them. The device of pleonastics 1s then used. In
some languages -- notably German and Dutch--an analogous problem arises
with the output of lexical rules. In English, the passive rule only
applies to verbs with external arguments and internal arguments, i.e.
to what are called transitive verbs. Passive morphology and the
concomitant deletion of the external argument does not occur with
unergatives. The passive rule can apply to hit, and ~at, and etc.,
but not to run or swim. As passive applies only to transitive verbs
,
in English, there 1s always an internal argument to be moved by move-(~
to the external argument position a,'t S-structure. However, in German
and Dutch passive morphology may be added to a single argument verb,
and its single, external argument is deleted. This leaves the verbal
head in a position identical to .~~ with respect to thematic arguments, i.e.
with no arguments to be moved to [NP, 5] position. For example, there
are passive forms of verbs suell as "dance," "work," "ski," and usleep ."
In the active fo~, these are single argument verbs and in the passive form
3they have no arguments. Some examples are given from Dutch:
(10) a. Er wordt hier door de jonge lui vee! gedanst.
nIt is danced here a lot by the young people."
b. Er wordt: in deze kamer vaak geslapen r
lilt 1s often slept 1n this room."
c. Er wordt hier veel geskied.
"It is skied here a lot."
As with the weather verbs in English, there is no thematic argument of
dance, sleep, or ski, for the VP to be predicated of, therefore the
pleonastic!!. is inserte~d as a formal subject.
The analysis of (lOa-c) is complicated by the fact that Dutch,
like Ge~an, is what is called a V2 language, i.e., a verbal element
must be the second constituent in a sentel:ce. These languages have
been analyzed (d~n Besten (1978), Thiersch (1983 personal communication»as
,
having the basic sentential structure shown in (11):
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(11) a.
[-INFL] [+INFLl
(mittelfeld)
98
b.
NP (VP)
NP v v
(mittelfeld)
The sentence consists of two constituents (Cit C2) followed by an s.
The S, which is traditionally termed the mittelfeld. consists of a
4VP (whether virtual or actual) and an [NP, 5}, t.he external argument.
The VP consists of a string of nominal arguments, followed by the
~erbal elements, a head which may be followed by modal and auxiliary
nodes. V2' the second constituent 1n the sentence, is filled b~' COMP
in subordinate clauses, and in matrix clauses by a [+INFL] verbal
element moved from S. The V2 + S can thus be considered as forming
an S'. A nominal or other [-INFL] constituent such 8S a locati'/e PP,
is also moved from S to the C1 position. (Note that if tre V2
position is analyzed as COMP so that V2 + S form an S', ,-nen the
predicate-linking rule predicts the necessity for a [-INFL] C1
posJ.tion because the S', like all maximal projections, will have to
be link~d to a formal subject at S-structure. In English, in matrix
sentences, there is no V2 position; a matrix clause is not an S',
but a non-maximal S. It does not, therefore, require linking to a
formal subject.) The S-structure of a simple active sentence like
(12) will be as in (13)
(12) De edelen buigen voor de konlg.
"The nobles bow before the king."
(13)
5
/~
NP/ ~VP
t p~~v
I I
voor de konig t 2
The representation of an impersonal passive like (lDc) will be very
similar:
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(14) (=-lOc)
The verb ski has had passive morphology added, and its agent argument
deleted. It now has no arguments. The [VP, S] bier veel geskeed wordt
has no external argument, thus the pleonastic ~ is inserted as formal
subject. Then the [+INFL] element wardt is moved to the C2 (V2)
position, and the nominal er is moved to the C1 position to become
the formal subject of the S' as well as of the VP. 5 ThUB we can see
that the pleonastic ~ is used here in basically the same way that
it 1s used in English. They are both inserted at S-structure to act
as formal subjects of predicates just in case the head of the predicate
has no thematic argument to be predicated of. The use of pleonastics
is thus a syntactic mechanism to provide a formal subject for predicates
with no thematic subject.
4.2.2 It 1s a universal fact that it is not possible to form passives
,
f-rom unacc·,lsative verbs. In English (1Sb) is an unacceptable attempt
to passivize (15a):
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(15) a. John shaved,
b. *It was shaved (by John).
In English this can be explained by the fact that pass1,ve applies
only to verbs with both an external and internal argument, but this
explanation cannot account for the cross-linguistic eX8D\ples. In
Dutch, Ge~n and Icelandic, ~'hert! impersonal passives flJrmed froD:
single argument verbs are C01DDK.'n, it is the case that thE~re are no
acceptable passives formed from un8ccusatives. The examples in (10),
from Dutch, and in (16) from Icelandic, are all formed from unergative
verbs,
(16) a. ~a. var hleg14
"it was laughed"
b. pa4 var synt
"it was swum"
i.e. single argument verbs which have an external argument at D-structure,
but no internal argument. The (b) examples in (17) and (18) which
are "passivized" unaccusative verbs, are not well-formed:
(17) (Icelandic)
a. Veizlan stoa lengi
"The feast lasted a long time."
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b. *1a4 var leng1 staa14.
"it was long lastecC'
(18) (Dutch)
a. De sneeuw 1s van het dak afgegleden•
.. "The snow sl~.d off the roof."
b. *Er werd door de sneeuw van het dak afgegleden.
"It was by the snow slid off the roof."
Perlmutter (1978) proposes that there is a universal principle,
the one advancement exclusiveness law, which states basically, that
in a given construction, only one internal argument can be moved to
subject position. This accounts for the ungrammaticality of pass1vized
unaccusatives in the following way. Unaccusative verbs have only an
underlying deep object. This is uadvanced" to subject position in
an ordinary active sentence, for example, (15a) , (17a) and (18a).
Pass1vizat1on of these forms leads to the advancement of the dummy
pleonastic to subject position in the (b) examples. In these sentences
there have therefore been two advancements to subject position, and
the sentences are ungrammatical. ~persoDal passives can be formed
only from unergative verbs. Here there is a D-structure subject, and
the advancement of the pleonastic to [NP. S] is· the single advancement
within the sentence, so the construction is well-formed.
Within the framework of the analysis presented here, the
unacceptabilityof (lSb), (l7b) and (lSb) falls out automatically from
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the statement of the passive rule, and no stipulative law, even a
universal one, has to be set out. The passive rule is a lexical
rule, performing operations on lexical forms. It adds passive
morphology, and deletes the argument indicated in the lexicon to
be externalized (optionally adjoining it to the VP, marked with a
preposition). In English it applies only to verbs with an external
argument and an internal "patient" argument, such as give or eat. In
Dutch it applies to any verb with an external argument, for example
zwemmen, "to swim." It 1s thus impossible for the lexical rule of
passivizat10n to apply to unaccusative verbs because they do not
have arguments which are perceived in the lexicon as being external.
They do not, in fact, have external arguments, except, as a result of
move~ , at S-structure. This 1s because the advancement of the
unaccusative verbs single argument to subject position is not a
lexical rule but the result of the application of the structural
rule of move-~ at D-structure.
This is the crucial difference between Perlmutter's analysis and
the one presented here. Perlmutter's framework allows, in principle,
multiple advancements to subject position and therefore requires a
law to rule such advancements out. We have argued that move-o(
applies to a D-structure representation of a sentence S, moving an
argument of the head to [NF, 5] position, so that S satisfies the
predicate-linking rule. Advancement to subject position is always
and only via the application of move-~ in this way, hence it can
I
never occur that there are two advancements to subject position in a
single derivation. Once the rule has applied the first time, the
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S-structure is derived, and the predicate linking rule must be satisfied.
In order for a sentence like (17b) to be derived, the externalization
of the internal argument which resulted in (17a) would have to be
the result of a lexical rule. It is a claim of our analysis that
no such lexical rules exist. A lexical rule may delete an argument
marked in the lexicon as externalized, but it may not externalize an
internal argument, for that is the function of the syntactic rule
of move-~. It 1s therefore an empirical prediction of this analysis
that there will be no need to promote internal arguments to subject
position by lexical rules.
4.3'.1 We have so far discussed the fact that when an XP does not
inherently have an external argument, assigned to that position by
general lexical principles, then an internal argument is moved by
move-c(, whenever possible, to the external position to be the formal
subject of the predicate. (Note that only NPs seem to be moved by
this rule: PP arguments remain internal. PPs, like all XPs, require
formal subjects, and moving a PP to [NP, 5] position would result in
a sentence that was not well-formed, for in that position there is no
argument for the PP to be a predicate of.) In English, and other
Germanic languages where the mapping from D- to S-structure fails to
provide a formal subject for an XP, a dummy pleonastic is inserted
at S-structure. Pleonastics are thus used only as a "last resort"
when no thematic argument is available to be the formal subject.
In the Romance lallguages, in particular, the so-called "pro-drop"
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languages such as Italian and Spanish, use of pleonastics is much
more wide,sp:cead. The vocabulary 01: these languages includes the
null plet)nastic pro whi,ch can be inserted in [NP, 5] position as a
formal subject in a wide variety of circumstances. The sets of circum-
stances which interest us here are two; firstly the lexical subject
can be moved to the right and adjoined to the VP and the pleonastic
pro can be inserted 1n its place and co-indexed (cosuperscripted)
with it:
(19) a. [Giovanni [scrive una lettera]vp]S
b. [proi [[Scrive una 1ettera]vp GiOVanni i ]vp]5
(nonmax) (max)
"Giovanni writes a letter.1I
Both (19a) and (19b) are equally acceptable as the Italian equivalent
of the English sentence. The pro acts as the formal subject of the
VP t and the NP Giovanni, because it is cosuperscripted with, the
[NP, 51, can be interpreted ·'by the semantic component as the
notional subject. In the second case, the pleonastic pro can be
inserted. just in case move-~ would have had to apply to provide
a formal subject for the VP. This occurs, as in the Germanic languages,
where the verbal head is a passive, or an unaccusative, e.g. (20):
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(20) a.
b.
[Halti student11 [furono arrescati tl]vp]S
i i[pro [furono arrestati molt! student! }vp1s
''Many students were arrested."
(21) a. [Molti studenti1 [arrivano t1l vp ] S
b. [proi [arrivano molti studentii]vp]s
"Many students arrived .. "
Again, the pro acts as the :ormal 9ubject, and is c08uperscripted
with the internal NP which would have been mov£e, had move- 0(
applied. It is clear that in these cases the cosuperscripted lexical
NP is underlyingly the [NP, VP], whereas in (19) this 1s not the case,
because of the possibilities of ne-clitization. Ne-cliticizat!on
is possible only when the NP replaced by the clitic is an [NP, VP]
at D-structure.
(22) a. Molt1 student! arrivano.
Arrivano molt! student!.
Ne arrivano molt!.
''Many of them arrived."
b. Molt! student! furono arrestati.
Furono arrestati molt! student!.
Ne furono arrestati molt!.
"Many of them were arrested."
c. MOlt! student! telefonano.
I£elefonano molt! student!.
*Ne telefonano molti.
lOt
Ne-cliticization is possible with an unaccusative verb, and with
a passive construction, but not with an unergative verb like
telephone in (22c), even 1£ the lexical [NP, S] has been adjoined
to the VP and cosuperscripted with a pro-subject. (It is important
to note that the indices assigned by cosuperscripting are not the
same as those assigned by colndexing under the binding theory. The
binding theory is concerned with properties of coreference, whereas
what is at stake here 1s the satisfaction of the predicate-linking
rule, and the proper assignment of case to all NPs, as we will dis~uss
below. Any analysis which collapses these two processes into a single
schema for assigning indices must also take into account the different
roles of each.)
The possibility of inserting a pleonastic and cosuperscripting it
with a post-verbal NP 1s available in Italian and Spanish but not
in English (except in the lexically restricted 1.nstances of there-
insertion). Chomsky (1981) argues that this is due to the fact that
English and Italian differ at a single (relevant) parameter. whether
AGR (the nominal "agreement" element of inflection) 1s adjoined to
the V-node in the syntactic component or the phonological component.
An S-stnlccure schema for a sentence is
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(23) NP INFL (AGR) VP
but phonologically AGR is always realized morphologically as affixed
,
to the verb. Chomsky proposes that in Italian and other pro-drop
languages, the affix-hopping rule which adjoins AGR to the verb
applies optionally in the syntax, whereas in English, it must apply
only post-syntactically. The parameter is stated as in (24):
(24) R (the ~le of affix-hopping) may apply in the syntax.
The effects of (24) are two-fold. AGR 1s a governing element, so
that when it applies in the syntax, the output is as in (25), and
the [NP, S] position 1s ungoverned:
(25) [NP [V + AGR NPl
This means that a pleonastic pro, which requires to be ungoverned
at S-structure, can be inserted in the [NP, 5] position. In languages
such as English and French, where R does not apply in the syntax,
[NP. S] is governed by AGR at S-structure, and a pro pleonastic
cannot be inserted. The second consequence of (24) is that when AGR
is adjoined to V in the syntax, the post-verbal NP is governed by
AGR and may be assigned nominative case. The system of cosuperscripting
ensures that the right NP gets nominative case. AGR is cosuperscripted
with the [NP t S] (i.e. pro) before movement, and the pro is cosuper-
scripted with a post-verbal NP. Only if all three indices agree can
case be assigned t~ the post-verbal NP. Sentences like (19) will
have an S-structure representation a8 in (26):
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(26) i 1 1[pro [[[Scrive + AGR J una lettera]vp Giovanni]vp J]S
max
Here pro is cosuperscripted with AGR and with Giovanni, and this NP
is assigned case under government by AGR. (Note that, as we argued
in 2.4, the maximal projection of the V is defined relative to a
particular S. The maximal projection of V in (26) is the full VP
scrive una lettera Giovanni, while if Giovanni had remained in [NP, S]
position the maximal VP would have been simply scrive una lettera).
If, in (26), the relevant index had been assigned to una lettera and
no~ to Giovanni, then the sentence would not be well-formed. The
NP una lettera would be assigned both nominative and objective case,
and Giovanni would be assigned no case at all. Thus because of the
choice which these pro-drop languages make at parameter (24), they
have another option for satisfying the predicate-linking rule.
4.3.2 The question which obviously arises next is whether there is
a connection between the use of pleonastics in English-type languages
and in Italian-type languages. In fact, it seems that there is a
connection, and that a single rule interacting with parameter (24)
will account for the distribution of pleonast1cs in both language-typese
As we showed for Italian, the pleonastic subject is cosuperscripted
both with the nominative-assigning AGR, and the nominative-marked NP.
The S-structure representation is as in (27a) before AGR is moved"
and as in (27b) afterwards:
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(27) a.
b.
i 1Ipleonastic AGR [V
i i[pleonastic [V + AGR
6There is a general rule which cosuperscripts [NP, 5] and AGR
and also a pleonastic and NP, at the stage at which ~ is inserted.
We will assume that the same rule of cosuperscripting applies in English.
Suppose that we have a D-structure representation of The cake was
~t~ to which move-~ does not apply. The S-structure representation
will then look like (28):
(28) [ AGR [was eaten the cake]vpJ
(28) dces not satisfy the predicate-linking rule, and at S-structure
it is too late for move-o( to apply so the only option is to insert
a pleonastic it. In order that nominative case is assigned, AGR and
it
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(29) i iAGR [was eaten the cake ]vp]s
are cosuperscripted. (We can assume that this cosuperscripting is
part of the nominative case-assignment mechanism.) The insertion of
a pleonastic is accompanied by an automatic co-superscripting with
a post-verbal NP. The outcome of this is indicated in (29). However,
because affix-hopping (R) does not happen in the syntax, case-assignment
in English must precede move-AGR. As case is assigned only under
government, AGR cannot assign case to the NP the cake, despite.the
matching cosupercriptions. This accounts for the impossibility of
sentences like (29) in English.
I The prediction that is made by this analysis 1s the following:
p1eonastics can be inserted in English only in case they are not
cosuperscripted with an NP which requires case. As a pleonastfc must
be cosuperscr1pted with an argument if there 1s one, they can occur
where there 1s no post-verbal argument, as occurs with lexical heads
like snow. They can also occur when the post-verbal arguement does
not require case, for example,when this argument is an Sl. In (30)
(30) a. That John is tired is certain.
b. It is certain that John is tired.
c. John is certain to be tired.
the adjective certain takes a single internal argument, the S' so
that the D-structure representation of (30) is (31):
(31) [ is certain [ that John is tired]]vp
In (31) the VP has no subject t and (30) shows the three possible
ways of providing a formal subject at S-structure. In (308) the
whole argument has been moved to the subject position and the VP
is linked to it. In (30e) S' deletion has taken place and. the [NP, 5]
of the embedded clause has been moved to act as formal subject for
7the whole VP. But in (30b) , a pleonastic has been inserted and
cosuperscripted with the internal S', and the predicate-linking rule
I
8is satisfied in exactly the same way as in (26).
III
Note, however, that the following sentence is not acceptable:
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(32) i 1It was given to Mary,
where it is pleonastic, and is coindexed with the goal argument,
a PP, even though~ is not dependent on AGR for cas~. The
pleonastic cannot be colndexed with a PP, but only with an NP, or
with an S', as the examples in (30) show. It seems that the
cosupercripted argument must be one which potentially could have
been moved by move-~ to the [NP, S] position, resulting in a well-
fo~ed representation. As a rule PPs cannot be moved to this
position because they have to be linked to subjects and thus cannot
be subjects of predicates themselves. An area for further investi-
8at~oD is whether languages wh~ch freely allow locative PPs in
[NP, 5] pOSition also allow pleonastics to be co-superscripted with
1nternal locative PP arguments.
As it stands, this analysis does not account for there-insertion
in English, O~ the pa~t1cula~s of !l-inseTtion in F~ench. There
behaves differently from it. It is lexically governed, appearing
only with verbs of certain types. It must be cosuperscripted with
an indefinite NP which is assigned case, and the matrix verb must
agree in number with the cosuperscripted NP, as in (33)
(33) There! were three men! !n the 8a~den.
II has similar properties to there; it is also lexically go,rerned and
is coindexed with a case-marked indefinite NP, but the matrix verb
in French is always 3.p.s. as is normally the case with verbs with
pleonastic subjects.
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(34) 1 1I1 est arrive 3 garcons.
There arrived 3 boys.
Essentially, there and 11 have the same function as it and pro; they
are forma!,non-thematic subjects inserted at S-structure, and
cosuperscripted with the argument to be interpreted as the notional
subject. The differences between these pleonastics and pro and !!
are due to other factors. Safir (1982) suggests that there, unlike
it, is able to form a "chain" with the NP that it: is cosuperscripted
with, and thus to transfer nominative case to that NP without its
being governed by AGR. It appears that it is a particular property
of these items that they can enter into such constructions.
4.4.1 We have discl1ssed the rule of move-NP «or move-argument) as
the examples in (30) show) as a mechanism for ensuring that the
predicate-linking rule is satisfied at S-structure. As we saw in
4.3, if move-~ does not apply then it is in some circumstances
possible to "save" the structure by inserting a pleonastic and
cosuperscripting it with an argument of the head. Exactly where
,
this is possible depends largely on whether (24) holds true 1n the
language.
This characterization of movement, and its role in passive and
unaccusative constructions differs from other analyses of these
constructions within the government-binding framework. These have
given characterizations of the movement rule in terms of principles
of case-assignment and theta-theory, and in particular have relied
heavily on "Burzio's generalization" (Burzio 1981). I shall argue
here that Burzio's generalization, stated in its present form, does
not hold; and that even 1£ it 1s modified so that it 1s empirically
correct, it 1s relevant to a discussion of movement of arguments only
in some languages. A characterization of move-~w1th respect to
constructions like passive and unaccusative, has to be st~ted in
terms such as those set out in 4.1-4.3, if it 1s to have wide
cross-linguistic relevance.
Burzio makes the observation that verbs that assign accusative
case (we will call this property "A") also assign a theta-r"le to
a D-structure external argument (i.e., have the property "Tn), and
conversely. Within Burzio's framework, the property T holds of a
verb 1£ it assigns a theta-role to subject position. In the context
of this discussion the two definitions of liT" are interchangeable.
The following biconditional expresses the generalization:
(35) - T ~-~ - A.
(35) may be broken into two conditionals (36a-b), which rule out
structures (37a-b) respectively.
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(36) a. - A --~ - T
b. - T --~ - A
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(37) a. * [V [NP
Ee-rOl~
b. *
[ -e-roi~
1
-+9-rOle J
-Ace case
--
[V [NP ]]vp
[
+9-rOle l
+Acc cas~
(36a) states that whenever a verb does not assign accusative case
it will not take a D-structure external object. This is a generali-
zation about -A verbs, which is derivable from the theta criterion
and the case filter (38)
(38)
*
NP
!+lex1cai]
L-case J
If a verb 1s -A, but has an internal argument, then that argument
must still receive case, otherwise it violates (38). There 1s no
way for it to be case-marked, other than with nominative case, 80
it must be moved to [NP, 5] position where it can be so case-marked.
This 1s the position to which the external theta-role 1s assigned.
and unless the verb Is -T, movement to this position will violate
,
the theta-cri~~r1on. If the verb 1s +T, then the [NP, S] position
should have been filled at D-structure, and clause (1) of the theta-
criterion prevents more than one argument filling a single theta-
position. (If the [NP J S] position was not filled -- i. e. J 1,f
there was a degenerate D-structure, movement to [NF, 5] will still
be prohibite~ for the theta-marked [NF, VP] would then receive a
second theta-role, also ruled out by the theta-criterion.) (36a) must
therefore be a property of those verbs whose internal arguments are
subject to move-~, such as passives and unaccusatives. (36b) says
that whenever a verb assigns no external argument, it also does not
have the property of assigning accusative case. This 1s logically
equivalent to A -~ T, which says that every accusative-assigning
verb will also assign a theta~role to its subject position. Stnlctures
like (37b) are ruled out by this, because 1£ the accusative-marked
[NP, VP] were moved to [NP. 5] it would receive nominative case, and
the structure would be unacceptable because the NP had received
case twice. 9
(35) thus states the properties which verbs must have 1f tIle
movement rule can operate in the grammar. A case-marked NP cannot
be moved to a position where it will receive case again and a theta-
marked NP cannot be moved to a position where it will receive another
theta-role. (35) has thus been identified as a necessary and sufficient
condition on movement (Chomsky (1981) class lectures) and it has been
suggested that the connection between (35) and instances of move-NP
is causal. If it 1s true that (35) is a necessary and sufficient
,
condition for movement then it must be the case that in every instance
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where there is movement from the VP, the head of the V must have
the properties of (35). This is formalized in (39):
(39) MDve-NP occurs in a derivation if and only if
the NP,~ , is in a position to which accusative
case is not assigned and there is an [e1NP to which
a 9-role has not been assigned.
(39) allows for a characterization of passive in terms of case-
assignment. The crucial properties of passive are held to be (1)
that a passive verb does not assign a theta-role to its subject and
(2) that passive morphology "absorbs" accusative case. Movement
in passive 1s then aecounted for by the facts that a passive verb
1s -T and -A and that (39) holds true.
The point I shall make in this section is the following. Even
if (35) and (39) hold true, it Is not clear that the best characteri-
zat10n of constructions like passive is in terms of case-assignment
and theta-role assignment. It 1s logically possible that a charac-
terization be given in terms of some other property Po I suggest
that there is such a property, which is the condition that the
predicate-linking rule be satisfied.
There 1s empirical evidence in support of this thesis. Firstly, there
are instances, where (35) does not hold true. Magnus (1983)
discusses examples of this from Norwegian. I shall present counter
examples, specifically to (36b),from Russian, Icelandic and Basque.
Secondly, if we weaken (35) so as to take account of these examples,
it will still be the case that (39) is not valid -- and that there
Ili
is evidence that move-NP applies to an NP which does receive case
from the verb which governs it. It can, however, be argued that
move-NP applies when and only when the predicate-linking rule must
be satisfied. The absence of a formal subject for a VP at S-structure
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the application of
move-c( to the (NP, VP].
4.4.2 There are instances in both Russian and Icelandic of verbs
which contradict (35) and (39). Pesetsky (1982) presents two
classes of Russian verbs which are -T and +A, violating (36b). The
first examples are verbs describing "natural disasters" which have
a transitive +T, +A form, as in (40), but also an impersonal
-T, +A fo~ as in (41):
(40) Voda zalila ulitsu.
water-NOH flooded-PF the street-ACe
"The water flooded the street".
(41) a. Ulitsu zalilo vodoj .
street-ACe flooded-PN water-INST
"The street was flooded with water."
b. Izbu zaneslo snegom.
hut-ACe cover-PN snow-INST
"The hut was covered with snow."
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These impersonal verbs take no overt NP with nominative case, and
are always third person, neuter, singular in form. They are clearly
-T, and we have evidence that the accusative NP is still the under-
lying D-object assigned case by the verb. These accusative NPs can
appear marked with the genitive of negation. a property of D-objects
alone:
(42) a. Ni odnoj ulitsy ne zal110 vodoj.
not one-GEN street-GEN neg. flood-PN water-INST
"Not one street was flooded with water"
b. Ni odnoj izby ne zaneslo snegom
not one-GEN hut-GEN neg- cover-PN snow-INST
"Not one hut was covered with snow."
The second group of -T, +A verbs includes those expressing physio-
logical states. These take one NP argument, the structural subject
which 1s assigned accusative case, but which can a190 appear marked
with the genitive of negation, indicating its underlying D-object
status
(43) a. Menja mut110.
I-Ace feel sick-PN
"I feel s 1ck~'
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b. Ni odnoj debushki ne mutilo.
Not one-GEN girl-GEN neg. felt sick-PN
"Not one girl felt sick."
In Icelandic (Levin, L. 1981, Andrews, 1982) there are wide-
spread examples of what has been called "quirky" case. Verbs
case-mark their objects with non-accusative case, and these quirky
case-marked NPs then appear as S-structure subjects of unaccusative
and passive verbs. Examples of unaccusative verbs are given in
(44) and of passive in (45) and (46):
(44) a. Mig (A) kelur (ace. subject).
I am getting frost-bitten/am freezing.
b. Mlr (D) likar ~ir b{lar (dative subject).
I like these cars.
Co Verkajanna (G) gaetir ekki (genitive subject).
The pains are not noticeable.
(45) a. Jbn kastadi steinl-DAT.
John threw a stone.
b. Steinl-DAT var kastad.
The stone was thrown.
12C
(46) a.
~Pu beidist min-GEN.
you awaited me ~ .
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~
b. Min-GEN var be4ili #
I was awaited v
In (45) and (46) we have clear examples of a verb specifying
the case it assigns its D-object, and that NP continuing to receive
the specified case from the verb even when it is not in [NP, VP] .
position. These verbs are not +A, in one sense, because it 1s not
accusative case which they assign, but they are -T, +case assigners.
It does not seem plausible to say that movement of an NP in the (b)
examples is in order that they be case-marked, because in the first
place they are assigned case by the verb, and in the second place,
if they moved to [NP, 51 to be assigned case by !NFL, we would
expect them to receive nominative case. The same argument holds in
(44). These verbs are semantically unaccusative and are analyzed
as taking one internal argument. They also show syntactic properties
of unaccusativity in that they are always 3-neuter-9ing~tar in form.
It is presumed that case assigned by INFL will always be nominative, 90
the analysis proposed for (44) is that the S-structure subject is
an internal argument of the verb, case-marked, under government, by
the verb. Unaccusative verbs, like the passive verbs in (45) and (46),
violate (36b) in that they are -T, but do assign case to their direct
objects. They thus also violate (39a) in that we hpve instances of
move-NP where Burzio's generalization does not hold.
It 1s clear that there are many instances of move-NP in Icelandic
where Burzio's generalization does hold, and where patterns of case-
assignment are those familiar from English. Many instances of passive
are like (47):
(47) a. ~ ofurinn-NOM raendi bankann-ACC.
The thief robbed the bank.
b. Bankinn-NOM var raendur.
The bank was robbed.
It is only when the case assigned is "quirky" that the generalization
does not hold. L. Levin (1981) suggests that quirky case is in fact
lexical, and that verbs assigning such case are lexically marked to
do 90. It seems that (35) as a statement about the properties of
verbs holds true, but with respect to structural and not lexical
case. This being so, the connection between (35) and move-NP cannot
be upheld because as we have seen, NPs assigned lexical case are
frequently subject to move-NP, despite the fact that they are case-
marked in their D-object position. All examples of movement, however,
share an tmportant property: they involve movement to subject position
just in case the VP would otherwise lack a subject at S-structure.
Both lexically and structurally case-marked NPs can be moved to [NP~ 51
position in order that the predicate-linking rule be satisfied.
It is consistent with this analysis that NPs ~y be moved as
"far" as the locality conditions allows, and that when this happEns
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lexical case 1s preserved under movement, although structural case
is assigned after movement and reflects S-structure configurational
positions. Case-marking with structural case in (48) is the same
as in the analagous English constructions:
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(48) a. feir /1- ~ad Marfa (N) hafi skrifcrli ritge~ina.te Ja
Marla (ACe) hafa skrifa~ ritger~1na_
~that Mary has written her thesis.""They believe Mary to have written her thesis. "
,
b. Maria (N) er talini hafa 9kr1fa~ ritger~1na.
Mary 1s believed to have written her thesis.
In (49), the case-marking is lexical t and thus reflects D-structure
configurational relations.
(49) a. Verkajanna (GEN) gaeti ekki.
"The pains are not noticeable. "
b. Hann telur verkajanna (GEN) ekka gaeta.
''He believes the pains not to be noticeablell "
c. Verkajanna (GEN) er tali~ekki gaeta.
'-rhe pains are believed not to be noticeable."
4.4.3 It has been suggested that the generalization that all case
is structurally assigned is one that we wish to maintain, along with
Burzio's generalization. If all case is structurally assigned, a
more complex analysis of quirky case-marking must be presented. It
is possible to argue that passive, in Icelandic, as well as in English,
involves case-absorption, and movement to subject in these constnlctions,
as well as in unaccusative verbs is because the [NP, VP] requires case.
The fact that 1f an [NP, S] in a passive sentence is assigned quirky case,
it is always the same case as that assigned to the INP, VP] of
the corresponding active form, is accounted for in terms of theta-
chains. If a verb assigns quirky case it is thought of as requiring
that it governs either an NP assigned that case, or a trace which is
part of a theta-chain headed by an NP assigned that case. Thus in
(45b), repeated here,
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(45) b. Steini-DAT i var kastad t i ·
"The stone was thrown."
the passive form kastad cannot assign dative case to its argument.
However, it does govern a trace which is part of a chain headed by
a dative-marked NP. The passive form var kastad is thus -T,-A
as Burzio's generalization requires.
This analysis seems inferior to the one presented above on grounds
of simplicity. However, in addition, there are other problems which
an account in terms of government and theta-chains'does not deal with.
In the first place, it does not explain how quirky case is assigned
to the [NP, S] in, e.g. (45). If dative case is assigned to the [NP, S]
position then we lose the principle that it 18 nominative caRe which
INFL assigns. A more difficult problem 1s that there are languages
wher~ case is unequivocally lexical. and the alternative analys1s
presented for Icelandic cannot be made to work. Such a language 18
Basque. Basque has traditionally been analyzed as an eruative language
in respect of case-marking. There is an ergative case NORK 8asisned
to the subject of transitive verbs, and an absolutive NOR case assigned
to the object of transitive verbs and the subject of s1ngle argument
verbs. The auxiliary in transitive verbs 1s always UICAN, and it is
marked for person, number and gender of both subject and object. In
other cases the auxiliary 1s lZAN, and this is marked only with a
NOR-marker indicating person. number and gender of its single argument.
B. Levin (1982, 1983) has argued that Basque, while showing ergative
esse-marking. 1s in fact a nominative-accusative 1ansuage. NOR
is the equivalent of nominative case in English, and NORK the equivalent
of accusative case. She argues that case-assignment reflects D-structure
grammatical relations, and that NORK 1s assigned to the subject of
intransitive verbs because this NP is themAtically an internal argument,
and D-object. This 1s clatming that all single argument verbs in
Basque are unaccusative or passive. Levin argues that this claim 1s
justified. Single argument verbs are semantically of the type clsseified
by Perlmutter (1978) as unaccusat1ve. Unergstive verbs, which in English
I
have a single external argument, in Basque take one of two forms.
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They may be expressed by a V-NP pair, where the V 1s always the
transitive verb esin "to make" and the NP may vary. Thus the unerga-
tive verb "to laugh" is barre egin, "laugh make", "to wOTk." 1s lan egin,
"work make", "to build" (8 house) 1s ext'!. eg1n ''houRe make" and 80 on.
The second option. which occurs with intransitive forma of transitive
verbs like~, 1s to maintain an object NOR marker on the verb,
while deleting the object. Thus
(SO) a. Janek aasarra jaten dUe
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John-NOH apple-NOR eat
"John ate the apple."
b. Janek jaten dUe
3s-NOR-UKAN-Js-NORK
John-NORK eat 3s-NOR-UKAN-3s-NORK
"John ate."
The claim that Levin makes 1s that case reflects D-structure,
and thus cannot be structural and assigned at S-structure. If case
1s not structural, it must be lexically aS8i8~ted: external arguments
are assigned NORK case 8S well as theta-role&, by their heads, and
internal arguments are similarly assigned NOR case. Thus we have
active-passive pairs like (51), where the internal argument has been
(51) a. Gizonak extea eg1ten dUe
Han-NORK house-NOR make
,
3s-NOR-UKAN~3s-NORK
"The man 1s building the house."
b. Extea egiten da.
House-NOR make 3s-NOR-IZAN
"The house is being built."
assigned NOR case, and maintains it, even when it becomes the external
argument at S-structure. (Note that Basque is a non r·conflguratlonal
language, so that move-NP has to be understood as "assume GF"
(grammatical function) rather than in terms of movement). Given this
analysis of passive. it 1s clear that move-NP cannot be explained in
Basque in terms of Burzlo's generalization. The D-object in (Sib)
becomes the subject. not because it requires case, but because the
VP requires a subject at S-structure.
One might try to argue that in Basque case-assignment Is not
lexical but structural. NOR 1s then assigned to the [NP. VP] under
government by the verb, and to the [NP, 5] by the auxiliary IZAN.
while NORK is assigned to [NP, 51 by the auxiliary UlCAN. The problems
with this are twofold. In the first place, the generalization that
case reflects D-structure grammatical relations is completely unex-
plained and becomes accidental. The second problem is not conceptual
but empirical. Case assignment cannot be structu~al because it takes
10place within infinitivals, where there is no auxiliary to assign it.
Infinitival clauses in Basque are always nominalized. The only way
of saying "I want John to leave" is "1 want John's leaving." Arguments
of infinitival heads assign NOR and NORK case in the same way that
inflected verbal heads do~ The single argument of an unaccusst!ve
is assigned NOR case:
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(52) Jon joatea ana da.
John-NOR go-NOMIN good 38 NORK-IZAN
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"The goiug of John 1s good."
• "For John to go is good."
When the infinitival takes two arguments, NOR and NORK csse is
assigned again within the nominalized clause where there is no INFL
node to assign case.
(53) Mikelek 8ginkaria 1rakurtrea nahi dut.
Mike-NORK newspaper-NOR read-NOMIN-NOR want 3s-NOR-UKAN-NORK 1s.
"I want Mike's reading the newspaper."
• "1 want Mike to read the newspaper."
Here the infinitival assigns NORK case to Mike and NOR case to news-
paper, and the whole clause 1s nominalized and receives NOR case from
want. The matrix Aux reflects that want'takes two arguments, a first
person singular subject, marked NORK, and the nominalized want clause
marked NOR.
Seeing that we are forced to say that in Basque case assignmen't
is lexical, and that languages must thus allow the possibility of
lexical case, it seems justifiable to assume the simplest analysis of
Icelandic and to say that while assignment of nominative and accusative
case 18 structural, quirky case 1s in fact lexical. This means that
,
we can maintain Burzlo's generalization with respect to structural
case. However, there are sufficient examples of NP-movement where
the NP already has lexical case that we cannot explain movement 8S
a mechanism to avoid violating the case filter. The analysis of
move-NP as a mechanism to avoid violating the predicate-linking rule
accounts for NP movement whether csse-assignment is lexical or
structural.
4.5 The analysis of predicate-linkiD8 which we have presented allows
us to explain the second clause of the Extended Projection Principle
(EPP) of Chomsky (1982), and in addition to explain the conceptual
link between its two clauses. The first clause of tile EPP 1s the
Projection Principle, which requires that the th~ta-criterion be
met at every syntactic level. The second clause 1s the requirement
that clauses have subjects. This second clause expresses the principle
defined by the phrase structure rule (54):
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(54) s ---7 NP INn VP
(although (54) also takes into account gerundives, which are not
obviously clausal). It is claimed that most of the information
conveyed by phrase structure rules can be captured by a combination
of X-bar theory, theta-theol~, and principles of osse-assignment
(c£., Stowell 1981), but (54) remains as a stip1Jlation in the grammar.
By including (54) and the Projection Principle tugether as the EPP,
Chomsky makes the point that the two principles are conceptually
quite closely related.
The fact that clauses have subjects is explained simply by the
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predicate-linking rule. According to this rule, all non-argument
maximal projections require syntactic subjects, and the fact that
an inflected VP requires a subject is just a particular instance of
the more general principle. Every csse covered by (54) 1s thus also
covered by the rule of predicate-linking (although the converse is
not true. (54) does not account, e~g., for small clauses). The
difference between (54) and the predicate-linking rule 18 that the
latter dafines "subject" as "subject of a (particular) predicate", and
not, as in (56),a8 the subject of a clause. If "subject" is under-
stood this way, then "clause" or "s" can be defined as a particular
type of subject-predicate relation, and not as a defin18u8 of a recur-
sive ~efinition. The predicate-linking rule is required in any case,
to account for the fact that non-clausal predicates require syntactic
subjects, and by subsuming (54) under this rule we can remove a
stipulation from the grammar.
The second clause of the EPP. in this account, is not that "clauses
must have subjects," but that "predicates must have subjects" -- i.e.,
the ~redicate-11nking rule. In the discussion 1n Chapter II we analyzed
predicates as one-place functions, and the subject of a predicate 8S
the argument which saturates that function. We also pointed out that
lexical heads are a type of lexical function, and that by assigning
theta-roles, they specify what thematic arguments they need in order to be
saturated. Looked at in this light, the connection between the two
,
clauses of the EPP becomes clear. A sentence can be represented in
two different ways, in terms of lexical heads (or lexical functional
and arguments, and in terms of predicates (or syntactic functions) and
subjects. The former 1s represented at LF, and is "checked" by the
theta-criterion. the latter is the S-structure representation. checked
by the predicate-linking rule. The conceptual link between the two
clauses of the EPP 1s just this; both clau8es refer to the 8atu~at1on
of functions. We can reWT1te the EPP as in (55):
(55) Extended Projection Principle:
For a sentence of L to be well-forme~ both syntactic
and lexical functions must be appropriately saturated:
i.e., the Projection Principle and the Predicate-
linking rule must be satisfied.
It is a result of defining subject 8S "subject of a predicate" instead
of "subject of a clause" that clause (or S) becomes a definable
concept, and not a primitive symbol on the left-hand side of a
rewrite rule. In the next chapter we will define S 8S a particular
type of subject-predicate relation which we will term primary predi-
cation, and distinguish between this and secondary predication. A
second result of this definition of subject is that we explain why
NPs do not have subject positions. The determiner position 1n a
nominal may be filled by an NP, which, as we have argued, can never
be properly assigned a theta-role, but this NP 1s never a "subject."
Furthermore, pleonastics may never appear in this position:
(56) a. *[Its belief that S]NP
b. *[Its rain]NP
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According to our definition of subject as "subject of a predicate"
and our definition of predicate as a (non-argument) maximal projection,
there can be no subject within the NP because there 1s no maximal
projection for it to be the subject of. The internal structure of
John's belief that S 18 (57):
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r
belief
NP
~~
HP N
'I
John's s'
I
that S
John's 1s the dete~lner of the HPJ but not the subject of a predicate,
for there is only an N', and not an HP, which it c-commands, and
which c-commands it. Pleonastics would not be expected in this position.
They are inserted by an S-structure rule (subject to conditions stated
in 4.3) just in case the predicate-linking rule would otherwise be
violated. The problem will not affect [NP, NPl positions, because
the predicate-linking rule has no relevance within NPs.
It should be pointed out that tiilliams (1980, 1981) also defines
the notion "subject" relative to a predd-cate. For him, the subject is
the "external argument of a head." Despite the fact that this too
defines subject relative to a predicate and not relative to a clause,
his approach differs fundamentally from ours. For him "subject" is, ,
defined in thematic terms: a particular thematic argument is
distinguished. For us, "subject" 1s defined in syntactic terms at
S-structure. and the formal subject of a predicate can have no thematic
relevance at all, for example, where it 1s a pleonastic. As we
argued in Chapter III, it 18 no accident that the external thematic
argument and the syntactic subject will coincide, but nonetheless,
the two concepts must be kept distinct. There must be a formal
subject even when there 18 DO external thematic argument. In fact,
this 1s exactly the po1nt that the ErP 1s making.
4.6.1 So far we have discussed the move-a( and cosuperacripting
methods chiefly with regard to NP argument. However, as was pointed
out in 4.3, Sl arguments are also subject to the same processes.
The examples cited earlier as (30), and repeated here a8 (58)
(58) a. That John is tired is certain.
b. It is certain that John 1s tired.
c. John 1s certain to be tired.
all have the same D-structure representation (59),
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(59) is certain [that John (" to be[ 1s tired]
with the S' the sole, internal argument of the adjective certain. As
(59) does not satisfy the predicate-linking rule, the structure has
to be modified by one of three available methods. 'In the (a) sentence
the S' has been moved by move-ol-.. to the [NP, 5] position. In ttle (c)
sentence, the S' has been deleted, and the [NP, S] of the lower clause
has been moved to [NP, S] position in the matrix clause. In the (b)
sentence, a pleonastic has been inserted and c08uperscripted with the
SI, an option which 1s available despite the fa~~ that move-AGR does
not take place in the syntax in English, since an S' does not have
to be assigned case. There are 8 series of circumstances in English
which, on the surface, are identical to the example in (S8b). These
include
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(60) a. It 1s believed
b~ It was understood
c. It amazed me
d. It proved our point
e. I t was a problem
that John was tired.
Each of the predicates in (60) takes an internal Sl argument and has
D-structures analogous to (59). In (60), the method of pleonastic
insertion has been used to provide a formal object at S-structure, but
move- C)l could equally well have been used:
(61) a. That John is tired
b.
c.
d.•
e.
11
was believed,
was understood.
amazed me,
proved our po!nt.
was a problem.
i.
In addition, the (a) and (b) examples are S· deletion pre~icates, and
(62)
(62) John was believed to be tired.
John was understood to be tired.
is also acceptaole.
There are, however, sentences similar in structure to (60),
where the alternates in (61) are not available. These are the !!!!-type
constructions:
(63) a. It seems that John 18 tired.
b. John seems to be tired.
c. *That John is tired seems.
(64) a. It appears that J~hn is tirede
b. John appears to be tired.
c. *That John is tired appears.
We can see that!!!! and appear are both 5' deletion verbs, and
that the [NP, 5] of the lower clause can be moved to the matrix subject
position, but the S' itself cannot be moved, as (63c) and (64c) show.
This 1s a problem for our analysis. It is an apparent counter-example
to the claim that the preferable way of satisfying the predicate-
I
linking rule is by externalizing an internal argument, and that
1
when a pleonastic 1s inserted and cosuperscripted with an argument,
this argument is alw'ys one which could have been moved itself to
subject position.
However. I should like to suggest that this is indeed only an
al?pG~ent counter-example. The differences between the .!!!!!-type "raising"
constructions, and those of (58)-(62) 1s the!!!! 1s not a lexical
head and does not take any arguments at all. Rather, it 1s a fo~ of
the copula. and sentences like those in (63) all have to be analyzed
as a type of copula construction. The tmpl1cations of this proposed
analysis are many, and a full discussion 1s beyond the scope of this
dissertation. However. in the rest of this chapter I would like to
outline the proposal 2 little more fully.
4.6.2 The most straightforward instances of copula construction are
those using the simple "be". Examples are given in (65):
(65) a. John is foolish/tired.
b. John 1s a good cook.
c. John is a less famous politician.
d. John is out of his mindlin the garden.
In each of these sentences, the [NP, 5] 1s a theta-marked argument
NP, and the rest of the S is predicated of it. The be which is used
in (65) is to be distinguished from the identifications! or equat1ve
be (or be of identity), which takes two arguments, 'assigning each of
them a theta-role, and identifying them as referring to the same object.
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(66) a. John 1s Mary's husband.
b. The Evening Star 1s the Morning Star.
c. The Dean 1s the Chairman of the Hospital Board.
d. The noisieRt ones are the freshmen.
Halliday (1967) describes several semantic tests for distinguishing
between different forms of be. chief among which 1s the fact that
the equated NPs in (66) can change places without this causing any
differences in meaning (though there may be some change in focus)
(67) 8. Mary's husband 1s John.
b. The Morning Star Is the Evening Star.
e. The Chairman of the Hospital Board is the Dean.
d. The freshmen are the noisiest ones.
The examples in (67) have exactly the aame structural descriptions
as those in (66), whereas if a similar transposition were effected
on (65) the output would be understood as topicalized constructions:
(68) a. Foolish/tired is John.
bv A good cook 1s John.
c. A less famous politician is John.
(It 1s possible to read (e) as identif1cat1onal, but note how much
more forced this reading is than (69):
(69) The less famous politician is John.
Clearly various factors, including that of definiteness are involved
in determining when be 1s interpreted as identificational and when
as a copula.)
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The function of the copula be is very different. Itself, it
assigns no theta-roles at all. In (65a) foolish, which is predicated
of John, assigns the NP its theta-role. The copula does not designate
arguments; the predicat1ve adjective, nominal, or prepositional phrase
does that by assigning a theta-role to its subject just 8S a VP does.
The purpose of the copula is precisely and only to turn the predicate
into an inflected predicate, just in case inflection is required by
the syntax, but cannot be affixed onto the head of the XP. For the
most part, !NFL can be affixed onto V. Many verbal heads have a
morphological "slot" for inflection aud these heads can never appear
in uninflected forms. (This has the consequence that, as adjunct
predicates must always be uninflected, the language can never allow
13f
verbal adjuncts. This will be discussed more fully in Chap. V.) Where
INFL cannot be affixed onto the verbal head, for example when the
verb appears in participle form, an auxiliary copula must be used:
(70) a. John and Mary~ swimming.
b. Bill's team has been defeated.
c. Trois pommes ant {te mangees.
The copula in (65) performs the same function. The predicates in
these sentences are all "matrix" predicates and as such must be
inflected. But non-verbal categories N, P, and A, cannot have INFL
affixed, as verbs can, and the copula is required to express or
,
"support" INFL. (An analagous process 1s "do" support. As (71) shows
(71) a. John is tired.
b. John left.
c. You always leave early.
Is John tired?
Did John leave?
Do you always leave early?
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the process of quest1C'R formation involves "subject-auxiliary"
inversion. Where there 1s no copular auxiliary, but an inflected
verb, (as in (b) and (e», the inflected verb is separated into a
form of. do aud "naked inf1nitive".)
The copu1~ then, is analyzed as an inflectional element which
assigns no theta-roles, and takes no arguments. It is introduced
solely t~ provide an inflectional element when the syntax requires
it. It 1s a tense operator, and we may 88sum9 that at LF it 1s
assigned scope, along with all other operators, and moved into COMP.
(This 1s a proposal argued for in Stowell (1982).) The LP represen-
tation of (65a) would be
(72) [ 1s [John tiredlS]S'
where tired is predicated directly of John, and 1s is assigned scope
over the whole S. This implies that the correct way to look at the
predicates in (65) is not as VPs but 8S inflected APs, NPs and PPs
respectively. Note that we can also have inflected Ss, dB 1n (73)
(73) It 1s (it's) that John's tired.
(in answer to, e.g., What's the matter?). Here the S' 1s a predicate
and, as it requires a formal subject. it is linked to the pleonastic
it. The copula is then inserted because INFL is required and the
LF representation of (73) at LF is the simple assertion:
(74) Is [that John is tired].
4.6.3 Seem and other raising verbs are also to be understood 8S
copulas, but with a somewhat different semantic force from the simple
copula be. Many of the syntactic restrictions on be hold for seem
also:
(75) a. John ~ is tired.
seems
b. John ~ is a fool.
seems
c. It fi8 that John is a fool.
seems
d. *That John 1s f 1 f~8 12a 00 •
seems
It is also the case that these copulas are all semantically related,
with some kind of assertive force. The copula be 1s used with a
predicate when that predicate is attributed unqualifiedly of its
subj ect. "John is foolish" involves an unqualified assertion ttlat
foolish can be predicated of John. Seem has some of the same assertive
force, but it is not an unequivocal assertion, but a qualified one.
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"John seems foolish" 1s understood as "foolish can be predicated
of John, uncertainly, not on good evidence." J. Austin discusses
this in Sense and Sensibilia echo IV) 13 and makes the point that this
use of seems when we hav~ "some, but not conclusive evidence carries
with it the fact that 'seems' 1s compatible with 'may be' and 'may
not be'." The other .!!.!.1!-type raising verbs, appear, turn out, look
~ if, all have similar semantic properties, and all share the syntactic
properties described above.
This clearly explains why these lexical items appear to take
no arguments. They are not, in fact, verbs, or any kind of lexical
head which requires,and determines the nature of, specific thematic
arguments. Rather, they are inflectional operators taking sentential
scope.
The syntactic analysis of these copula constructions 1s analagous
to that presented in 4.6.2.
(76) a. [John [seems foo11shl AP ]s
b. [John [seems a fool]NP]S
[[seem [John tired ] :c.
a fool XP S S'
The predicates in (a) and (b) are analyzed as an inflected AP and
an inflected NP respectively. While 1u the LF r~presentation (c)
!!!! has been moved by QR to COMP, and is assigned scope over the S.
In (7 7) the analysis is basically the same:
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(77) a. [it seems [that John is a fo01]5']5
b. [John seems [to be a £001]5]S
The Sl in (77a) 1s an XP which is not an argument of any head. It
therefore requires a formal subject, the pleonastic it. The copula
is inserted because the predicate has to be inflected. In (77b)
because of the S'-delet1on properties of the operator, John can
be moved from the embedded clause to the [NP. 5] position to act as
formal subject for the inflected S'. An interesting prediction made
by analyzing copulas as operators and not 8S l~ical heads is that,
aa there is no verbal fo~ of the copula, there will be no derived
nominals either. We expect that copulas will occur within gerunds:
(78) a. John's seeming tired
b. Mary's turning out a fool
c. B1ll's being out of his mind
upset us
This 1s to be predicted. given e.g. Reuland's 1983 analyst.s of gerunds
as containing [+finite] inflection and AGR. If INFL 1s a requirement
of gerundive nominals, then the adjectival nominal and prepositional
heads in (78) will need an inflection marker in the same way that
they would in a eimple S. However, in non-gerundive nom1nals there
1s no INFL, and if a raising-"verb" is in fact a lexical realization
of INFL we would not expect to find nominala derived from them. This
prediction is borne out -- there are no such nominals. We cannot use
the forms seeming and turning out except in gerunds:
(79) *The seemings
*The turning outs
and appearing can only be used as an antonym of disappear
(80) The constant appearing and disappearing delighted Ariel.
The only possible counter-example 1s appearance, as in John's appearance
(the way he looked) upset us. But this 1s not derived from the copula
either. Derived nominals all have the same argument 9tructure 8S
their corresponding verbal heads -- they are, after all, derived from
the same lexical head. But while we have minimal pairs
(81) a. He gave the book to the children.
b. The gift of the book to the children.
it 1s impossible to use appearance with an adjective
(82) a. John appeared tired.
b. *John's appearance tired.
The only way (82b) can be interpreted as well formed is if 8ipearance
is understood again as the anton~ of disappearance.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) In some languages, e.g. Chinese, there is no wh-movement at
S-structure. However, as Huang (1980) argues, even in these
languages there is wh-movement (and thus explicit scope-
assignment) at LF.
(2) Note that English has a mechanism for allowing resultatives
with intransit1ves. An anaphor is inserted in [NP, VP]
position, and becomes the subject of the resultative.
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(1)
(11)
(i11)
John ran himself exhausted
John laughed himself silly
John ate himself sick
(3) ~personal passives may take prepositional arguments;
in particular an agentive by phrase, 8S (lOa) shows.
However, these cannot be subjects for the VP. PPs like
other maximal projections, have to be predicated of a subject,
and as we argued in Chapter II, a subject cannot itself be
predicated of its own subject. How PPs are linked to subjects
is discussed in Chapter VI.
(4) Virtual categories are discussed in Zub1zaretta and Vergnaud,
(1982).
(5) It is also possible to move hier to the C1 position, so thatan alternate fo~ of (14) 1s----
(1) Bier wordt er veel geskeed
In some dialects of Dutch, (11) is also acceptable
(1i) Bieri wordt t i veel geskeed
where the VP has been linked to the trace of bier. The
analogous constructions in German are also fine--
(iii) Hier i wurde t i den ganzen Abend getanzt.
A possible reason for the difference might be that in dialects
where (11) 1s not acceptabl~VP must be linked to a nominal
element,so ~ must be inserted in [NP, 5] position, while S'
can be linked to any [-INFL] element. In German, and the
dialects of Dutch which accept (11),VP as well as S' can be
linked to hier. This may be another example of locative PPs
behaving as closed arguments, which we noted in Chapter II.
I
(6) Chomsky (1981) suggests that the cosuperscripting of [NP, S]
and [AGR] takes place at D-structure, but there is no necessary
reason why this should be the case. It is more plausible
that it takes place at S-structure, firstly because cosuper-
scripting is to do with structural case-assignment, an
S-structure phenomena, and, second, because there is no
reason why there must be an [NP , S] position at D-structure.
D-structure represents underlying grammatical relations, and
if a verbal head does not 118ve aD-structure subj ect, it is
not clear why the representation must be as in (i)
(1) [[e]NP INn VP]s
It 1s possible that (11) 1s more accurate
(i1) [INFL VP] S •
(7) It is elear there is a semantic difference between (30a-b)
and (JOe). In (a) and (b) the S' is the notional subject,
of which certainty is predicated. In (30e) John is the
notional subject, and what is predicated of this 1s ~
certain to be tired. However, this is a distinction which
is to be made at SR, and which need not concern the syntax.
(8) This predicts wrongly that the following sentences should
be acceptable:
(1) *It was hoped [[PRO to go]
(1i) [[PRO to go] was hoped.
(pointed out to me by J. Higginbotham). This contrasts with
the perfectly acceptable (and expected) (11i)
(11i) It was hoped that I would go.
At the moment I have no explanation for this.
(9) (J6b) and (37b) also predict the non-occurence of structures
like (1)
(1) It hurts him.
(where (1) is interpreted as "he hurst") where hurts is -T,
but +A. Note, however, that (1) is ruled out independently
by the constraints or pleonastic insertion and cosuperscription,
discussed in 4.3. These constraints enforce,s cosuperscripting
between [NP, 5] (the pleonastic), AGR, and [NP VP], and
entail that there be no clash in case-features among the
co-superscripted elements. In (1) AGR and an accusative NP
are cosuperscripted, and thus the sentence would be ruled out.
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(10) I thank Esmerlda Martin-Callijo-Menandise for this data.
(11) It is clear that with some S' deletion verbs these constructions
are dubious:
1. It was thought that S.
11. ?That S was thought.
But (11) 1s not ill-formed -- the contrast between it and
(63c) is apparent. Presumably some semantic considerations
affect the acceptability of (i1).
(12) Be, like seems, also has the property of deleting S' nodes
which it governs. Cf. (Stowell (1978». There are constructions
analogous to (63b), e.g.,
i. John is to be married.
but these have a specialized semantic force.
(13) Sense and Sensibilia, J. L. Austin. ed. G.J. Warnock,
OOP 1962'"
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CHAPTER V .
5.0 Two types of predication relations are subsumed under the predicate-
linking rule. These are the relations of primary and secondary
predication. Primary predicates correspond roughly to what are called,
on an intuitive level, "clausal predicates," while secondary predicates
have been termed "small clauses." (Williams 1976, 1980. 1981, 1982;
Schein 1982, etc.) Although both types are subject to the same syntactic
conditions on well-formednes9, each is characterized by certain parti-
cular syntactic properties. In this chapter, I describe some of these
properties, and on the basis of this description define the ~ot1on8
in (1):
(1) a. X is a primary predicate of Y under conditions Zl •••• Zn
b. X is a secondary predicate of Y under conditions Z'l Z'n
These conditions are all stated on LF. In addition. a further distinc-
tion can be made between the two types, since there are various semantic
conditions on secondary predication which bold at SR. whilst primary
predication is not subject to these.
5.1.1 The class of secondary predicates defines the syntactic class
of adjuncts. Adjunct XPs are never theta-marked and are therefore
never arguments and always require to be predicated of a subject.
Adjuncts can be adjectival, prepositional or nominal, as the examples
in (2) show:
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(2) a. John eats carrots raw.
b. They painted the house red.
c. He sprayed his new car a brilliant shade of green.
d. We elected John president.
e. We found Bill at last in the "library.
f. We eat strawberries with cream and sugar.
(2a) we discussed briefly in Chapter II, terming it a dep1ccive, while
(2b)-(2d) are all instances of resultatives. It appears, however,
that there are no verbal adjuncts.
(3) a. *We like John run.
b. twe found Mary be in the library.
This systematic gap can be explained in the following way. As the
examples in (2) show, adjunct predicates are always uninflected.
Prepositional, adjectival and nominal heads are not morphologically
inflected and therefore there 1s no problem with their being used as
adjuncts. Verbs, unlike these other categories, have a morphological
"slot" for inflection, and require an inflectional affix of some kind
in order to be morphologically well-formed. A verb therefore cannot appear
in adjunct position because in order to be well-formed morphologically
it must be [+INFL], in which case, 8S an inflected predicate, it is
ill-formed as an adjunct. Evidence as to the morphological difference
between verbal and other types of heads, as we discussed in 4.5, comes
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from the fact that when non-verbal heads require to be inflected,
inflection can never be affixed onto the head itself but must be
realized autonomously as the copula be. Thus we have
(4) a. The carrots are raw.
b. John 1s a fool.
c. The best way to eat strawberries 1s with sugar and cream.
Note that the participle forms of the verbs also require a copula:
(5) a. John is sleeping.
b. The water 1s boiling.
We can hypothesize that this is because the -ing suffix here is not
inflectional, but a purely "neutral" or formal suffix, which nonethe-
less completes the head (see Fabb (1982) for a full analysis of these
forms). If this is the case, then we predict that these non-inflected
verbal forms should be able to appear in adjunct position, and this
is 1n fact true:
(6) a. We found John at last, sleeping in the library.
b. She likes to drink tea, boiling hot.l
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5.1.2 ,The characteristic which all these adjunct predicates share
is that they are predicated of an argument which is theta-marked by
another lexical head. In all of the examples in (2), the subject
of the adjunct was the [NP, VP] of the matrix verb; carrots is assigned
a "patient" argument by!!!!.; as well as a theta-role by!.!!.; the house
is the object of painted and subject of (& brilliant shade of) ,red, etc.
In (2) all the subjects of adjuncts were within the VP, and thus
internal arguments of the matrix verb, Qut it is of course possible
to predicate adjuncts of the external argument of the verb:
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(7) John wrecked the car, drunk.
Here, 8S we showed in 2.4, drunk must be an immediate daughter of
the S node, because the subject and predicate must be in the relation
of mutual c-command for the predication to be well-formed.
The well-formed adjunct predicates which satisfy both these
structural and thematic conditions come 1n two varieties: those
which are selected for by the verb, and those which are "free." We
discussed, also in 2.4, the differences between resu1tat1ve and depie-
tive predicates and instances of each of these two varieties. Resulta-
tive predicates were permitted only with verbs which describe a change
of state occurring to the patient argument. The predicate des~ribes
the state which the verb causes, and predicates this of the object.
Here, we can see that it is the verb itself which "allows" or selects
for a predicate of this type. These predicates are not of course
theta-marked, for they are not arguments. They are also not cate-
gorially specified. Usually a resultative is adjectival, but this
need not be the case. There are nominal and prepositional resultat1ve
predicates.
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(8) 2a. We elected John president.
b. He drank himself into a stupor.
c. Be painted the car a brilliant red.
This implies that within the lexicon, selectional demands are for
semantically appropriate predicates. and are stated in category-neutral
terms.
The second group of predicates, the "free" variety, 10 typified
by the depictives. These appear with any kind of matrix predicate,
but there are general semantic restrictions on how the prp~1cate 1s
to be interpreted. As was suggested earlier, a depletive describes
the state of its subject at the time defined by the tense of the main
predicate. Thus in (9):
(9) Bill ate the carrots raw.
raw describes the state of the carrots at the time denoted by the
tense of the verb eat. (9) might be paraphrased roughly as (lOa),
and more precisely as (lOb):
(10) a. Bill ate the carrots when they were raw
b. [3t: t a past time] Bill ate the carrots at t and the
carrots were raw at t.
The formal paraphrase of such predicatea i~ ........ ten more complex,
especially when the main predicate describes a habit or disposition
of its subject rather than a simple event. Thus
(11) Bill eats carrots raw.
cannot be represented 8S simply as (lOb) with reference to a parti-
cular point in time. The representation of (11) will depend on the
tense representation given to the "habitual" present. Formally,
the clauses of (11) are conjoined open sentences, an argument-place
of each being filled by the object carrots, in a manner paraphrasable
by (12):
(l2) Carrots are things x such that Bill eats x when (only
when, provided that) x is raw.
The small-clause construction of (11) is thus seen to be semantically
distinct fram the relative construction of (13):
(13) Bill eats carrots which are raw.
3
since the latter carries no conditional force.
152
Depict1ve predications are d1st1nguiahed by the specific semantic
conditions which hold of subject and predicate. We have to distinguish
between minimal pa1r9 such as
(14) a. John ate the peanuts salted/*salty.
b. John ate the meat raw/burnt/*tasty.
c. I met Mary drunk/in high spir1ts/*tall/*stup1d.
d. We eat carrots raw/*oraoge.
There seem to be two distinct conditions on these predicates. 1be
attribute described by the predicate must be at th~ same time an
intrinsic property of the subject, and a tran3itory one. Thus in
(14a). salted 1s an acceptable predicate of peanuts, because it
describes an intrinsic property of the subject itself, albeit a
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temporary property -- they do not grow salted. SaltL, however,
describes Dot a property of its subject, but rather the relation
between the peanuts and John, (he finds them salty). A similar analysis
accounts for (14b). This emphasis on the intrinsic nature of the
property also accounts for minimal pairs like (15),
(15) a. *We ate th~ meat fragrant.
b. ?We ate the meat fragrant with herbs.
where the extra information in (15b) allows us to understand how
,
fragrance can be an intrinsic property of meat. The examples 1n
(14c) and (14d) indicate that only temporary, intrinsic properties
can be predicated in this w~y. Drunk and sick are both acceptable
by this criterion, while stupid, tall and orange are not. Note that
in the right context, i.e., when they can be interpreted as temporary,
transitory pl'y~ert1es, these are acceptable predicates, 8S (16) shows:
(16) a. The rabbit met Alice tall.
b. We don't eat tomatoes green. but we'll eat them red.
A third semantic constraint is stated in thematic terms: the subject
of a depletive predicate must be an agent or patient, in particular
t NPs marked goal cannot take depietive predicates:
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(17) ( drunk.a. John ~ave Mary the book dunrea •
b. *The nurse gave John the medicine sick.
In (17a) unread 1s predicated of the patient NP the boo~, but drunk
can only be predicated of John. Despite the fact that configurational
restrictions are met, Mary is the goal NP and cannot be subject of
drunk. (17b) 1s anomalous for the same reason; John is the goal NP,
therefore the only available subject is the nurse, and in the context
of thE. Cjentence ~t is possible, but odd, to predicate sick of this
NP. The same thematic restrictions hold within nominals; in (18) it
is impossible to predicate~
(18) John's g1ft of the dog to Mary sick.
of Mary, and its subject must be the dog.
In summary, we have seen that secondary predicates must meet
conditions on well-formedness at each level of the grammar. At
5-structure they are constrained by the predicate-linking rule, at
1F, where theta-relations are represented. they are constrained to
be predicated of arguments theta~rked by another lexical head, and
in addition, at SR they must meet specific semantic conditions.
Before characterizing formally the relation of secondary predication,
we will consider the characteristics of primary predicates.
5.2 Intuitively, primary predicates are "main clausen predicates.
We can define instances of primary predication quite simply by saying
that acceptable instances of predication which do not involve secondary
predicates, do involve primary predicates. However, it is possible
to give a more precise characterization of the properties of primary
predicates. They occur in the following environments:
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(19) 1. matrix sentences: [NP I NFL
11. dominated ~ediately by Sf: [[COMP] [8]]5'
e.g. a.
b.
[That [John is late]SJ S ' is disturbing.
John persuaded htm([0 [PRO to leaveJsJ s '
([that [he should leaveJSJ S'
iii. perception and causative verb complements: [NP V [NP VP]S]S.
e.g. a. I saw [John leave]S'
b. I made [John leave]S.
iv. objects of S· deletion verbs: [V [NP V (INFL) XP)S]vp
e.g. I considered John (to be) a fool.
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v. gerunds:
e.g. We disliked John's leaving.
All these examples of predication share certain features which d1s-
tinguish them from adjunct predicates. The subject (if it 1s not
a pleonastic) 1s, of course, tbeta~rked by the head of the XP
predicated of it, but unlike subjects of adjuncts, this NP can never
be the internal argument of any other lexical head. Williams (1982)
defines the notion "argument complex" 8S lIa head, its arguments and
its arguments' arguments and etc. It and in this language, we can say
that each subject and predicate in (19) fo~ an autonomous argument
--------._--
complex. This. of course ,--d1.s t1.i1gu1-snes--th-em--from---the--secondary--
predicate discussed above, which are constrained to choose 8S subjects,
NPs assigned theta-roles from another source. It 1s clear in (1).
(1i) and (v) that the subject is not the internal argument of another
lexical head. Such theta-roles are assigned under government. In
(i) there 1s nothing which governs the [NP, S]t apart from INFL which
does not assign theta-roles. In (il) and (v) the [NP, S] is dominated
Dot only by S, but by S' and NP respectively, and both these nodes
are absolute barriers to government. The lexical heads persuade and
dislike are "on the other sidell of the barrier, and are therefore not
able to assign a theta-role. However, the S' and ihe NP which each dominate
the [NP. 5] are governed by persuade and dislike, and are assigned a
theta-role by them. With (iii) and (iv) it is less obvious that
subject and predicate form an autonomous unit because the [NP, 5]
is governed and case-marked by the matrix V. Perception verba and
causatives subcategorize for a ''bare S," while .£!lIls1der and believe
type verbs can delete the S' node which they govern leaving only an
S between the matrix verb and the lower [NP, S] and [VP, S]. As S
is not a maximal projection of any category, and thus is not a barrier
to government, the matrix V governs, case-marks and is in a position to
assign a theta-role to the NP adjacent to it. If it did 80, then the
instances of predication in (i11) and (iv) would be interpreted as
adjunct predicates. There is evidence, at all levels of grammar
(S-structure, LF and SR), that this is not the case. The syntactic
evidence comes from the distribution of pleonastics. Adjunct predi-
cates require their subjects to be the'ta-marked by another lexical
head, and therefore they cannot be predicated of pleonast1cs, which
by definition are not theta-marked. Yet the predicates in (111) and
(iv) can all have formal, pleonastic subjects, thus indicating that
they are not adjuncts.
(20) a. John watched it snow for hours.
b. The witch doctor made it rain with magic.
c. We believe it to have rained non-stop for 40 days.
d. We consider it possible that it will snow.
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The second piece of evidence comes from the assignment of theta-roles.
Theta-roles are assigned to arguments, which are closed constituents.
It is this which makes them denotative. In (1i1) and (tv) the matrix
verbs do assign a theta-role to an internal argument, but this argu-
ment 1s the whole S, and not the [HPJ S] itself. We assume that the
whole S is an argument of the verb because of minimal contrasts like
the following:
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(21) a. We consider that
b.
c.
is foolish.
to be foolish.
foolish.
In (21a) it is clear that the S' is a closed, theta-marked argument
of consider, and that John cannot receive a theta~role from anything
other than 1s foolish. In (21b) where S' deletion has taken place,
John functions in certain structural respects as the syntactic argument
of consider, but the s~nt1c interpretation of (2Ib) is the same 8S
that of (21a), and the argument-assigning properties of consider are
held to be the same in both instances. (21c) receives a similar
semantic interpretationi and in all three instances consider is
understood as taking a single, propositional argument. In the case
of (22)
(22) We saw Mary arrive.
there is no semantically equivalent S' complement ("We saw that Mary
arrived" has a very different range of possible interpretations, but
evidence that Mary arrive is a thematic constituent comes from the
close similarity between (22) and (23):
I
I (23) We saw Mary's arrival.
r-----.---...----------.----------.--------.----..-.--.-----.----.----.. ----.-------.----.-.----.--...--.-.--..-----..--------- .---.-- .. ----.-..... -.-.--.-.----- .....-...
Here the theta-marked argument of !!.!. is the NP Mary's arrival,
and, as NP 1s an absolute barrier to government,~ cannot be theta-
marked or case-marked by!!!. The NP object in (23), and the 5
argument in (22) both denote a single item, the event of Mary's
arriving, as Higginbotham (1981) argues. Be further suggests that
at some level of representation, (LF or SR), the S as well as the
NP should be represented aS8 nominal differing only in the fact
that the complement in (23) is definite, whereas in (22) it is
indefinite. A similar analysis of the complement structure of
5
causative verbs 1s proposed.
The third reason to suppose that these predicates are not secon-
dary predicates 1s that the semantic restrictions on adjuncts do
not hold. Compare the examples in (24) with those of (14):
(24) a. I consider John tall/stupid/a genius.
b. We found the meat tasty/salty.
Here the non-temporary properties (24a) and the intrinsic properties
(24b) can equally well be predicated of these subjects. It is true
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that (25) is unacceptable, but Higginbotham (1981) argues that
(25) I saw John foo11sh/a fool.
this is because perception verb complements must denote events,
not states; verbs which do not denote events are not permitted here
either:
(26) *1 saw John own a house/be tall.
When. in context, such complements can be understood as denoting
events, they are acceptable:
(2l} a. I made John tall (by giving h~ a potion).
b. I made John own a house (by leaving him one as a legacy).
Note that see does also take simple NP objects t as in "I saw John."
These NP objects may of course be subjects of secondary predicates
subject to the usual restr1ct1ons~ hence we have the examples in (28):
(28) I saw John *tall/happy.
5.3 Given that the instances of predication in (19) can be shown not
to have the properties of adjuncts it remains to state clearly how
the distinctiori between the two types can be formalized. Adj uDctS.
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we saw, do not form constituents with their subjects, and thus a
secondary predicate and its subject can never be a (theta-marked)
argument. Adjunct predicates are never inflected, and there are
semantic restrictions relating predicate and subject. Non-adjunct
predicates do form constituents with their subjects. these consti-
tuents have a denotative function, and can refer to propositions.
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events, facts and S~ on. There were certain semantic constraints
on these non-adjunct predicates. especially on the perception verb
complements, but these were different from the constraints on dep1c-
tives. The latter restricted the denotation of the XP alone -- it
had to refer to a specific typ3 of property, while the constraints
on (19111) involved the constituent as a whole -- the S had to denote
a semantically appropriate object to the matrix verb, i.e .• an event.
In stating a formal definition of the distinction between primary
and secondary predication we do not want to make refe~ence to these
semantic differences, but rather to draw the distinction at either
S-structure or LF. At S-structure, all predicates are subject to the
same structural conditions, but they do meet different conditions at
LFu We can formalize definitions of both primary and secondary
predication. and state as a general condition on predication relations
at LF that each instance of predication must meet the requirements
of one or the other definitions. The essential property of secondary
predicates is as in (29):
,
(29) X is a secondary predicate of Y if and only if Y is
an NP theta-marked by a lexical head other than x.
It is not possible to define primary predication as merely the
converse of (29), i.e., the subject of a primary predicate is never
an argument of another lexical head,because of examples like (30),
(30) John wrecked the car drunk.
where John 1s the subject of drunk as well as wrecked the car. In
any case, as we have seen, primary and secondary predication are
---------- --~
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essentially different syntactically and semantical-ly-,- -ancf---lt"1s
preferable to define each in te~8 of its properties, rather than
defining one type in this way, and the second type as being "not
the first." We can state the defining propercies of an instance of
primary predication as in (31):
(31) X 1s a primary predicate of Y if and only if X and Y
form a constituent which is eitheT theta-marked or [+INFL]
Despite the fact that primary and secondary predicates are not defined
in terms of the same properties, the relationship between (29) and
(31) can be stated clearly. The predicate-linking rule, a structural
condition, 1s a necessary but not sufficient condition for an
acceptable instance of predication. (32) is not, 1n
(32) *John foolish.
6English, an acceptable predicate. (32) requires INFL to fulfil
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the conditions set out in (31) to make it an acceptable sentence.
Predicates do not require to be inflected in one of two cases.
Firstly, a prerticate and its subject can fo~ a referential consti-
tuent, analagou8 semantically to a matrix 5, which is a theta-marked
argument of another lexical head, and is thus governed by an inflected
7head. An example of this 1s given in (33). where
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(33) s
NP VP
I
We V+INFL ~s7 'NP
believe him I
a fool
the S is an argument of believe. (thus satisfying (31», and so to
speak "shares" 1n its INFL. In the second case. where the predicate
1s an adjunct, it must 'be predicated of an argument of an inflected
predicate, and thus "shares" in INFL in this way. cf. (34);
(34) s
~"I VP'Jo
~ Jaw
VjINFL 7
ate carrots
The general constraint on predication thus seems to be that
any predicate must be dominated by INFL at some level. Instances
of primary pred1cation 9 which fo~ referential constituents, are
either arguments of an inflected head, or are directly inflected
themselves. Instances of secondary predication consist of XPs
predicated of an inflected head. This corresponds with the semantic
distinction; that Sa are simple denotative units, while secondary
predicates are "qualifications" of existing propositions.
The prediction of this analysis is that an S requires to be
inflected only when it 1s not theta~rkedJ and for the most part
this is the case. A matrix S can never be theta-marked, and thus
1s always inflected. The other type of inflected S is one tmmed1ately
dominated by S' as in (3 5) :
(35 ) a. [That [John is late] s] s' is a shame
b. John believed [that [he should go]S]S'
Here it is the 5' which is the theta-marked argument, and the S
itself, not an argument of an inflected head, requires inflection.
We can thus explain the contrast between (36a) and (36b):
_(361_ _ .a!_ _ll~~J~_~l~~y~d [JQ_OO haRPyJ s •
b • We persuaded B11l [[ PRO happy] sJ 5 ' •
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In (36a) the S is directly theta-marked by· believe and thus does not
require an INFL node, whereas in (36b) the S' is assigned a theta-
role, and the S has neither theta-role nor inflection, and is thus
an unacceptable case of predication. The inflected
(37) We persuaded Bill [[PRO to be hapPY]sls'
is perfectly acceptable.
There are apparent contradictions to this generalization though.
In the first case, the complement to S' deletion verbs are inflected
and theta-marked:
(38) We believed [Bill to have gonelS.
Here it is the S' complement that believes assigns a theta-role to,
and the S which is immediately dominated by the S' must be inflected,
in the same way as in (39).
(39) We believed [that [Bill had 6one]S]S'.
A more serious problem for the claim that properties of having an
INFL node and having a theta-role are in complementary distribution
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arises with gerunds and with perception verb ··complements .. «19111) and
I(19v»). Reuland (1983) argues that -lnA is a form of INFL, and the
, 8
fact that raising verbs appear in gerund forms supports this,
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as we discussed in 4.5. The verbal forms in perception verb comple-
ments also appear to be inflected, and this is supported by the fact
that "naked infinitives" cannot be used aa adjuncts. On the other
hand, neither the +1ng affix nor the (apparently zero) infinitival
affix function as full inflectional markers; neither of th~ can be
9
used in a matrix sentence (40)
(40) a. *John leave.
b. *John leaving.
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We suggest that these two affixes are Dot full inflectional
markers and that this is why they appear to form theta-marked and
inflected SSe This correlates with the fact that perception verb
and causative complements and also gerunds are distinguished from other
instances of primary p~ed1cation in semantic terms, and have been
analyzed as denoting events rather than propositions. Furthermore,
they have been described as having essentially nominal properties
(Higginbotham (1981», and this too marks them as different from the
inflected Sa.
A final point to be made is that (29) and (31) alone are not
quite sufficient because they do not together rule out (41):
(41) *John foolish drunk.
,
According to (29) foolish and drunk are both secondary predicates of
John, and thus (41) should be acceptable. It can be ruled out by
restating (29) 8S (42):
(42) X is a secondary predicate of Y if and only if Y is
an argument of another lexical head, and 1s dominated
by s.
5.4 We can use the definition of pr~ry and secondary predication
given above to predict where XPs may occur.
(43) *We eat carrots turnips raw.
is unacceptable because!!! is predicated of turnips. but this NP is not
theta~rked by another lexical head. Turnips raw must thus be an
instance of pr~ry predication and an uninflected S. nowever, if it
1s an uninflected S it must be theta-marked, and &s there is nothing
to 98818n it a theta-role, (43) is ruled out.
Conditions on secondary predication explain why several putative
secondary predications are not well fo~ed. We have already made
reference to these, but will recap briefly. In the first place, a
secondary predicate can never have a pleonastic subject
(44) a. *It rains heavy.
b. *Ic snows freezing,
A!:J~c'?Il~.a1:'}"J?l'ed1catehas to have a subject theta-marked by another
lexical hea~ and pleonastics, which are not theta-marked by anything,
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are not acceptable subjects for them. (44) contTasts with (45):
(45) John arrived freezing.
where John is theta-marked by arrive, and is thus a possible subject
of freezing.
We can also explain the facts about predicates within nominals.
In (45b)
(46) a. *The author of the book unread
b. The delivery of the parcel uDWTapped
the derived nominal assigns a theta-role to its object parcel, which
can therefore be subject of the secondary predicate unwrapped. But
the head of (46&) is a Don-derived nominal which cannot assign a theta-
role to its post nominal NPs. The NP th~ book, 1s therefore not
theta-marked. and cannot be the subject of unread. TIl1s distinction
between derived and non-der1ved nominals with respect to the possi-
bility of assigning theta-roles explains the difference between
(46a) and (46b). Stmilarly, this explains the contrast in (47):
(47) a. *John's letter late
b. ?John's performance drunk
In (47a) letter assigns no theta-role to the [NP, NPl and Jolm cannot
be the subject of late, whereas the derived head performance does have
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a theta-role to assign and John's in (47b) can be interpreted as
the subject of the secondary predicate drunk. As we argued in 3.3,
the marginal status of (47b) 1s due to the fact that the theta-role
cannot be "properly assigned" because there is no predication relation
between the N' and the determiner, and the thematic relation cannot
be syntactically encoded.
5.5 The analysis of secondary predicates which we have been developing
violates the theta-criterion 8S presented in Chomsky (1981, 1982).
The theta-criterion was stated in Chapter III (13), and is repeated
here as (48):
(48) i. Every obligatory theta-role must be assigned to one
and only one argument
1i. Every argument must be assigned one and only theta-role.
(48(1) presents no problems. It says in effect that a lexical head
is a function with n argument places, and each of these places must be
filled by one argument and no more than one argument. The second
clause states that an argument can be assigned no more than O~le theta-
role. Our analysis of secondary predication has made it a condition
on secondary predicates that the subject of such a predicate 1s the
argument of, i.e., is assigned a theta-role by another lexical head~
It is therefore a condition on secondary predication that the theta-
criterion be violated. The analysis of small clau~es in Chomsky (1981)
conforms to the biuniqueness requirement of (48(11». As a result
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(49a) is analyzed as (49b):
(49) a. John left Mary angry,
b. [Joml [left Mary]vp [PRO angry]S]S.
Here the adjunct angry assigns its theta-role to PRO. PRO can then
be controlled by Mary or by John, depending on which interpretation
of (49a) is required. There are several weaknesses in thi~ approach
to small clauses. Firstly, in order for PRO in (49b) to be ungoverned,
the constituent [PRO angry] must be outside the VP. This means that
the ambiguity of (49a) 1s not structurally represented, 8S they are
in the analysis of small clauses presented in this dissertation. A
second problem is semantic. The semantic representation of (49a) where
angry is predicated of~ interprets the sentence as a single complex
predication, with left Mary angry predicated of the subject~. Where
this predication is not dominated by a single VP node, the algorithm
proposed in 3.2 for mapping between LF and sa no longer works. It is
not the case in (49b) that the syntactic predicate directly correlates
with the semantic predicate. Thirdly, we have claimed that every
instance of primary predication 1s a referential constituent which
must be either inflected, or assigned a theta~role. [PRO angry] is
neither of these, and directly contradicts our analysis of the proper-
ties of SSe Furthermore, 1£ we analyze adjuncts as we are forced by
(48(11». then every adjunct can be represented with a PRO subject as a
constituent S in a non-theta-marked position. We are then not able
to predict where such Sa can occur, and cannot rule out (43). We
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lose the syntactic generalization that S constituents are either
theta-marked or inflected, and we lose the semantic generalization
that S 1s a referential constituent denoting an autonomous unit
(usually a proposition, or as with (19(111» and (v) an event).
Schein (1982b) presents an analysis of small clauses in which
he suggests weakening the theta-criterion to (50):
(50) i. Each theta-role is assigned to one and only one argument.
1i. Each argument bears a tbeta-role.
(50) allows the analysis of adjuncts presented here, but is not sufficient
to rule out other, unacceptable violations of the biuniqueness condition,
ruled out by (4 8(11) :
(51) a. The book i gave t i·
b. We thought Johni proud t i
In (51a) the book is the patient argument of gave, which has been moved
to [NP, 5] position, because the sentence was generated without an
external argument. Here it 1s also assigned the agent role. Similarly,
John in (SIb) is both the subject of proud and as the trace indicates,
the internal argument of the AP. It is possible to suggest that
(S1a) is ruled out because the NP 1s assigned nominative case, while
the trace is assigned objective case. However, this does not account
for (Sib) where .e.roud assigns no case at all. ("afll-insertion operates
between an adjective or noun, and an adjacent lexical NP, and presumably
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would not apply in (SIb»). Clearly an addition to (50) is required.
Schein himself suggest the condition is an ear11e~ piece of work
(1982a), and discusses it in footnote 16 to (1982b). He proposes
(52) Any two theta-roles 91 and 92 cannot be assigned to the
same NP 1£ and only if the ~ that selects 9 1 also
selects 92•
10
which has the effect of making (51) unacceptable.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) Note that the so-called "naked" infinitives cannot appear as
adjuncts. They do appear in the complements to perception
verbs and causatives:
(1) We saw John drive away
(i1) We made Mary leave early.
We will show in 5.2 that these complements are clausal, and
thus take inflected predicates. These 1nfinitivals then may
be used where an inflected predicate can appear, but never
where the predicate must be uninflected. We hypothesize
that despite the term sometimes applied they are not "uninflected
infinitives", whatever their precise status may be.
(2) These are to be distinguished from the genuine ditrans1tive
verbs which select, and theta-mark two thematic arguments, e.g.
(i) They called him insulting names.
(11) He envied him his new car.
(3) It has been suggested (Halliday 1961. Sfmpson 1982) that the
predicate'in (11) can be interpreted in one of two ways, either
as a depletive or as a circumstantial or COIld1tional. They
illustrate this with
(i) The books sell cheap
which can be interpreted as the depictive (1i) or the conditional (iii).
(ii)
(iii)
The books sell at a cheap price
The books sell only when they are cheap.
However. there are no syntactic distinctions distinguishing
them in the same way that,dep1ctives and resultatives are
distinguished. The differences between (13a) and (13b) and
between (1i) and (i11) must be the responsibility of the
semantic interpretation.
(4) For a structural analysis of gerunds see, e.g., Chomsky (1979),
Schacter (1976). The exact structure of v i p disputed;
what is clear is that (v) consists of an NP with a VP 1n
place of the N' .
(5) Despite the fact that the complement of make
(i) I made Mary leave.
(i1) He made John build a house.
can be understood as denoting an event, more has to be said
to explain the ungrammatica11ty of
(1) *1 made Mary's arrival.
(6) In some languages, e.g., Hebrew, structures analagou8 to
(32) are acceptable, and are usually analyzed as having a
null copula.
(7) Assuming that affix-hopping in English takes place at PR,
then at S-structure (33) will look like this:
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(1)
v + [] S
so that the 5 1s governed by a to-be-inflected head. If
we assume that INFL 1s in any case moved at LF to COMP, then
the structure of (33) at LF will be
(11) s'
s
/,,,,,NPA
V + [t,] S
and the syntactic representation of AGR will be irrelevant.
The INFL node in (11) will bind the variable [+INFLl slot in
the V. (see Chapter VI).
(8) Fabb (1982) suggest that there is both a verbal and a nominal
+1ng" affix. While the verbal participle is used in gerunds., it
is tne other which occurs in the adjectival small clauses.
e.g., He left the room, shouting.
(9) The naked infinitive is acceptable if INFL is expressed by do e.g.
(1) Did John leave,
whereas it cannot occur with the copula in (i1), implying that
its status 1s different from that of the inflectional cate-
gories.
(ii) *John is leave.
Presumably (iii) is acceptable because the +~ affix here is
(lii) John is leaving
not the verbal affix, and leaving can be interpreted as an AP.
(10) This is basically the same to Williams (1983) version
of the theta-criterion. He states
(1) in an argument complex each phrase is assigned
only one theta-role.
where "argument-complex" 1s
(ii) a verb (or any other predicate) its arguments,
its arguments' arguments, and so forth.
However, he puts this to a different use.
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CHAPTER VI
6.0 In this chapter we will examine the characteristics of those
constituents which can be theta-marked arguments of lexical heads.
The constituents which can behave this way are the maximal projections
NP and S', and, as we saw in the previous chapter, certain Sa. Several
questions immediately arise. As the predicate-linking rule states,
all maximal projections which are not theta-marked have to be predi-
cated of a formal subject at S-structure. This raises the question
of what the connection is between theta-marking (or the lack of it),
and predication, and why it is that S' and NP are the only maximal
projections that can be theta-marked. We must also ask what the
difference is between argument and non-argument NPs and Ss, an~ also
between theta-marked and non-theta-marked SSe
The answers lie in the fact that theta-roles indicate the referential
positions in a sentence. This is not to say that every theta-marked
constituent denotes some real-world object. but rather that any theta-
marked constituent must be structurally a referring expression. The
structural property which makes this possible is that,unlike predicative
XPs, these constituents are not open functions, depending on another
constituent for completion, but are closed autonomous units. They
therefore are not linked by the predicate-linking rule, but are
the constituents to which other predicative XPs may be linked for
closure. Such closed syntactic units appear only as arguments
,
of lexical heads. Lexical heads can be seen as defining relations
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between arguments.l Se~ for example, defines the two-place relation
involving John and~ in
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(1) John saw Mary.
The theta-roles assigned by a head indicate how many arguments are
involved in the relation and what the semantic role of each argument
is. The theta-criterion, by specifying that each argument be assigned
a theta-role, ensures that an argument can appear in a sentence only
if it is involved in such a relation.
Theta-marked constituents are exempt from the predicate-linking
rule because they are not dependent on external arguments for closure.
They are thus also the potential subjects for predicates. This
follows from axiom (13) (cf. Chapter II) which states that 1£ X is
predicated of Y, th~n Y may not be predicated of anything. Y must
therefore be a theta-marked, internally closed constituent.
5' and NP are the only maximal projectionli which can be theta-
2
marked because they are the only XPa which can be closed without
linking to an external argument. Similarly, Sa which can be theta-
marked are closed, as opposed to other open forms of S, which would
be unacceptable in a theta-position. The question we will discuss in
this chapter is what are the structural properties of these· constituents
which makes it possible for them to be internally closed. The answer
seems to lie, as regards to nominals, in the analysis of NPs as
restricted quantifiers. With respect to S' and S, the property
of being open or closed involves factors of tense and inflection. A
full study of either of these areas is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. This chapter should therefore be read as the beginning
of an analysis of the syntactic structure of arguments, and as
making certain suggestions for further research.
6.1.1 NPs can appear either in theta-positions (2a), in which case
they must be closed afguments, or in non-theta-positions l2b), 1n
which case they must be properly linked, according to the predicate-
linking rule.
(2) a. A fool walked into the room.
b. We considered John a fool.
If we are to follow the basic tenets of X-bar theory and assume that
all NPs are XP projections of an N° head, then it will follow that
predicative and argument NPs should have the same internal syntactic
structure. We then have to ask how it is that NPs can sometimes be
closed, and sometimes open.
The structure of NP is as in (3) (following Jackendoff (1977),
Chomsky (1981), and etc.)
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( 3) [Det [N' lJNP
where De~ is a determiner -- either ~, or the, or else a quantifier
like~, every, many, or a full NP which receives possessive case,
e.g. John and the man in John's cat, th~ man's belief that S. It
has been suggested (originally in Reacher (1962), and discussed later
in e.g. Barwise and Cooper (1981», that NPs are really quantifiers,
and that (3) reflects their quantificational structure. Barwise and
Cooper give the following structural analysis:
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Quantifier
Determiner
I
every x:
Set Expression
I
x a man
where the determiner is seen as binding a variable in the N'. Higgin-
botham (1983b) understands the structure of an NP in this way; NPs are
thus to be seen as restricted quantifiers, with the N' analagous to
an open sentence. Comparing the structures in (4) to (5),
(5) a. 5
/\
Jo1 /\
V NP
lo!es Jry
b. [loves Mary (x)]
we can see immediately why VP must always be a predicate, linked to
an external argument, whereas this is not the case with NPs. In
( .5), it is the maximal VP which iDDDediately contains a variable.
As there is nothing to bind the variable within the maximal projection,
the VP must remain open, and can only be closed by linking to an
external argument. In (4), on the other hand, it 1s the N' which
tmmediately dominates the variable. The determiner is thus available
to bind it, and when this is the case, the NP 1s "internally"
closed. Any determiner f and not merely an overt quantifier, can
bind the variable in the N'. However, pleonastics may not appear
in this position, hence (6):
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(6) *1ts rain.
This is predicted by the analysis of pleonastic elements in Chapter IV,
which said that pleonastics are inserted by an S-structure rule, when
a maximal projection with no external thematic arguments requires a
subject to be predicated of. It will never appear uuless a full
predicate is linked to it. Thus it will never be the determiner of
3
an NP because the NP does not properly contain an XP which requires a subject,
but only an N'. Higginbotham (1983b) proposes a different reason for
the non-occurrence of pleonastics in this position. He asserts that
thR ordinary rule for" interpreting the relation between determiner
and N' in NPs like the cat is rule (7):
(7) [the x: cat(x)].
However, when the determiner has lexical content, as is the ca~e in
NPs like John's cat, an additional rule of interpretation is required.
No~ only does the determiner John's bind the variable in the N',
but there is a specific s~ant1c relation between the {NP, NPJ and
the N'. The semantic structure assigned to such NPs is (8):
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(8) [the x: cat (x) and R (John, x)]
Here, the binding properties of the determiner are represented, bue
in addition there is a relation R between John and the variable, to
be int9rpreted contextually. As we discussed in Chapters III and V, the
usual way of assigning a semantic relation between head and argument
1s by interpreting the latter as 3 th~ta-marked argument of the former~
This is not available for [NP, NP] because none of the syntactic
methods of encoding theta-relations can apply here and the theta-role
cannot be properly a8s1gn~d (cf. 3.3). The [NP, NPJ cannot be ass1gneu
case by the head, neither can it bl~ interpreted as the external argumeat
of the head because there is no maximal projection intervening between
them. Thus the need for the contextually interpreted relation.
Higginbotham suggests that this semantic relation between the two
positions Is the reason why pleonsstics cannot fill the [NP, NFl.
A pleonastic is not a simple determiner, so rule (7) is not sufficient.
Yet because it is a purely formal syntactic element. rule (8) cannot
a~~ly either. Pleonast1cs are unable to take part in a semantic
relation like R. They are ignored at the levels of semantic inter-
pretation, so that when R is interpreted it will be passed over, and R will
be analyzed as an incomplete relation, lacking an argument.
In fact these two explanations are complementary. Both the
impossibility of pleonastics in [NP, NPl position, and the necessity
for a contextually interpreted relation between [NP, NPl and N' are
the result of the same syntactic fact -- that there is no predication
relation between determ1ner 3nd N
'
• Pleonast1cs are inserted by a
syntactic rule, only to provide a formal subject tor an unlinked
non-argument XP. In the same syntactic context the general rule
for interpreting the semantic relation between a head and its external
argument applies. The general rule involves interpreting R, the
semantic relation between head and subject,with reference to the
theta-role assigned to the subject by the head. c.f. (9).
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(9) R(NP, x) -~ NP is subject of the maximal projection of x, and
NP is assigned a thematic role by x.
It is only when (9) does not apply that the relation between the NP
and the lexical head must be interpreted contextually. This will
occur in exactly those places where the rule of pleonastic insertion
will not apply either.
6.1.2 Not all NPs act as theta-marked arguments. NPs may appear
as primary predicates:
(10) We considered John a fool.
as predicates selected by lexical heads (nominal or verbal):
(11) a. We painted the house a brilliant shade of reE.
b. The house was painted a brilliant shade of rej.
c. The painting of the house a brilliant red upset us.
and as free adjuncts:
(12) a. John ~eft 9choo~ a good-for-nothing dropout.
b. Mary, a dancer. joined the Royal Ballet.
The underlined NPs in these sentences are clearly not theta-marke~,
arguments. but are predicative XPs linked to a formal subject in the
appropriate syntactic context. It seems that in these cases
the determiner which binds the variable in the Nt does not close
the NP, but leaves it as an open function which can be predicated of
a subject. However, while all the NPs in (10) - (12) are acceptable
as predicates, the examples in (12) are not:
(13) a. *We consider the boys ~everal/many idiots.
b. *The boys, several fool~, failed the exam.
c. *They believed the men a few soldiers.
Whatever factor allows the NPs in (10) - (12) to be predicates does
not permit the same for the underlined NPs in (13).
A possible explanation for these facts is the following. The
determiners in (12) are all quantifiers: several, many, a few. These
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quantifiers bind the variables in the N', and close the NPs of which
they are determiners. Those quantificat10nal NPs (which are subject
at LF to the rule of quantifier-raising) are always closed, and thus
are never predicates. They require no external argument to close
them, and the constructions in (13) are ill-formed because NPs with
the structure of arguments are being used as predicates (and, in
addition, lack theta-roles, thus violating the theta-criterion).
Other determiners have a much weaker quantfficat10nal force, and
although they do bind the N' variable 80 that it 1s not "free in NP",
they do not close the NP. The determiner, ~, of a fool 1n (10),
works in this way. It binds the variable 1n the N' within the
NP, but it does not close the NP. The representation of a fool is
(14) [ ( x) a f 001 ] NP
analagous to the VP representation 1n (5b). However, the determiner
~ may close an NP and allow it to be an argument. We have examples
like (16) as well as (15):
(15) a. We consider him a good doctor.
b. John, a good doctor, came round to help.
(16) a. A good doctor joined the clinic.
b. Finally we found a good docto~.
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It appears that what happens with a is the converse of what happens
in the case of the true quantifiers. In (13) the true quantifiers
p~evented the NPs from being anything other than arguments. In
(15), where there is a formal subject available, and where the NP
is in a non-theta position, the NP 1s interpreted as a predicate.
But where the predicative interpretation 1s not available, ~ can
bind the variable in the N' and the NP can b£ understood as an
argument.
The determiner the also allows its NPs to be predicates or
arguments, but it has a stronger quantificational force than 8.
(Note that it is sometimes assigned scope by the move-quantifier
rule (QR) at 1F, while ~ is never subject to this rule.) It is
therefore much less easily interpretable 1n predicat!ve position
4than a. The possibility of interpreting the x as a predicate depends
in part on contextual features -- including the lexical material
covered by x. Thus in (17)
(17) a. ??We consider John the man.
b. ?Ue consider John the best man.
c. We consider John the best man for the job.
the (a) sentence 1s difficult to interpret. As the N' contains
more and more evaluative material, the easier it is to interpret
the NP as pred1cat1ve. For some reason, an NP 1s easier to interpret
predicatively if it is a comparative or superlative. For example
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(18) a. We consider John ) ?the good doctor
b. the better doctor
c.
" the best doctor
These distinctions between the possibilities of interpreting various
NPs as closed or open show up clearly when the matrix verb 1s
ambiguous. The verb find has two complement structures. Either it
is analogous to consider, and takes an S complement, to which it
assigns the theta-role "proposition." An example of this would be
''We found [the book boring]S", with the AP boring predicated of the
[NP, S] the book. On the other hand, find may assign two theta-roles,
a patient and a benefactive, and it can have an [_NP PP] or an [_NP NPl
complement structure. Examples of this are I~e found the book for
John," and ''We found John the book." In the examples 1n (19) the
underlined NPs force a particular reading of find, by their internal
structure.
(19) a. We found them many good doctors.
b. We found them the good doctors.
c. We found them good doctors.
In (19a) the NP many good doctors cannot be understood as a predicate
because it is closed. It can only be an argument, which means that,
if the sentence is to be well-formed, find must be interpreted as
assigning theta-roles to both them and many good doctors. And indeed,
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(19a) has only the reading "We found many good doctors for them. 1I
The predicative reading ''We found them to be many good doctors" is
unacceptable. In (19b), the has a weaker quantificationsl force than
many and the two readings ''We found the good doctors for them," and
"We found them to be the good doctors" are both available. However,
the first reading, where the good doctors 1s interpreted as an argument,
is still preferred. In (19c), there 1s a null determiner which is
the plural form of a. It is not a quantifier, and closes NPs only
when there is no subject for the NP to be predicated of. Strictly
speaking, the NP IIgood doctors" can be interpreted as a predicate or
an argument, and both readings of (19c) are available. However, the
predicative reading ''We found them to be good doctors" is the most
easily available, which 1s what we would predict.
6.1.3 A problem mentioned briefly in Chapter II involves prenom1nal
APa such as tall in the tall man. It would seem likely that these
adjectives, like other maximal projections, are functions which
require linking, but there is no NP in the correct syntactic position for
them to be linked to. The structure which these phrases are to
be assigned is given in (20):
(20) a. [the[[strange]AP [man of la Mancha]N.lN"lNP
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x a man
b.
x:
AP
strange( x )
N'
~
N PP
~
P NP
of la Mancha
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The determiner in (20) is in a position to bind the variable in
the AP as well as that in the N
'
• TheAP is thus saturated, though
not by the predicate-linking rule. As it is bound within the NP
it is already closed. The pred1cate~link1ng rule is blind to it
because it is part of the NP, and it simply has no empty slot to
fill with an argument. Semantically it is interpreted not as an
autonomous predicate with its own subject, but as part of the complex
"open sentence" x a strange man of 18 Mancha. Note that in English
only prenom1nal NPs can be bound in this way. This may be because
in (20) the AP is not part of the N' but sister to it, and both can
thus be bound by the determiner. In, e.g., the man tall, the struc-
ture would be
(21) NP
~
Det N '
I ~
the x: N AP
x a1man tall (x)
Here the AP is within the N' and cannot be linked either to the
determiner or to any NP within the N,.5 Post-nominal APs are accep-
table only when there is an NP within the N' which the AP can be
predicated of, e.g., the delivery of the parcel unwrapped, where
unwrapped is predicated of the book. Presumably in languages which
allow post-nominal APa to be bound by the determiner, e.g., the
French Ie crayon bleu, a structure like (22) is available:
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(22)
Det
11 x:
H'
J
x un clayon
Ibleu(x)
6.2.0 The second type of XP which can be either an argument or a
predicate 1s the S'. We have examples of S's in both these positions:
(23) a. We told John [that he should leave]S'.
b. We told John [because we wanted him to leave] S' ·
c. We know [who had won the race]S'·
d. We wanted to meet the man [who had won the race]S,e
In (23a) and (23c) the S' is a theta-marked argument of the matrix
verb. In (23b) and (23d) the Sl is not theta-marked, but is linked
by the predicate-linking rule. (In (23b) there is no NP for the S'
to be linked to. In 6.3 I shall suggest that, like certain PPs,
the S' can be linked to INFL.) I shall argue 1n this section that
the paradigms in (23) are explained by the fact that S' has a struc-
ture analogous to that of NPs, with a "determiner" binding a variable.
The IIdetermin~r" position in s' is COMP, but the analysis of s' 1s
complicated by the fact that COMP is "doubly-filled", dominating
a wh-node and an INFL node (cf. J. Levin (1983», and that furthermore
INFL seems to involve both tense, and a nominal element. We will
first look at wh-sentences, and then go on to discuss tense and INFL.
6.2.1 The wh-element in COMP works very similarly to the determiner
in NP. It has some properties of a quantifier -- e.g., it is assigned
scope by QR at LF, and it must bind a variable within the S governed
by COMP. This variable may be either a trace, as in (24i). or a
resumpt1ve pronoun, in (24b) (from Hebrew).
(24) a. The man1[whom [I saw ~SJs'
b. ha-ish1[se-[ra'iti ot~S]S'
The man that saw-I him
"The man whom I saw."
The wh~element shares another property with determiners. When it
binds the variable in S within the S', it may either close the S',
in which case the XP is an argument (23c), or it acts as a "gate",
allowing the S' to be predicated of an NP in the appropriate
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syntactic position «23d), (24». In (25)
(25) I recognized [the man [who1we met tlyesterday]S']NP
the wh-word who binds the trace within the S') but instead of its
closing the S', the whole XP 1s left open and predicated of the NP
the man. The structure of the sentence 1s as in (26):
l~l
(26) s
~
f ~I, ~
recognized NP S'
, ~
the man COMP S
, I
who we saw yesterday
6.2.2 Clearly this is not all which must be said about the structure
of Sa. In the first place there are Sa which are closed which have
no wh-element; for example (2 T) :
(27) a. We persuaded John [(that) he should leave]S'
b. [That he should leave] is obvious.
In the second place there are sentences which are closed as far
as wh-words are concerned, but which are not arguments. These are
the matrix sentences like (2 8):
Not only is (28) not an argument (there is nothing for it to be an
argument of), but it is not possible for clauses which are marked
[+tense] to appear in argument position.
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(29) 6a. *We persuaded John he leaves
b. *He leaves is obvious.
.'
This relates back to the point made in Chapter V that theta-marked
Sa are those S8 which are not inflected. Let us rephrase this
as the claim that Sa which are [+tense] are not theta-marked,
and conversely, clauses which are theta-marked are [-tense].
(We follow Stowell (1982) in analyzing infinitivals like "We believed
John to be a genius" as having "unrealized tense".f Given these
facts about the distribution of S clauses we hypothesize that it
is having the feature [+tense] which makes a clause open, and that
this is why tensed clauses are not permitted to be theta-marked,
i.e., to appear in argument position. We may think of tense as
quantifying over time. The (partial) semantic representation of a
sentence like (30a) is as in (30b):
(30) a. John saw Mary.
b. l3~: t a time] John saw Mary at t and t is PAST.
I
Stowell (1982) suggests that tense is represented at LF in COMP.
In 4.5 we discussed this in reference to the LF representations of
copula sentences. The LF representation of (30) is 11ypothes1zed
to be (31):
(31) [PAST [John saw Mary]]S'
with tense represented as an operator assigned scope.
If 1nflect~d S9 are open sentences, then the relation between
a non-argument S and an argument S' is that 5' 1s a closed S. We
hypothesize that complementizers which are not +wh-, are 1n fact
[+tense] and are capable of binding the tense-operator in S, and
closing the clause. (Thiersch p.e. and den Besten (1978) both argue
that complement1zers and verbs share a +lnflectional element.
Evidence for this 1s that only these two constituents may fill the
V2 place in a sentence, cf. 4.2.). In (32)
(32) We knew that John saw Mary.
the tense-operator in the embedded clause is bound by that, and
the whole clause is closed and can be the thematic argument of knew.
The semantic correlation of this distinction between open 5s and
closed 58 is that while (31) is understood as referring to an event
in "real time", the S' in (32) denotes a propos1tion, and the semantic
paraphrase of (32) is roughly ''We knew the fact that John saw Mary."
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Several facts are explained by this analysis. In the first
place we can explain why 5s which are not tensed do appear in argument
positions. The embedded 5s in (33)
(33) a. We consid~~ [John a £001]5 ·
b. We saw [John stroke the dog]S.
c. [John's stroking the dog]S delighted us.
are all [-tense] slid are therefore closed, and can be theta-marked
arguments of the heads. 8 Given the close relation between COMP and
te~ge, it 1s to be predicted that tense-less Sa are also COMP-less.
The primary function of COHP 1s connected with tense, and COMP can
be considered a projection of tenseo This prediction is borne out
all the Sa in (33) are COMP-Iess and wh-movement within the lower
clau;e 1s impossible.
(34) a. *We consider [what1[John ~S]SI (cf we consider John what?)
b. *We ~aw [what 1[John stroke ~]S]S'
c. *[What 1[John's stroking ~sls' delighted us.
We can also explain a third fact pointed out in Stowell (1982). He
suggests that 1nfinitivals are unrealized with respect to tense in
S' embedded clauses like (35):
(35) We persuaded John [[PRO to gO]S]5'
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However in (36) where the matrix verb deletes S' the tense of the
embedded clause is determined by the matrix verb~ The tense of the
embedded clause 1s future in (35a), and past in (36b):
(36) a. I expect [John to win the race]S .
b. I considered [John to be the smartest]S .
This follows from the fact that in (35) the embedded clause has its
own COMP, by which the tense variable is bound. In (36) there is no
lower COMP, as a result of Sl deletion. and the tense of the embedded
S has to be bound by the tense-operat~r of the higher clause.
6.2.3 We have suggested that Sa like those in (33b) and (33c)
are [-tenge]. However, they still appear to be infl.ected (cf. the
discussion in 5.2). If we separate the notions of tense and inflec-
tion we are left asking what exactly INFL is. One suggestion 19 that
INFL is an argument of a verbal head. Davidson (1966) in the "Logical
Form of Action Sentences" suggeots that in all action sentences
(at least indicative ones) there is a quantification over events.
He argues that in (37) kick
(37) John kicked Bill.
is not a two-place predicate but a three-place relation between John,
,
Bill and an event, and it should have a semantic representation as
in (38):
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(38) [~x: x an event] kicked (John, Bill, x.)
If kick is such a three-place predicate then it is plausible to
think of the event quantifier as residing in the non-tensed INFL.
A full semantic representation of (37) will make explicit quantifi-
cation over time as well as over events: e.g.,
(39) [ilx: x an event] [~t: t a time] kick (John, Bill., x) and
R ( x ,t) and t is past
where R denotes the relation" x took place at tn.
This analysis allows us to explain the occurrence of inflected
non-tensed verbal forms such as the gerund, and the naked infinitive.
These forms allow no quantification over time, but do still maint~ln
quantification over events. This is why the S complements of
(40) a. I saw John leave.
b. I saw John leaving.
are understood as Dominala and not as tensed propositions.
6.3 This analysis of inflection as an argument allows us to solve
an outstanding problem involving these locative, temporal and manner
PPs which require to be linked to formal subjects but which do not
appear to be linked to anything at S-structure. cf the examples in (41):
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(41) a. It snowed for three hours.
b. He screamed in a wild fury.
c. She ate with a fork and knife.
None of the PPs in (41) have any NP to be linked tOe In (41b) and
(41c) there is no [NP VP] to act as subject t and in (41a) where the
PP 1s hung from S, the [NP S] is a pleonastic which is not a possible
subject of a secondary predicate. Yet, as these PPs are not theta-
marked t they must be predicated of something. A solution is suggested
by Davidson's a~alysis of the logical structure of sentences which
are analogous to (41). He proposed (43) as a semantic representation
of (42):
(42) I flew my spaceship to the Evening Star.
(43) 9x: x an event] flew (I, ~y spaceship. x) and
To (the Evening Star, x).
The locative PP in (42) is being predicated of the event, which is
an argument of the head as much as the NPs ! and my spaceship. The
syntactic correlate of (43) is an analysis of the PP, to the Evening.
Star, as a predicate of INFL. It is thus able to meet the require-
menta of the predicate-linking rule.
We may ask why PPs and no other lexical categories can be
I
predicated of INFL. The answer lies in the fact that the
secondary predicates, AP and NP, assign theta-roles to their subjects
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and the NPs they are predicated of have to be lexical and thus
capable of being assigned theta-roles. PP, as we discussed in 3.1,
does not assign a theta-role to its subject but designates its
external argument as a particular argument of the relation denoted
by the head of the PP. Thus in (43), the event is the second argumAnt
in the two-place, locative relation defined by the preposition To.
We predict that other XPs which do not assign theta-roles to
their subjects can also be predicated of INFL. The only XP which
satisfies this criterion is Sl, and the prediction is borne out.
S' can be linked to INFL to satisfy the predicate-linking rule. e.g.
(44) We ran [because we were late]S' •
which has a semantic representation
(45) ~x: x an event] Ran (We, x) and Because (x, 'we were late').
One final point must be made. Davidson discusses only quanti-
fication over events. Yet INFL is present in non-action verbs like
(46) a. John owns a house.
b. John's owning a house delighted his parents.
It also occurs with predicate adjectives and predicate nominals, e.g.
(47) a. John 1s foolish.
b. John is a genius.
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It seems that we must allow INFL to quantify over states as well
as actions, in order to account for the variety of structures
available in natural language.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) Except, of course, for the predicates like snow which have
no notional subject, and presumably constitute degenerate
propositions at SR.
(2) We mentioned briefly in Chapter II that in some languages
(and possibly even English) locative PPs should be analyzed
as arguments, and therefore closed. A PP has the internal
structure of (i)
200
(1) pp
P~NP
The preposition is interpreted as defining a relation
(locative, temporal, etc.) between the NP it governs, and
the NP that the whole PP is linked to. Presumably, in the
restricted cases where a PP is an argument, it has been
reduced to a one~place relation, and is not linked. There
must be strict semantic restrictions on where this reduction
can take place -- indicated by the fact that only locative
PPs seem to undergo this process.
(3) Pleonastics are marginally acceptable to some people in
gerunds (and totally unacceptable to others) e.g.,
Its raining yesterday upset us. A possible explanation
is that a gerund has the structure
where the verbal head has been "de-verbalized" (possibly
by the addition of the +nominal affix -inA). Although the
VP can be predicated of the NP because it is a maximal
projection. the rule of pleonastic insertion sees only
the N' and. blind to the VP it immediately dominates, does
not insert a pleonastic.
(4) Note that in (i)
(1) That is the man
the identificationsl be 1s being used, and path the man
and That are assigned theta-roles.
(5) Note that a structural contraint analogous to the c-command
condition is involved here. C-command defined in terms of
maximal projections clearly is not involved withjn NPs.
However in (20) (and also (23»,where the AP is bound by
the determiner the first branching node dominating the one
also dominates the other. This is not the case in (21).
(6) This is possible only when there is a deleted complement!zer
(1) We persuaded John (that) he leaves at dawn.
(7) Cf. the explanation in G~pter V for the theta-marked
infinitival complements of S' deletion verbs.
(8) Non-inflected SSJl1ke the object of consider in
(1) We consider John a genius J
do not appear in subject position.
(11) *[John a fool] is obvious
(11) is ruled out by the case filter, as there is no way
for John to be assigned case. This predicts that the
following structures should be acceptableJas John can receive
case from consider.
(11i) We consider [[John a foo1]5 drunk]S
(iv) We consider [[John a fool]S obvious]s.
(1ii) is uninterpretable with the S subject (although OK
with a fool the primary predicate,and drunk the secondary
predicate of John This is because drunk does not assign
the theta-role proposition to its subject position, but
requires a [+animate] NP subject. (tv) should be marginally
acceptable in the sense of "we consider that John is a fool
is obvious. 1I It is clearly more acceptable than (iii)
and its marginal status may well be due to processing
difficulties.
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